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[Decision] May a rank-and-file member set their OWN sys_user.locale? Ruling B opened the COLUMN; ADR-0092 D5 still answers no to the ROUTE, so today only admins can set it #14959
Filed by the domain:services execution seat from a measured gap in PR #14958 (#14787), reported by the dev rather than acted on — correctly, because closing it is a second security-boundary decision the maintainer's ruling did not take.
What is already ruled, and is not being reopened
Maintainer ruling B on #14787 (comment 5522882528, verbatim 「同意」): the ADR-0092 D2 self-service whitelist becomes {name, image, locale} and the column's readonly goes. PR #14958 implements exactly that. ⛔ This card does not revisit it.
The gap, measured
After that PR:
the identity write guard admitslocale on a user-context update to sys_user;
butmember_default still declares allowEdit: false on sys_user (plugin-security/src/objects/default-permission-sets.ts, via denyWritesOnManagedObjects()), so an ordinary member's PATCH to their own row is refused by the permission layer before the guard is ever consulted;
⇒ Today a platform admin can set any user's locale, and a rank-and-file member cannot set their own.
ADR-0092 D5 is explicit that this split is intended — the guard decides which columns any permitted actor may touch; permission sets decide who. So PR #14958 is faithful to the ruling as written. The ruling simply did not reach the route.
⚠️ Why it cannot just sit: objectui#7501 is already filed for the account-settings "my language" form item, and it has no route to post to. #14788 was ruled in the same batch to make the stored locale outrank Accept-Languagebecause it is a user-stated preference — which is only true if the user can state it. Shipping the column without the route leaves a user-facing setting only an administrator can set.
Options
A — grant it on the generic data path, in the sys_api_key shape. An explicit member_default entry for sys_user (allowRead/allowEdit true, create/delete false) plus a sys_user_self RLS policy widened from select to cover writes. The identity write guard then bounds which fields to {name, image, locale} and the RLS bounds which rows to the caller's own.
B — a dedicated endpoint (POST /api/v1/me/locale, or extending the update_my_profile action) writing under system context after checking the caller is the subject, leaving member_default untouched.
C — leave it admin-only for now. Ship the column, let admins and applications use it, revisit when a shipped surface needs self-service.
⚠️ The cost of A, stated plainly because it is the real decision
A also opens name/image self-editing through the generic data path, which ADR-0092 D5 currently routes through better-auth /update-user for its session-cache refresh. That refresh is already mirrored by the D6 afterUpdate hook PR #14958 touches — so the mechanism exists — but exists is not ruled, and D5 is an accepted ADR. A is a maintainer decision with an ADR-0092 amendment, not an implementation detail. That is why it is here.
Filed by the
domain:servicesexecution seat from a measured gap in PR #14958 (#14787), reported by the dev rather than acted on — correctly, because closing it is a second security-boundary decision the maintainer's ruling did not take.What is already ruled, and is not being reopened
Maintainer ruling B on #14787 (comment 5522882528, verbatim 「同意」): the ADR-0092 D2 self-service whitelist becomes
{name, image, locale}and the column'sreadonlygoes. PR #14958 implements exactly that. ⛔ This card does not revisit it.The gap, measured
After that PR:
localeon a user-context update tosys_user;member_defaultstill declaresallowEdit: falseonsys_user(plugin-security/src/objects/default-permission-sets.ts, viadenyWritesOnManagedObjects()), so an ordinary member'sPATCHto their own row is refused by the permission layer before the guard is ever consulted;/update-user— what the existingupdate_my_profileaction posts to — cannot carry the field, becauselocaleis deliberately not a better-authadditionalFieldsentry ([Decision] Per-user notification locale —— 2026-08-13 裁决所等的「实测拉力」已到(hotcrm:4 个已发布语言 × 16 个 notify 节点 × 0 可本地化) #13881 measured why: it would makegetSessionSELECT a column an environment that has not run schema-sync does not have).⇒ Today a platform admin can set any user's locale, and a rank-and-file member cannot set their own.
