diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
index 1a9528255..9683797cd 100644
--- a/.jules/sentinel.md
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -17,3 +17,8 @@
 **Vulnerability:** The `verify_github_sig` function in `apps/server/src/infra_routes.rs` verified GitHub webhook signatures using standard string comparison `expected.eq_ignore_ascii_case(hex_sig)`.
 **Learning:** String comparison functions exit early as soon as a character mismatch is found. In a cryptographic context, this variable response time leaks information and allows an attacker to perform a timing attack to forge a valid HMAC signature by guessing it byte by byte.
 **Prevention:** Always use a constant-time comparison library (like `hmac`'s `verify_slice()`) to compare cryptographic hashes, secrets, and signatures to prevent side-channel timing attacks. Avoid custom implementations of standard cryptographic algorithms.
+
+## 2026-11-11 - [Bypass Command Parsing - rm]
+**Vulnerability:** The `validate_command` function in `crates/agent/src/tools/workdir_cmd.rs` used a trailing space in the `BLOCKED_TOKENS` list for `rm ` and `rm\t` to prevent matching prefixes like `arm` or `chmod`. This logic, however, did not block exact uses of `rm` at the end of a command string, such as `npm run rm`. It also relied primarily on the joined command string without checking the individual parsed tokens for exact matches of these sensitive binaries.
+**Learning:** Checking for substrings against joined command strings can be bypassed if the restricted token happens at the end of the string where a space is not appended, or if the tokenizer fails to match exact words.
+**Prevention:** Validation for string tokens should run not just against the joined command but also check for exact token matches over the tokenized arguments (e.g. iterate over tokens and verify `token.to_ascii_lowercase() == "rm"`).
diff --git a/crates/agent/src/tools/workdir_cmd.rs b/crates/agent/src/tools/workdir_cmd.rs
index 46a5ff54a..714a8e584 100644
--- a/crates/agent/src/tools/workdir_cmd.rs
+++ b/crates/agent/src/tools/workdir_cmd.rs
@@ -112,6 +112,12 @@ fn validate_command(raw: &str) -> std::result::Result<Vec<String>, String> {
             return Err(format!("token interdit dans la commande : {bad}"));
         }
     }
+    for part in &parts {
+        let p_lower = part.to_ascii_lowercase();
+        if p_lower == "rm" {
+            return Err(format!("token interdit dans la commande : rm"));
+        }
+    }
     let bin = parts[0].as_str();
     let bin_base = Path::new(bin)
         .file_name()
@@ -354,6 +360,7 @@ mod tests {
     fn blocks_obfuscated_commands() {
         assert!(validate_command("npm run \"s\"udo").is_err());
         assert!(validate_command("cat \"..\"/\"..\"/etc/passwd").is_err());
+        assert!(validate_command("npm run rm").is_err());
     }
 }