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fix(mirror,capsule,wallet): adopt chia-query 0.20.0, resolve landed spends, mark relayed backfills - #451

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fix(mirror,capsule,wallet): adopt chia-query 0.20.0, resolve landed spends, mark relayed backfills#451
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@MichaelTaylor3d MichaelTaylor3d commented Aug 31, 2026

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DO NOT MERGE — DRAFT, the gate round has not run. The orchestrator gates.

Batch lane, one PR for the repo (§1.4 batch-per-repo).

1. Adopt chia-query 0.19.0 -> 0.20.0

One declaration (crates/dig-wallet/Cargo.toml:112). success narrowed to ack status 1; TxStatus
gained inclusion: MempoolInclusion and error: Option<String>.

  • dig-wallet/src/sage/spend.rsaccepted_by_mempool reads inclusion.is_admitted() rather than
    comparing the status STRING, and appends the full node's own refusal text. The string comparison
    was correct; it was also the field that says the least about what is being asked, and Unknown
    now fails closed for free.
  • dig-wallet/src/sage/chain.rspush read status.success, which was true for a PENDING ack. It
    returned PushOutcome { accepted: true, transaction_id: Some(..) } for a bundle no mempool
    held
    — the node telling a caller its spend landed. 0.20's narrowing fixes that silently; this PR
    makes it explicit by reading inclusion, and carries error into rejection so an operator sees
    BAD_AGGREGATE_SIGNATURE instead of a bare PENDING.
  • Three comments made false by the bump, rewritten: sage/spend.rs's accepted_by_mempool doc,
    its test-helper doc, and mirror/lifecycle.rs's reservation comment.

The test helper ack() still routes through chia_query::peer::translate::ack_to_tx_status rather
than hand-building a TxStatus, so the coupling to the crate stays real.

2. Closes #449 — two mirror fixtures signed under the L2 genesis

mirror_advertised_urls.rs and mirror_intra_pass_reservation.rs opened the operator wallet under
dig_constants::DIG_MAINNET.genesis_challenge() (DIG L2) while production signs Chia L1 CAT
spends under mirror_agg_sig_data(). Both now take the domain from that one function.

Not a production defect — both drive MockBroadcaster. It matters because a signer asked for the
message it already believes in always agrees with itself, so a fixture calling itself "a REAL
operator wallet" could never fail under the wrong domain, and the next signature-validity assertion
added there would have been written against it. mirror_agg_sig_data() stays a pure function with
no env override, deliberately.

3. Closes #446 — inbound-demand backfill landed a remote-triggered capsule bondable

claim is now a required argument of cache_fetch_and_cache, threaded through
gap_fill_generation and spawn_capsule_backfill. That closes the class; a check at each call site
would have closed one instance.

Claims are derived, never hard-coded:

call site claim why
note_inbound_demand (remote peer's serve request) holder_claim_for_landing(Peer, FirstParty) -> Suppress a stranger's demand
maybe_backfill_capsule derived from the origin that just passed its gate gate and claim must not be two answers
dispatch.rs cache.fetchAndCache holder_claim_for_landing(origin, provenance) the dispatcher is handed an origin precisely so it need not assume
control.rs x2, dig-wallet dig_cache_fetch, sync_whole_store, chain-watch gap-fill Announce genuinely operator-initiated; dig_cache_fetch is self-origin-gated

Reuses the shared holder_claim_for_landing #442 landed — no third copy of the rule.

Reachability, stated plainly: gated behind DIG_NODE_INBOUND_DEMAND_CACHE, which defaults OFF.
Never exploitable in a default install. An operator who enables a documented feature is still not
consenting to have their $DIG staked on a capsule a stranger chose.

Blast radius

.gitnexus indexes are stale here (impact returns a false-safe impactedCount: 0), so this was
measured by grep + direct read, and stated as such.

cache_fetch_and_cache — 13 call sites: 3 production control-plane, 1 RPC dispatch, 1 wallet
sidecar, 2 internal, 6 tests. gap_fill_generation — 8: 1 chain-watch, 1 backfill task, 6 tests.
spawn_capsule_backfill — 2 triggers. HolderClaim is newly re-exported from the dig-node-core
root so the two downstream crates can name the required argument. accepted_by_mempool — 1 caller.
ChainTransport::push — 2 (trait impl + direct).

