From 1db4f51e48526639c41e373b4c9a5cff6e196370 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Smith <13200576+smitt14ua@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2026 01:31:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] feat(server): log healthcheck at debug level, add logLevel setting Replace fuego's request logging with an access log middleware that keeps its fields and X-Request-ID but logs the healthcheck polled by Docker at debug level. Add logLevel (OCAP_LOGLEVEL, default info): the slog handler was created without options, so debug records were always dropped. --- README.md | 3 +- cmd/ocap-webserver/main.go | 13 +++- go.mod | 2 +- internal/server/accesslog.go | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ internal/server/accesslog_test.go | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ internal/server/setting.go | 16 +++++ internal/server/setting_test.go | 34 +++++++++ setting.json.example | 1 + 8 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 internal/server/accesslog.go create mode 100644 internal/server/accesslog_test.go diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 0e585ecd7..93b99d84d 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -122,7 +122,8 @@ The configuration file is called `setting.json`. All settings can also be set vi | `listen` | `OCAP_LISTEN` | Server address | `127.0.0.1:5000` | | `prefixURL` | `OCAP_PREFIXURL` | URL prefix for all routes | `""` | | `secret` | `OCAP_SECRET` | Shared secret — authenticates record uploads and signs admin session JWTs | *required* | -| `logger` | `OCAP_LOGGER` | Enable request logging to STDOUT | `false` | +| `logger` | `OCAP_LOGGER` | Also write logs to `ocap.log` (they always go to STDOUT) | `false` | +| `logLevel` | `OCAP_LOGLEVEL` | Minimum log level: `debug`, `info`, `warn`, `error`. Healthcheck requests are logged at `debug` | `info` | ### Paths diff --git a/cmd/ocap-webserver/main.go b/cmd/ocap-webserver/main.go index bf477d478..26f7cf509 100644 --- a/cmd/ocap-webserver/main.go +++ b/cmd/ocap-webserver/main.go @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import ( "log/slog" "os" "os/signal" + "strings" "syscall" "time" @@ -49,9 +50,16 @@ func app() error { } // Set up slog with JSON handler for consistent logging - logHandler := slog.NewJSONHandler(logOutput, nil) + logLevel, err := setting.SlogLevel() + if err != nil { + return err + } + logHandler := slog.NewJSONHandler(logOutput, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: logLevel}) slog.SetDefault(slog.New(logHandler)) + // Docker polls the healthcheck every 30s; keep it out of info-level logs. + healthcheckPath := strings.TrimRight(setting.PrefixURL, "/") + "/api/healthcheck" + operation, err := server.NewRepoOperationWithDataDir(setting.DB, setting.Data) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("operation: %w", err) @@ -70,6 +78,9 @@ func app() error { s := fuego.NewServer( fuego.WithAddr(setting.Listen), fuego.WithLogHandler(logHandler), + // Replaced by server.AccessLogMiddleware. + fuego.WithLoggingMiddleware(fuego.LoggingConfig{DisableRequest: true, DisableResponse: true}), + fuego.WithGlobalMiddlewares(server.AccessLogMiddleware(healthcheckPath)), fuego.WithoutAutoGroupTags(), fuego.WithSecurity(server.OpenAPISecuritySchemes), fuego.WithEngineOptions( diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod index f826c7c0b..42582e061 100644 --- a/go.mod +++ b/go.mod @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ require ( github.com/getkin/kin-openapi v0.153.0 github.com/go-fuego/fuego v0.21.0 github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.1 + github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.5.3 github.com/klauspost/compress v1.20.4 github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3 v1.14.53 @@ -27,7 +28,6 @@ require ( github.com/go-playground/universal-translator v0.18.1 // indirect github.com/go-playground/validator/v10 v10.30.4 // indirect github.com/go-viper/mapstructure/v2 v2.5.0 // indirect - github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 // indirect github.com/gorilla/schema v1.4.1 // indirect github.com/leodido/go-urn v1.5.0 // indirect github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.4.3 // indirect diff --git a/internal/server/accesslog.go b/internal/server/accesslog.