ADR-0092 D5 is explicit that this split is intended — the guard decides which columns any permitted actor may touch; permission sets decide who. So PR #14958 is faithful to the ruling as written. The ruling simply did not reach the route.
Accept-Languagebecause it is a user-stated preference — which is only true if the user can state it. Shipping the column without the route leaves a user-facing setting only an administrator can set.Options
sys_api_keyshape. An explicitmember_defaultentry forsys_user(allowRead/allowEdittrue, create/delete false) plus asys_user_selfRLS policy widened fromselectto cover writes. The identity write guard then bounds which fields to{name, image, locale}and the RLS bounds which rows to the caller's own.POST /api/v1/me/locale, or extending theupdate_my_profileaction) writing under system context after checking the caller is the subject, leavingmember_defaultuntouched.localea better-authadditionalFieldsentry so/update-usercarries it. ⛔ Named only to be refused: [Decision] Per-user notification locale —— 2026-08-13 裁决所等的「实测拉力」已到(hotcrm:4 个已发布语言 × 16 个 notify 节点 × 0 可本地化) #13881 already measured that this breaksgetSessionon any environment that has not run schema-sync.A also opens
name/imageself-editing through the generic data path, which ADR-0092 D5 currently routes through better-auth/update-userfor its session-cache refresh. That refresh is already mirrored by the D6afterUpdatehook PR #14958 touches — so the mechanism exists — but exists is not ruled, and D5 is an accepted ADR. A is a maintainer decision with an ADR-0092 amendment, not an implementation detail. That is why it is here.四棱分析
长期健全性(权重最高)。 只有 A 保住一套契约。平台已经有「某个行为者可以编辑自己那一行的这些列」的通用机制 —— 权限集 +
_selfRLS + ADR-0092 的列白名单 —— 而sys_api_key就是这个形状的已出货先例:better-auth 托管表上的、按属主限定的、只开一列的写入。B 会为同一列建第二条写路径,而这正是裁定 B 当初在 #14787 上否掉选项 A 时给的理由(「它会让每个应用自己去造一条 stamping 路线」)—— 一个平台自建的专用端点是同一个缺陷上移了一层。C 不稳定:它出货一个除管理员外没人能设的用户面设置,这是 ADR-0049 禁止的「declared-not-enforced」形状,只隔了一步。D 已被测量否决。真实业务需求。 是实测的,不是设想的:hotcrm 为这个列本身测出了拉力(4 个已发布语言 × 16 个 notify 节点 × 0 个可本地化);#14788 在同一批里被裁定让该列压过⚠️ 这三处读的都是「用户自己的选择」;没有任何一处描述的是管理员去设别人的语言。 拉力指向的恰恰是自助。
Accept-Language;objectui#7501 是已立的表单项卡。AI 编写元数据的安全性。 A 是把「拒绝」留在它已经在的地方的那个选项。列上的形状规则在每条路径上同样地拒绝畸形 tag,所以放宽谁可写,并不放宽什么可写;B 需要在第二条路由上把这条规则重新证明一遍,而一个跑在系统上下文里的专用端点,正是这类检查最容易被跳过的位置。
创业公司范围。 A 是三个可行选项里 diff 最小的 —— 一条权限集条目 + 一处 RLS operation 放宽,两者所在的文件都已经带着
sys_api_key的同款写法。不加新端点、不加新概念、不加新的待文档化面。推荐 A,但它带 ADR-0092 D5 修订,因此必须由维护者裁。
Refs: #14787 / PR #14958(开列的那一半)· ADR-0092 D5(路由归权限集)· #13881(为何 D 被否)· #14788(读侧优先级,同批裁定)· objectui#7501(等这条路由的表单项)· #14951(ADR-0092 D1 的 tier 表仍写着旧的两字段)