Not in this PR

  • Mirror-coin lifecycle: the pass runner, the state surface, the DHT pointer, and the real-machine proof #412 stays open. See the note on the ticket.
  • dig_ecosystem#382 (dig-onion privacy mode) is SPLIT OUT — a real seam, not an excuse. SPEC.md
    §8 is five subsections specifying a new crate dependency, a mode field on two RPC methods, a
    distinct onion identity key, a new dig.onion stream over the dig-nat mux, an additive DHT
    namespace, an opt-in onion-relay capability, three new error codes and two invariants
    (no-silent-downgrade, local-node-only). That is materially larger than items 1-3 combined and
    needs its own reconcile against epic dig_ecosystem#3128 first.
    Checked for a rival onion path: dig-node contains only SPEC/README/DEVELOPMENT_LOG prose, and
    dig-sex v0.5.0 — the latest published — contains no onion or circuit code at all. So there is
    no rival today, and the reconcile is about not creating one.

Deps (§2.4b)

Every dig-* and chia-* declaration was checked against the index with the required User-Agent
header. All were already at the latest published version except chia-query. chia-* correctly
remain at 0.36 as a set: chia-protocol 0.48.0 exists, but chia-wallet-sdk is still 0.36.0, which
is the stated ceiling. Verified from the resolved Cargo.lock, not from carets.

Version

Workspace 0.188.0 -> 0.189.0, dig-node-core 0.63.0 -> 0.64.0, dig-wallet 0.42.1 -> 0.43.0.

Minor, and minor IS the breaking slot for a 0.x crate. CapsuleStore::cache_fetch_and_cache
and gap_fill_generation gained a required parameter, and CapsuleStore is publicly re-exported, so
this breaks any external implementor. HolderClaim is newly re-exported from the crate root
(additive). Under Cargo semver 0.188 -> 0.189 is semver-INCOMPATIBLE, which is the correct and
intended signal.

…chia-query 0.20.0

Batch for the repo (one PR, one bump).

chia-query 0.19.0 -> 0.20.0. `success` narrowed to ack status 1; `TxStatus` gained
`inclusion: MempoolInclusion` and `error`. `accepted_by_mempool` now reads
`inclusion.is_admitted()` rather than comparing the status string, and appends the
full node's own refusal text, so `BAD_AGGREGATE_SIGNATURE` reaches an operator instead
of a bare `PENDING`. `ChainTransport::push` read `status.success`, which was true for a
PENDING ack: it returned `accepted: true` WITH a transaction id for a bundle no mempool
held. It now reads `inclusion` and carries the reason into `rejection`. Three comments
the bump made false were rewritten.

Closes #446. `claim` is a required argument of `cache_fetch_and_cache`, threaded through
`gap_fill_generation` and `spawn_capsule_backfill`. A required parameter closes the
class; a check at each call site closes one instance. `note_inbound_demand` -- reached
from a remote peer's serve request -- derives `Suppress` from its own origin; the
fetch-side miss and the RPC dispatch derive from the origin already in scope; the
genuine control-plane sites pass `Announce` explicitly. Reachable only with the
default-OFF `DIG_NODE_INBOUND_DEMAND_CACHE`, so never exploitable in a default install.

Closes #449. Two mirror fixtures opened the operator wallet under the DIG L2 genesis
while production signs Chia L1 CAT spends under `mirror_agg_sig_data()`. A signer asked
for the message it already believes in always agrees with itself, so a fixture calling
itself "a REAL operator wallet" could not fail under the wrong domain.