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ed12648cc --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/server/accesslog.go @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +package server + +import ( + "bufio" + "log/slog" + "net" + "net/http" + "slices" + "time" + + "github.com/google/uuid" +) + +// accessLogWriter records the response status for the access log. +type accessLogWriter struct { + http.ResponseWriter + status int + hijacked bool +} + +func (w *accessLogWriter) WriteHeader(code int) { + if w.status == 0 { + w.status = code + } + w.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code) +} + +func (w *accessLogWriter) Write(b []byte) (int, error) { + if w.status == 0 { + w.status = http.StatusOK + } + return w.ResponseWriter.Write(b) +} + +func (w *accessLogWriter) Flush() { + if f, ok := w.ResponseWriter.(http.Flusher); ok { + f.Flush() + } +} + +func (w *accessLogWriter) Hijack() (net.Conn, *bufio.ReadWriter, error) { + h, ok := w.ResponseWriter.(http.Hijacker) + if !ok { + return nil, nil, http.ErrNotSupported + } + conn, rw, err := h.Hijack() + if err == nil { + w.hijacked = true + } + return conn, rw, err +} + +// Unwrap lets http.ResponseController reach the underlying writer. +func (w *accessLogWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter { + return w.ResponseWriter +} + +func (w *accessLogWriter) statusCode() int { + switch { + case w.hijacked: + return http.StatusSwitchingProtocols + case w.status == 0: + return http.StatusOK + } + return w.status +} + +// AccessLogMiddleware logs every request: "incoming request" at debug level +// and "outgoing response" at info level, or at debug level for quietPaths +// (such as the healthcheck polled by Docker). It sets X-Request-ID, keeping +// the one the client sent. +func AccessLogMiddleware(quietPaths ...string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler { + return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler { + return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + start := time.Now() + + requestID := r.Header.Get("X-Request-ID") + if requestID == "" { + requestID = uuid.NewString() + } + w.Header().Set("X-Request-ID", requestID) + + ctx := r.Context() + slog.DebugContext(ctx, "incoming request", + "method", r.Method, + "path", r.URL.Path, + "request_id", requestID, + "remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr, + "user_agent", r.UserAgent(), + ) + + lw := &accessLogWriter{ResponseWriter: w} + next.ServeHTTP(lw, r) + + level := slog.LevelInfo + if slices.Contains(quietPaths, r.URL.Path) { + level = slog.LevelDebug + } + attrs := []any{ + "status_code", lw.statusCode(), + "method", r.Method, + "path", r.URL.Path, + "duration_ms", time.Since(start).Milliseconds(), + "request_id", requestID, + "remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr, + } + slog.Log(ctx, level, "outgoing response", attrs...) + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/server/accesslog_test.go b/internal/server/accesslog_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ea0d0c791 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/server/accesslog_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +package server + +import ( + "bytes" + "encoding/json" + "log/slog" + "maps" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "strings" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func captureLogs(t *testing.T, level slog.Level) *bytes.Buffer { + t.Helper() + var buf bytes.Buffer + prev := slog.Default() + slog.SetDefault(slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: level}))) + t.Cleanup(func() { slog.SetDefault(prev) }) + return &buf +} + +func logEntries(t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer) []map[string]any { + t.Helper() + var entries []map[string]any + for line := range strings.Lines(buf.String()) { + var e map[string]any + require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal([]byte(line), &e)) + entries = append(entries, e) + } + return entries +} + +func TestAccessLogMiddleware(t *testing.T) { + handler := AccessLogMiddleware("/api/healthcheck")( + http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + if r.URL.Path == "/missing" { + http.NotFound(w, r) + return + } + w.Write([]byte("ok")) + }), + ) + + serve := func(path string, header http.Header) *httptest.ResponseRecorder { + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, path, nil) + req.RemoteAddr = "172.18.0.2:4000" + maps.Copy(req.Header, header) + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + return rec + } + + t.Run("info logs response", func(t *testing.T) { + buf := captureLogs(t, slog.LevelInfo) + rec := serve("/missing", nil) + + entries := logEntries(t, buf) + require.Len(t, entries, 1) + e := entries[0] + assert.Equal(t, "outgoing response", e["msg"]) + assert.Equal(t, "INFO", e["level"]) + assert.EqualValues(t, http.StatusNotFound, e["status_code"]) + assert.Equal(t, "/missing", e["path"]) + assert.Equal(t, "172.18.0.2:4000", e["remote_addr"]) + assert.NotEmpty(t, e["request_id"]) + assert.Equal(t, e["request_id"], rec.Header().Get("X-Request-ID")) + }) + + t.Run("healthcheck is hidden at info", func(t *testing.T) { + buf := captureLogs(t, slog.LevelInfo) + serve("/api/healthcheck", nil) + assert.Empty(t, buf.String()) + }) + + t.Run("healthcheck is logged at debug", func(t *testing.T) { + buf := captureLogs(t, slog.LevelDebug) + rec := serve("/api/healthcheck", http.Header{"X-Request-Id": {"req-1"}}) + + entries := logEntries(t, buf) + require.Len(t, entries, 2) + assert.Equal(t, "incoming request", entries[0]["msg"]) + assert.Equal(t, "outgoing response", entries[1]["msg"]) + assert.Equal(t, "DEBUG", entries[1]["level"]) + assert.EqualValues(t, http.StatusOK, entries[1]["status_code"]) + assert.Equal(t, "req-1", rec.Header().Get("X-Request-ID")) + }) +} + +func TestAccessLogWriter_ResponseController(t *testing.T) { + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + w := &accessLogWriter{ResponseWriter: rec} + require.NoError(t, http.NewResponseController(w).Flush()) + assert.True(t, rec.Flushed) + assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.statusCode()) +} diff --git a/internal/server/setting.go b/internal/server/setting.go index e18a1dbf8..a69a8c472 100644 --- a/internal/server/setting.go +++ b/internal/server/setting.go @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package server import ( "encoding/json" "fmt" + "log/slog" "os" "path/filepath" "slices" @@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ type Setting struct { Static string `json:"static" yaml:"static"` Tmp string `json:"tmp" yaml:"tmp"` Logger bool `json:"logger" yaml:"logger"` + LogLevel string `json:"logLevel" yaml:"logLevel"` Customize Customize `json:"customize" yaml:"customize"` Conversion Conversion `json:"conversion" yaml:"conversion"` Streaming Streaming `json:"streaming" yaml:"streaming"` @@ -114,6 +116,7 @@ func NewSetting() (setting Setting, err error) { viper.SetDefault("static", "") viper.SetDefault("tmp", "") viper.SetDefault("logger", false) + viper.SetDefault("logLevel", "info") viper.SetDefault("customize.enabled", false) viper.SetDefault("customize.websiteURL", "") viper.SetDefault("customize.websiteLogo", "") @@ -162,6 +165,10 @@ func NewSetting() (setting Setting, err error) { return } + if _, err = setting.SlogLevel(); err != nil { + return + } + // Viper can't unmarshal a JSON string env var into map[string]string, // so parse OCAP_CUSTOMIZE_CSSOVERRIDES manually if set. Env var takes // precedence over config file. @@ -206,6 +213,15 @@ func NewSetting() (setting Setting, err error) { return } +// SlogLevel parses LogLevel: debug, info, warn or error. +func (s Setting) SlogLevel() (slog.Level, error) { + var level slog.Level + if err := level.UnmarshalText([]byte(s.LogLevel)); err != nil { + return level, fmt.Errorf("logLevel %q is not valid, must be one of: debug, info, warn, error", s.LogLevel) + } + return level, nil +} + func validateAuthConfig(auth Auth) error { validModes := []string{"public", "password", "steam", "steamAllowlist"} if !slices.Contains(validModes, auth.Mode) { diff --git a/internal/server/setting_test.go b/internal/server/setting_test.go index 2a4fd92fc..1ccab5f8c 100644 --- a/internal/server/setting_test.go +++ b/internal/server/setting_test.go @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ package server import ( + "log/slog" "os" "path/filepath" "testing" @@ -675,3 +676,36 @@ func TestNewSetting_AuthPasswordMode(t *testing.T) { assert.Equal(t, "password", setting.Auth.Mode) assert.Equal(t, "hunter2", setting.Auth.Password) } + +func TestNewSetting_Logging(t *testing.T) { + dir := t.TempDir() + require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "setting.json"), []byte(`{"secret": "base-secret"}`), 0644)) + load := func(t *testing.T) (Setting, error) { + t.Helper() + viper.Reset() + t.Cleanup(viper.Reset) + viper.AddConfigPath(dir) + return NewSetting() + } + + t.Run("defaults to info", func(t *testing.T) { + setting, err := load(t) + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, "info", setting.LogLevel) + }) + + t.Run("env var", func(t *testing.T) { + t.Setenv("OCAP_LOGLEVEL", "debug") + setting, err := load(t) + require.NoError(t, err) + level, err := setting.SlogLevel() + require.NoError(t, err) + assert.Equal(t, slog.LevelDebug, level) + }) + + t.Run("invalid log level", func(t *testing.T) { + t.Setenv("OCAP_LOGLEVEL", "verbose") + _, err := load(t) + assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "logLevel") + }) +} diff --git a/setting.json.example b/setting.json.example index 66b596c22..2b92faf07 100644 --- a/setting.json.example +++ b/setting.json.example @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ "fonts": "assets/fonts", "maps": "maps", "logger": false, + "logLevel": "info", "customize": { "disableKillCount": false, "enabled": false, From 5b3753745735a13df8035840de93ae718c0f448c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Smith <13200576+smitt14ua@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2026 02:37:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] feat(server): log real client IP behind trusted reverse proxies (#607) * feat(server): log real client IP behind trusted reverse proxies Add trustedProxies (OCAP_TRUSTEDPROXIES) and remoteIPHeaders (OCAP_REMOTEIPHEADERS, default X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP). When the direct peer is a trusted proxy, RemoteAddr is replaced with the client address from the headers, X-Forwarded-For read right to left so entries the client sent itself are skipped, and the access log adds the proxy as proxy_addr. No proxy is trusted by default, so headers are ignored. * docs: explain trusting Cloudflare behind another reverse proxy * refactor(server): drop proxy_addr from the access log With a single reverse proxy it is the same address on every line. * style: gofmt realip_test.go * fix(server): match IPv4-mapped trusted proxy prefixes Addresses are unmapped before matching, but a trusted proxy given as an IPv4-mapped CIDR (::ffff:172.18.0.0/112) stayed an IPv6 prefix and never matched. Convert it to the equivalent IPv4 prefix; reject mapped prefixes shorter than /96, which cover more than the mapped range. --- README.md | 20 ++++ cmd/ocap-webserver/main.go | 11 ++- internal/server/accesslog_test.go | 11 ++- internal/server/realip.go | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ internal/server/realip_test.go | 146 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ internal/server/setting.go | 11 +++ internal/server/setting_test.go | 18 +++- setting.json.example | 2 + 8 files changed, 330 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) create mode 100644 internal/server/realip.go create mode 100644 internal/server/realip_test.go diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 93b99d84d..8d55450a3 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -244,6 +244,26 @@ When `allowedOrigins` is empty the server responds with `Access-Control-Allow-Or } ``` +### Reverse Proxy + +Behind a reverse proxy every request comes from the proxy's address. To log the client's address instead, list the proxies the server should trust. Forwarding headers are read only from requests whose direct peer is one of them; by default no proxy is trusted and headers are ignored. + +| Setting | Env Var | Description | Default | +|---------|---------|-------------|---------| +| `trustedProxies` | `OCAP_TRUSTEDPROXIES` | IPs or CIDR ranges of trusted reverse proxies. Comma-separated in env var. | `[]` (trust none) | +| `remoteIPHeaders` | `OCAP_REMOTEIPHEADERS` | Headers holding the client address, tried in order. Comma-separated in env var. | `["X-Forwarded-For", "X-Real-IP"]` | + +`X-Forwarded-For` is