Agent Decoder is in the 0.x series. Security fixes are applied to the latest minor version; older 0.x minors are not back-patched.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.x (latest) | Yes |
| 0.x (older) | No |
Please report vulnerabilities privately, not in a public issue.
Report it through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting — the repository's Security → Report a vulnerability tab.
Include, at minimum:
- A description of the issue and its impact
- Steps to reproduce (a minimal proof-of-concept is ideal)
- Affected version(s) and platform
- Any relevant logs or screenshots
What to expect:
- Acknowledgment within 72 hours of your report.
- For critical issues, a fix or mitigation targeted within 14 days. Less severe issues get rolled into the next regular release.
- Coordinated disclosure — please give us a reasonable window to ship a fix before publishing details.
Agent Decoder runs entirely on the user's machine and binds to 127.0.0.1 by default. There is no telemetry, no remote backend, and no authentication layer — the security model assumes the local user trusts processes running as themselves.
The interesting attack surface is therefore narrow:
--exposemode, which binds to0.0.0.0and exposes the API to the local network. Anyone on that network can read chat history.- The file viewer, which reads and (with
--enable-edit) writes files on disk. Path traversal, symlink escapes, and writes outside the session-related sandbox are in scope. - JSONL parsing of session files (malformed or maliciously crafted input).
- The headless runner, which invokes a subprocess CLI on the user's behalf.
Out of scope:
- Vulnerabilities that require an attacker already having local code execution as the same user.
- Issues only reachable when the user has explicitly enabled
--exposeon an untrusted network (this is documented as unsafe).
There is no monetary bounty program. Researchers who report valid vulnerabilities will be credited by name in CHANGELOG.md (unless they prefer to remain anonymous).