Tests. `inbound_demand_backfill_is_started_as_relayed_not_as_this_nodes_own` and
`a_local_origin_miss_still_starts_a_bondable_backfill` differ in ONE input and assert
two different observable results. Both proven load-bearing by reverting only their fix:
restoring the hard-coded `Announce` fails the first (`left: Some(Announce), right:
Some(Suppress)`); suppressing the operator's own backfill fails the second. Three
`accepted_by_mempool` tests cover the reason text, including two refusals differing only
in their cause, which an implementation that drops the reason renders identically.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
@MichaelTaylor3d

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loop-security — IN PROGRESS, not the verdict

Auditing head e2279e5de748ad4f0964cc5eac98f0a511e20fb5 (resolved from gh pr view 451 --json headRefOid, matches dispatch). Own worktree at C:\tmp\worktrees\sec451; the lane's dn-batch and the parked primary checkout are untouched.

Diff shape confirmed. --stat reports ~30k lines, which is CRLF churn — git diff --ignore-cr-at-eol gives the real diff: 620 insertions / 117 deletions across 20 files. That is the diff I am auditing.

Areas identified, all four money/peer-reachable:

  1. crates/dig-wallet/src/sage/spend.rsaccepted_by_mempool now status.inclusion.is_admitted(); new refusal_detail.
  2. crates/dig-wallet/src/sage/chain.rs:503ChainTransport::push same narrowing, plus error folded into rejection.
  3. crates/dig-node-core/src/seams/capsule/capsule_store.rscache_fetch_and_cache + gap_fill_generation gained a required HolderClaim; 7 call sites threaded.
  4. crates/dig-node-service/tests/mirror_{advertised_urls,intra_pass_reservation}.rs — genesis fixtures moved to mirror_agg_sig_data().

Not yet verified — these are the probes now running, not conclusions:

  • MempoolInclusion semantics in the published chia-query 0.20.0 (is Unknown non-admitted, does Admitted mean status 1 only) — read from the vendored registry source, not from the PR's comments about it.
  • Every caller of accepted_by_mempool and of push's accepted field, both directions (false-refusal strands money; false-admission invites a double send).
  • Whether holder_claim_for_landing is genuinely shared and folds BOTH axes, vs a third copy of the rule.
  • Repo-wide grep for any remaining L2-genesis wallet open.
  • Independent revert-proof of at least one inbound-demand backfill lands a remote-triggered capsule with no provenance marker (defect A) #446 test.
  • Cargo.lock resolved-graph check.

Also noted for the verdict: this PR commits three scratch files into the repo tree — .loop-batch-note.md, .own.md, .pr-body.md. Checking their content for anything that must not be published, and will flag as hygiene regardless.

@MichaelTaylor3d

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loop-security — IN PROGRESS, not the verdict

Head audited: e2279e5de748ad4f0964cc5eac98f0a511e20fb5.

Priority check 1 (money surface) — RESOLVED CLEAN, both directions

Verified against the published chia-query 0.20.0 source in the registry cache, not against this PR's description of it (~/.cargo/registry/src/index.crates.io-1949cf8c6b5b557f/chia-query-0.20.0):

  • types/response.rs:74-79is_admitted() is matches!(self, Admitted). Unknown is #[default] and is NOT admitted, so the new reading fails closed.
  • peer/translate.rs:109-122 and coinset/mod.rs:33-46 — the only two producers of TxStatus. Both set success: inclusion.is_admitted(), so at 0.20.0 the two readings are now identical by construction. The behavioural fix came from the crate bump; the local change to inclusion is a no-op in value and a real improvement in intent.

False-admission direction: closed. Repo-wide grep finds exactly two push paths — dig-wallet/src/sage/chain.rs:499 and dig-wallet/src/sage/spend.rs:338 — and both now gate on inclusion.is_admitted(). There is no surviving rival reading: zero occurrences of the "SUCCESS" string literal anywhere in the repo, and every other .success hit is std::process::ExitStatus. accepted_by_mempool has exactly one production caller (spend.rs:342).

False-refusal direction: closed for this repo. TxStatus.inclusion carries #[serde(default)], so a deserialized TxStatus would default to Unknown and be refused while success deserialized true. That is a real trap in the type — but it is unreachable here: grep confirms dig-node never deserializes a TxStatus, and neither producer inside chia-query goes through serde (the coinset path reads json["status"] and calls the constructor).