read right to left: trusted proxies are skipped and the first other address is the client, since entries further left can be sent by the client itself. The access log and the handlers then see the client in `remote_addr`. + +```json +"trustedProxies": ["172.18.0.0/16"] +``` + +**Cloudflare in front of another proxy** (e.g. Cloudflare → Traefik → OCAP): only the direct peer (Traefik) is checked against `trustedProxies`, so a header that proxy merely passes on is only as trustworthy as whoever reached it. + +- Recommended: keep `X-Forwarded-For`, let the proxy pass it on (Traefik: `forwardedHeaders.trustedIPs` with [Cloudflare's ranges](https://www.cloudflare.com/ips/)) and list both the proxy and Cloudflare's ranges in `trustedProxies`. Every hop appends its peer to the chain, so a client that bypasses Cloudflare ends up as the first untrusted entry and is logged as itself. +- Simpler: `"remoteIPHeaders": ["CF-Connecting-IP"]` with only the proxy in `trustedProxies`. This header holds a single address that the proxy passes on unchecked, so let only Cloudflare reach the proxy (firewall), otherwise a client that bypasses Cloudflare can set it itself. + ## Large Recording Support ### Overview diff --git a/cmd/ocap-webserver/main.go b/cmd/ocap-webserver/main.go index 26f7cf509..36bc09b5e 100644 --- a/cmd/ocap-webserver/main.go +++ b/cmd/ocap-webserver/main.go @@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ func app() error { logHandler := slog.NewJSONHandler(logOutput, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: logLevel}) slog.SetDefault(slog.New(logHandler)) + trustedProxies, err := server.ParseTrustedProxies(setting.TrustedProxies) + if err != nil { + return err + } // Docker polls the healthcheck every 30s; keep it out of info-level logs. healthcheckPath := strings.TrimRight(setting.PrefixURL, "/") + "/api/healthcheck" @@ -80,7 +84,12 @@ func app() error { fuego.WithLogHandler(logHandler), // Replaced by server.AccessLogMiddleware. fuego.WithLoggingMiddleware(fuego.LoggingConfig{DisableRequest: true, DisableResponse: true}), - fuego.WithGlobalMiddlewares(server.AccessLogMiddleware(healthcheckPath)), + // Each global middleware wraps the ones before it, so RealIP runs + // first and the access log and handlers see the client address. + fuego.WithGlobalMiddlewares( + server.AccessLogMiddleware(healthcheckPath), + server.RealIPMiddleware(trustedProxies, setting.RemoteIPHeaders), + ), fuego.WithoutAutoGroupTags(), fuego.WithSecurity(server.OpenAPISecuritySchemes), fuego.WithEngineOptions( diff --git a/internal/server/accesslog_test.go b/internal/server/accesslog_test.go index ea0d0c791..620177070 100644 --- a/internal/server/accesslog_test.go +++ b/internal/server/accesslog_test.go @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ func logEntries(t *testing.T, buf *bytes.Buffer) []map[string]any { } func TestAccessLogMiddleware(t *testing.T) { + trusted, err := ParseTrustedProxies([]string{"172.18.0.0/16"}) + require.NoError(t, err) handler := AccessLogMiddleware("/api/healthcheck")( http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if r.URL.Path == "/missing" { @@ -44,6 +46,8 @@ func TestAccessLogMiddleware(t *testing.T) { w.Write([]byte("ok")) }), ) + // Same order as main: RealIP wraps the access log. + handler = RealIPMiddleware(trusted, nil)(handler) serve := func(path string, header http.Header) *httptest.ResponseRecorder { req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, path, nil) @@ -54,9 +58,9 @@ func TestAccessLogMiddleware(t *testing.T) { return rec } - t.Run("info logs response", func(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("info logs response with client address", func(t *testing.T) { buf := captureLogs(t, slog.LevelInfo) - rec := serve("/missing", nil) + rec := serve("/missing", http.Header{"X-Forwarded-For": {"1.2.3.4"}}) entries := logEntries(t, buf) require.Len(t, entries, 1) @@ -65,7 +69,7 @@ func TestAccessLogMiddleware(t *testing.T) { assert.Equal(t, "INFO", e["level"]) assert.EqualValues(t, http.StatusNotFound, e["status_code"]) assert.Equal(t, "/missing", e["path"]) - assert.Equal(t, "172.18.0.2:4000", e["remote_addr"]) + assert.Equal(t, "1.2.3.4", e["remote_addr"]) assert.NotEmpty(t, e["request_id"]) assert.Equal(t, e["request_id"], rec.Header().Get("X-Request-ID")) }) @@ -86,6 +90,7 @@ func TestAccessLogMiddleware(t *testing.T) { assert.Equal(t, "outgoing response", entries[1]["msg"]) assert.Equal(t, "DEBUG", entries[1]["level"]) assert.EqualValues(t, http.StatusOK, entries[1]["status_code"]) + assert.Equal(t, "172.18.0.2:4000", entries[1]["remote_addr"]) assert.Equal(t, "req-1", rec.Header().Get("X-Request-ID")) }) } diff --git a/internal/server/realip.go b/internal/server/realip.