Both accepted consumers traced: dig-wallet/src/sage/rpc.rs:2110 (reserves coins only on accept — a PENDING now correctly reserves nothing) and dig-node-service/src/control.rs:2547 (reports accepted/rejection on a token-gated verb). Neither can now report a PENDING bundle as landed.


FINDING 1 — MEDIUM. A full-node peer's arbitrary-length refusal text is written verbatim into the node's permanent on-disk spend journal. NEW in this diff.

crates/dig-wallet/src/sage/spend.rs:322-330 (refusal_detail) and spend.rs:308-319 (accepted_by_mempool)

This is the one genuinely new attacker-reachable surface the diff opens, and it is a side effect of the otherwise-good decision to stop discarding the node's reason.

The chain, each link verified by direct read:

  1. chia-protocol-0.36.1/src/wallet_protocol.rs:42-46TransactionAck.error is Option<String>, streamable, length-prefixed. The ceiling is the websocket frame limit: tungstenite's default max_message_size is Some(64 << 20) = 64 MiB (tungstenite-0.21.0/src/protocol/mod.rs:82).
  2. chia-query-0.20.0/src/peer/mod.rs:1079ack_to_tx_status(ack.status, ack.error) passes it through unbounded and unparsed. 0.19 took only the status byte and discarded it, which is why this path did not exist before this PR.
  3. spend.rs:322-330refusal_detail interpolates it into the error message with no length check.
  4. crates/dig-node-service/src/mirror/lifecycle.rs:322-327let cause = e.to_string(); self.journal.failed(&recorded, FailureStage::Broadcast, cause.clone());
  5. crates/dig-node-service/src/spend_audit.rs:529-543append writes it to <state_dir>/spend-audit.jsonl, append-only, never rewritten, no rotation, no size cap.

Attacker and reachability. A Chia full-node peer. NC-12 states these are untrusted by design, and they are reached via DNS introducers, so an attacker can stand one up and be dialled. chia-query's pick() selects from the pool; the mirror pass pushes on a schedule. The attacker's action is to answer one push with a large error.

Consequence — the amplification is per-read, not per-write, which is what makes it worth fixing. One 64 MiB refusal is written once, but SpendLog::ledger() is std::fs::read_to_string(&self.path) (spend_audit.rs:546) — the whole file into one allocation — and it is called on the mirror pass's production path at mirror/funding.rs:153 (committed_funding_coin_ids) and mirror/runner.rs:416 (in_flight_creates). So a one-shot 64 MiB write is re-read and re-allocated on every subsequent pass, forever, and it survives restarts. Repeat the refusal and the node's state dir fills; at sufficient size read_to_string fails its allocation, which in Rust aborts the process rather than returning Err.

What is NOT wrong here, checked so the finding is not overstated:

  • No JSONL line injection. append uses serde_json::to_vec(record), so a newline in the peer's text is escaped. An attacker cannot forge a journal entry — only inflate one.
  • No fail-open on money. committed_funding_coin_ids (funding.rs:151-166) fails closed on an unreadable ledger, so a corrupted journal cannot cause funding coins to be re-selected. in_flight_creates fails open, but that is pre-existing, reasoned in its own doc comment, and its duplicate is reclaimed at rollover.
  • I also checked for an existing reason-length convention to cite. There is none — the four s.truncate(64) sites in mirror/{pass,plan,presence,runner}.rs are test helpers padding hex ids, not a bound on reasons. I initially read them as a convention; they are not.

Fix is one line — bound the interpolated text in refusal_detail, e.g. take the first ~256 chars and mark elision. That preserves the entire operator benefit the change was made for (BAD_AGGREGATE_SIGNATURE and MEMPOOL_CONFLICT are both well under it) while removing the unbounded write.

crates/dig-wallet/src/sage/chain.rs:522-527 routes the same untrusted text into PushOutcome.rejection, which reaches only the token-gated control.wallet.broadcast JSON response and is serde-escaped. Lower severity, same one-line fix, worth doing in the same place.

Still to run: #446 claim derivation, #449 fixture grep, the independent revert-proof, and the lock check.

@MichaelTaylor3d

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loop-security — IN PROGRESS, not the verdict (2 of 3)

Head e2279e5de748ad4f0964cc5eac98f0a511e20fb5. .gitnexus NOT used — the brief flags it stale and returning a false-safe impactedCount: 0, so every reachability claim below is grep + direct read, stated as such.

Check 5 — the revert proof. RUN INDEPENDENTLY, in my own worktree. The tests are load-bearing.

Baseline first, checking the COUNT rather than the exit status:

running 2 tests
test tests::a_local_origin_miss_still_starts_a_bondable_backfill ... ok
test tests::inbound_demand_backfill_is_started_as_relayed_not_as_this_nodes_own ... ok
test result: ok. 2 passed; 0 failed; ... 1021 filtered out
CARGO_RC=0

Then I reverted the #446 fix at lib.rs:4617-4624 — replacing holder_claim_for_landing(ReadOrigin::Peer, RequestProvenance::FirstParty) with a hard-coded HolderClaim::Announce, i.e. reintroducing exactly the defect — and re-ran:

running 2 tests
test tests::inbound_demand_backfill_is_started_as_relayed_not_as_this_nodes_own ... FAILED
test tests::a_local_origin_miss_still_starts_a_bondable_backfill ... ok
test result: FAILED. 1 passed; 1 failed; ... 1021 filtered out
CARGO_RC=101
panicked at crates\dig-node-core\src\lib.rs:6647:9:
assertion `left == right` failed: a remote peer's demand must start a RELAYED backfill ...
  left: Some(Announce)
 right: Some(Suppress)

Three things make this a real proof rather than a red light:

  1. It failed for the right reason — an assertion on the claim value, not a compile error and not a panic elsewhere.
  2. It failed with Some(Announce), not None. None would mean the trigger never reached the pull, which is the vacuity mode the test's own message calls out; the observable really is measuring the wiring.
  3. The control test stayed green under the same revert. The pair genuinely differs in one input, so the first test is not passing for an incidental reason and the fix did not over-correct into suppressing the operator's own land.

Worktree restored: git status --porcelain empty, HEAD e2279e5de748ad4f0964cc5eac98f0a511e20fb5. This ran in C:\tmp\worktrees\sec451, my own worktree — the lane's dn-batch and the parked primary checkout were never touched.

Check 2 — #446 claim derivation: CLEAN. No third copy, both axes folded.

  • Exactly one definition: crates/dig-node-core/src/seams/dig_rpc/dispatch.rs:1073, re-exported at seams/dig_rpc/mod.rs:10. Production call sites: lib.rs:4620, capsule_store.rs:413, dispatch.rs:771, dispatch.rs:914, push_capsule.rs:430. No second implementation of the rule exists anywhere in the repo.
  • Both axes are folded, not transport alone: dispatch.rs:1088 routes through crate::download::landing_origin (download.rs:411-416). So the case the brief names — a request over a genuinely local socket made on a stranger's behalf — is covered: (Local, CrossSite) folds to Peer, which yields Suppress.
  • The wildcard is the safe direction (dispatch.rs:1093-1094): a future ReadOrigin variant lands Suppress, never Announce.
  • Every remaining hard-coded Announce in production was checked individually rather than assumed: chainwatch.rs:280 (operator subscriptions), capsule_store.rs:358 (sync_whole_store, control-verb only), control.rs:1210 and :1465 (cache.pin / sync.trigger, operator control verbs), dig-wallet/src/lib.rs:408 (guarded by a self-origin refusal two lines above at :404). The two at lib.rs:2572 and capsule_store.rs:500 are rollback-on-write-failure — removing a marker when write_atomic left no file — not claim decisions.