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..63c785509 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/server/realip.go @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +package server + +import ( + "fmt" + "net" + "net/http" + "net/netip" + "slices" + "strings" +) + +// DefaultRemoteIPHeaders are the headers read for the client address when the +// request comes from a trusted proxy and remoteIPHeaders is not configured. +var DefaultRemoteIPHeaders = []string{"X-Forwarded-For", "X-Real-IP"} + +// ParseTrustedProxies parses IP addresses and CIDR ranges. +func ParseTrustedProxies(entries []string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) { + var prefixes []netip.Prefix + for _, entry := range entries { + entry = strings.TrimSpace(entry) + if entry == "" { + continue + } + if strings.Contains(entry, "/") { + p, err := netip.ParsePrefix(entry) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("trusted proxy %q: %w", entry, err) + } + // Addresses are unmapped before matching, so an IPv4-mapped + // prefix must become the equivalent IPv4 prefix. + if p.Addr().Is4In6() { + if p.Bits() < 96 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("trusted proxy %q: IPv4-mapped prefix must be at least /96", entry) + } + p = netip.PrefixFrom(p.Addr().Unmap(), p.Bits()-96) + } + prefixes = append(prefixes, p.Masked()) + continue + } + a, err := netip.ParseAddr(entry) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("trusted proxy %q: %w", entry, err) + } + a = a.Unmap() + prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.PrefixFrom(a, a.BitLen())) + } + return prefixes, nil +} + +type clientIPResolver struct { + trusted []netip.Prefix + headers []string +} + +func (c clientIPResolver) isTrusted(a netip.Addr) bool { + a = a.Unmap() + for _, p := range c.trusted { + if p.Contains(a) { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// clientIP returns the client address from the forwarding headers, but only +// when the direct peer is a trusted proxy. Each header is read right to left: +// trusted proxies are skipped and the first untrusted address is the client, +// as anything further left could have been sent by the client itself. +func (c clientIPResolver) clientIP(r *http.Request) (string, bool) { + host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr) + if err != nil { + host = r.RemoteAddr + } + peer, err := netip.ParseAddr(host) + if err != nil || !c.isTrusted(peer) { + return "", false + } + + for _, header := range c.headers { + values := r.Header.Values(header) + if len(values) == 0 { + continue + } + items := strings.Split(strings.Join(values, ","), ",") + for i, item := range slices.Backward(items) { + ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.TrimSpace(item)) + if err != nil { + break // malformed header: try the next one + } + ip = ip.Unmap() + if i == 0 || !c.isTrusted(ip) { + return ip.String(), true + } + } + } + return "", false +} + +// RealIPMiddleware replaces r.RemoteAddr with the client address taken from +// the forwarding headers when the request comes from a trusted proxy. With no +// trusted proxies headers are never read. +func RealIPMiddleware(trusted []netip.Prefix, headers []string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler { + if len(headers) == 0 { + headers = DefaultRemoteIPHeaders + } + resolver := clientIPResolver{trusted: trusted, headers: headers} + return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler { + if len(trusted) == 0 { + return next + } + return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + if ip, ok := resolver.clientIP(r); ok { + r.RemoteAddr = ip + } + next.ServeHTTP(w, r) + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/server/realip_test.go b/internal/server/realip_test.