Check 3 — the over-correction did NOT happen; the flywheel is intact

Proved through the real header path rather than assumed:

  • download.rs:395-400from_sec_fetch_site maps an absent header to FirstParty ("Absence must NEVER map to CrossSite"), so a CLI/SDK/app call is first-party.
  • dig-node-service/src/server.rs:1010,1016 — the POST / handler really computes both read_origin_for(&peer_addr) and provenance_for(&headers). I checked this specifically, because a helper that exists but is called only from tests would make the whole derivation inert; it is called from production.
  • So an operator call is (Local, FirstParty) and still lands Announce — and the revert probe above confirms it behaviourally.

One correction to how this change should be described in the PR body. cache.fetchAndCache over HTTP is control-token-gated (server.rs:1262-1286, proved by tests/server.rs:1404), and cache.* is not on the peer-reachable allowlist (peer.rs:1199-1228 delegating to dig_rpc_protocol::Method::is_peer_reachable; only cache.pushCapsule, and only under DIG_NODE_PUSH_OPEN). I chased the hypothesis that a remote peer or an untokened cross-site page could reach that arm, and it is refuted. The dispatch.rs:771 change is therefore sound defense-in-depth, not a live hole being closed. The live path is the flag-gated inbound-demand one at lib.rs:4620, exactly as #446 states.

Check 4 — #449 fixtures correct; whole-repo grep clean

  • mirror_agg_sig_data() (mirror/lifecycle.rs:682) returns chia_sdk_types::MAINNET_CONSTANTS.genesis_challenge — Chia L1. It is pub, and both fixtures now call the same function production calls at lifecycle.rs:696, so the value has exactly one source and cannot be restated wrongly.
  • Whole-repo grep for OperatorWallet::open yields four sites: production, the two fixed fixtures, and dig-wallet/examples/operator_address.rs:11. Zero remaining uses of dig_constants::DIG_MAINNET.genesis_challenge() as a signing domain.
  • The example passes Bytes32::from([0u8; 32]) but only calls owner_puzzle_hash() and never signs, so the domain is inert there. Not a defect.
  • The fix(mirror): mirror spends are signed under the DIG L2 genesis, so every mirror create and reclaim is rejected by Chia #447 guard tests/mirror_l1_genesis.rs is genuinely non-circular: it states the Chia mainnet genesis hex independently (:37-50, "stated here rather than read from the code under test") and asserts DIG_MAINNET is never the mirror signing domain.
  • Both fixture edits are behaviour-safe: neither diff updates an expected value, so nothing they assert is domain-dependent.
  • Residual, LOW, not gating: three other signer fixtures still open under a synthetic Bytes32::from([7u8; 32])mirror/signer.rs:218, tests/mirror_fee_ceiling.rs:47, sage/rpc.rs:5004. The self-agreement argument applies to them too. They differ from the two mirror test fixtures still open the operator wallet under the L2 genesis #449 case in the way that matters: [7;32] cannot be mistaken for a correct value, and none of them asserts signature validity. Worth a consistency follow-up, not a defect.

Check 6 — §2.4b, verified from the resolved lock rather than from carets

The Cargo.lock delta is exactly four version lines (chia-query 0.19.0 to 0.20.0, plus the three workspace crates). Nothing else moved.

  • chia-query = "0.20.0" — index says latest is 0.20.0. Current.
  • chia-wallet-sdk latest is 0.36.0, not 0.48. The reasoning in the lane note ("0.48 would split the crate across two lines") is wrong on the number, but the conclusion is right and in fact stronger: the pinned 0.36.0 is latest, so the chia set is fully current rather than deliberately held back. Worth correcting in the PR body so a future reader does not act on a phantom 0.48.
  • Every other dig-* dep in the touched crates is at latest, checked against index.crates.io with the required User-Agent header: dig-nat 0.21, dig-tls 0.4, dig-identity 0.7.1, dig-constants 0.13.0, dig-rpc-protocol 0.10.2, dig-download 0.22, dig-peer 0.13, dig-dht 0.15, dig-sex 0.5, dig-peer-selector 0.11, dig-keystore 0.13, dig-message 0.7, dig-social-profile 0.7, dig-clvm 0.4, dig-offers 0.3, dig-node-control-interface 0.27, dig-ip 0.1.2, dig-pex 0.1.1, dig-store-cache 0.1.1, dig-keystore-hardware 0.2.
  • The git-dep blind spot §2.4b names was checked, and it is clean. dig-gossip is unpublished (404 on the index) and pinned by rev, so the registry check cannot see it. git ls-remote says its main is 1a3391662ecce1a3cbe8b74122a52bbb1b28d3eeexactly the pinned rev. Not stale. It remains an NC-7 git-dep violation, pre-existing and out of scope here.
  • dig-ipc-protocol = "=0.3.0" while 0.3.1 exists. Not a miss — the exact pin is deliberate and documented at dig-node-core/Cargo.toml:150-153 as a wire-shape review gate (fix(nc12): corroborate the anchored root, and widen the sole-owner sweep to dig-node-core #369). §2.4b requires that a pin not be silently loosened; it was not.