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a721eb98f --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/server/realip_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +package server + +import ( + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "testing" + + "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" + "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" +) + +func TestParseTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) { + prefixes, err := ParseTrustedProxies([]string{ + " 172.18.0.0/16 ", "10.0.0.5", "::ffff:192.168.1.1", "fd00::/8", "", + "::ffff:172.19.0.2/128", "::ffff:172.20.0.0/112", "::ffff:0.0.0.0/96", + }) + require.NoError(t, err) + got := make([]string, len(prefixes)) + for i, p := range prefixes { + got[i] = p.String() + } + assert.Equal(t, []string{ + "172.18.0.0/16", "10.0.0.5/32", "192.168.1.1/32", "fd00::/8", + "172.19.0.2/32", "172.20.0.0/16", "0.0.0.0/0", + }, got) + + for _, bad := range []string{"proxy.local", "10.0.0.0/33", "300.1.1.1", "::ffff:0.0.0.0/95"} { + _, err := ParseTrustedProxies([]string{bad}) + assert.Error(t, err, bad) + } +} + +func TestRealIPMiddleware(t *testing.T) { + trusted, err := ParseTrustedProxies([]string{"172.18.0.0/16", "10.0.0.1"}) + require.NoError(t, err) + + tests := []struct { + name string + trusted []string + headers []string + remoteAddr string + set map[string][]string + wantAddr string + }{ + { + name: "no trusted proxies ignores headers", + trusted: []string{}, + remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000", + set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"1.2.3.4"}}, + wantAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000", + }, + { + name: "untrusted peer ignores headers", + remoteAddr: "8.8.8.8:4000", + set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"1.2.3.4"}}, + wantAddr: "8.8.8.8:4000", + }, + { + name: "trusted peer uses X-Forwarded-For", + remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000", + set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"1.2.3.4"}}, + wantAddr: "1.2.3.4", + }, + { + name: "spoofed left entries are skipped", + remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000", + set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"9.9.9.9, 1.2.3.4, 10.0.0.1"}}, + wantAddr: "1.2.3.4", + }, + { + name: "multiple header lines are joined", + remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000", + set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"9.9.9.9", "1.2.3.4"}}, + wantAddr: "1.2.3.4", + }, + { + name: "all entries trusted gives leftmost", + remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000", + set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"172.18.0.9, 10.0.0.1"}}, + wantAddr: "172.18.0.9", + }, + { + name: "malformed header falls back to next header", + remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000", + set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"garbage"}, "X-Real-IP": {"5.6.7.8"}}, + wantAddr: "5.6.7.8", + }, + { + name: "no header keeps RemoteAddr", + remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000", + wantAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000", + }, + { + name: "configured header only", + headers: []string{"CF-Connecting-IP"}, + remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000", + set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"9.9.9.9"}, "Cf-Connecting-Ip": {"2001:db8::1"}}, + wantAddr: "2001:db8::1", + }, + { + name: "IPv4-mapped peer and client are unmapped", + remoteAddr: "[::ffff:10.0.0.1]:4000", + set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"::ffff:1.2.3.4"}}, + wantAddr: "1.2.3.4", + }, + { + name: "IPv4-mapped /128 trusted entry", + trusted: []string{"::ffff:172.18.0.2/128"}, + remoteAddr: "[::ffff:172.18.0.2]:4000", + set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"1.2.3.4"}}, + wantAddr: "1.2.3.4", + }, + { + name: "IPv4-mapped subnet trusted entry", + trusted: []string{"::ffff:172.18.0.0/112"}, + remoteAddr: "172.18.0.2:4000", + set: map[string][]string{"X-Forwarded-For": {"1.2.3.4, 172.18.5.5"}}, + wantAddr: "1.2.3.4", + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { + tp := trusted + if tt.trusted != nil { + tp, err = ParseTrustedProxies(tt.trusted) + require.NoError(t, err) + } + var gotAddr string + h := RealIPMiddleware(tp, tt.headers)(http.HandlerFunc(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + gotAddr = r.RemoteAddr + })) + + req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil) + req.RemoteAddr = tt.remoteAddr + for k, vs := range tt.set { + for _, v := range vs { + req.Header.Add(k, v) + } + } + h.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req) + + assert.Equal(t, tt.wantAddr, gotAddr) + }) + } +} diff --git a/internal/server/setting.go b/internal/server/setting.go index a69a8c472..a87d42644 100644 --- a/internal/server/setting.go +++ b/internal/server/setting.go @@ -33,6 +33,11 @@ type Setting struct { Auth Auth `json:"auth" yaml:"auth"` HttpServer HttpServer `json:"httpServer" yaml:"httpServer"` CORS CORSConfig `json:"cors" yaml:"cors"` + + // TrustedProxies lists the reverse proxies (IPs or CIDR ranges) whose + // RemoteIPHeaders are believed. Empty: headers are ignored. + TrustedProxies []string `json:"trustedProxies" yaml:"trustedProxies"` + RemoteIPHeaders []string `json:"remoteIPHeaders" yaml:"remoteIPHeaders"` } type Conversion struct { @@ -117,6 +122,8 @@ func NewSetting() (setting Setting, err error) { viper.SetDefault("tmp", "") viper.SetDefault("logger", false) viper.SetDefault("logLevel", "info") + viper.SetDefault("trustedProxies", []string{}) + viper.SetDefault("remoteIPHeaders", DefaultRemoteIPHeaders) viper.SetDefault("customize.enabled", false) viper.SetDefault("customize.websiteURL", "") viper.SetDefault("customize.websiteLogo", "") @@ -169,6 +176,10 @@ func NewSetting() (setting Setting, err error) { return } + if _, err = ParseTrustedProxies(setting.TrustedProxies); err != nil { + return + } + // Viper can't unmarshal a JSON string env var into map[string]string, // so parse OCAP_CUSTOMIZE_CSSOVERRIDES manually if set. Env var takes // precedence over config file. diff --git a/internal/server/setting_test.go b/internal/server/setting_test.go index 1ccab5f8c..4a73fa1c9 100644 --- a/internal/server/setting_test.go +++ b/internal/server/setting_test.go @@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ func TestNewSetting_AuthPasswordMode(t *testing.T) { assert.Equal(t, "hunter2", setting.Auth.Password) } -func TestNewSetting_Logging(t *testing.T) { +func TestNewSetting_LoggingAndProxies(t *testing.T) { dir := t.TempDir() require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "setting.json"), []byte(`{"secret": "base-secret"}`), 0644)) load := func(t *testing.T) (Setting, error) { @@ -688,19 +688,25 @@ func TestNewSetting_Logging(t *testing.T) { return NewSetting() } - t.Run("defaults to info", func(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("defaults trust no proxy", func(t *testing.T) { setting, err := load(t) require.NoError(t, err) assert.Equal(t, "info", setting.LogLevel) + assert.Empty(t, setting.TrustedProxies) + assert.Equal(t, []string{"X-Forwarded-For", "X-Real-IP"}, setting.RemoteIPHeaders) }) - t.Run("env var", func(t *testing.T) { + t.Run("env vars", func(t *testing.T) { t.Setenv("OCAP_LOGLEVEL", "debug") + t.Setenv("OCAP_TRUSTEDPROXIES", "172.18.0.0/16,10.0.0.5") + t.Setenv("OCAP_REMOTEIPHEADERS", "CF-Connecting-IP") setting, err := load(t) require.NoError(t, err) level, err := setting.SlogLevel() require.NoError(t, err) assert.Equal(t, slog.LevelDebug, level) + assert.Equal(t, []string{"172.18.0.0/16", "10.0.0.5"}, setting.TrustedProxies) + assert.Equal(t, []string{"CF-Connecting-IP"}, setting.RemoteIPHeaders) }) t.Run("invalid log level", func(t *testing.T) { @@ -708,4 +714,10 @@ func TestNewSetting_Logging(t *testing.T) { _, err := load(t) assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "logLevel") }) + + t.Run("invalid trusted proxy", func(t *testing.T) { + t.Setenv("OCAP_TRUSTEDPROXIES", "proxy.local") + _, err := load(t) + assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "trusted proxy") + }) } diff --git a/setting.json.example b/setting.json.example index 2b92faf07..cb0c98002 100644 --- a/setting.json.example +++ b/setting.json.example @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ "maps": "maps", "logger": false, "logLevel": "info", + "trustedProxies": [], + "remoteIPHeaders": ["X-Forwarded-For", "X-Real-IP"], "customize": { "disableKillCount": false, "enabled": false,