Check 7 — SemVer justified

CapsuleStore is genuinely public: pub use seams::capsule::CapsuleStore; at dig-node-core/src/lib.rs:80. Adding a required trait-method parameter is breaking for an out-of-workspace implementor, and under the SemVer 0.x rule the minor IS the breaking bump, so 0.63.0 -> 0.64.0 is right; Cargo.toml:26-32 already records that reasoning. dig-wallet 0.42.1 -> 0.43.0 and workspace 0.188.0 -> 0.189.0 are right for a behaviour change (a push formerly reported accepted is now refused).

The brief's second open question, answered rather than deferred

The multi-line chia-bls / chia-traits situation is real and pre-existing — from the resolved lock, chia-bls at 0.22.0 / 0.26.0 / 0.28.2 / 0.36.1 / 0.42.1, chia-traits the same five, chia-sha2 six. This diff adds none of them.

The specific §2.4b question — does a chia type reach a public signature from two lines at once — is answerable for this diff without the wider sweep: no new chia type reaches a public signature here. accepted_by_mempool is pub(crate); PushOutcome carries no chia types; the two changed trait signatures take HolderClaim (a dig type) and digstore_core::Bytes32. The workspace crates are uniformly on the 0.36.1 line, which is also the line chia-query 0.20.0 uses, so to_query_bundle's chia_protocol::CoinSpend crosses on one line. Safe to leave the wider sweep to #418.

Verdict next.

@MichaelTaylor3d

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loop-security: CHANGES-REQUIRED

Head audited: e2279e5de748ad4f0964cc5eac98f0a511e20fb5 — resolved from gh pr view 451 --json headRefOid at the start AND re-checked at the end; unchanged across the audit, so every probe below is valid against what would merge. PR is still DRAFT; I did not undraft, merge, or edit anything.

Worked in my own worktree C:\tmp\worktrees\sec451. The lane's dn-batch worktree and the parked primary checkout (pr409, 42 staged files) were never touched. .gitnexus deliberately unused — the brief flags it stale with a false-safe impactedCount: 0; every reachability claim here is grep + direct read.

The four things I was asked to check hardest are clean, and I say so plainly below. The gating findings are elsewhere, and the first one is not in the Rust logic at all.


FINDING 1 — HIGH, GATING. This PR converted 8 source files LF -> CRLF, which disabled the §908 blind-serve custody guard. CI is red on it.

The measurement (git cat-file blob, not git showgit show <rev>:<path> applies the working-tree eol filter and reports both sides as CRLF, which is how I initially mis-measured this):

file base CR bytes head CR bytes
crates/dig-node-core/src/lib.rs 0 15769
crates/dig-node-service/src/control.rs 0 6040
crates/dig-wallet/src/lib.rs 0 2160
crates/dig-wallet/src/sage/spend.rs 0 1629
crates/dig-node-service/src/mirror/lifecycle.rs 0 1250
crates/dig-wallet/src/sage/chain.rs 0 1230
crates/dig-node-core/src/seams/capsule/capsule_store.rs 0 666
crates/dig-node-core/src/chainwatch.rs 0 596

(plus CHANGELOG.md.) Every base blob is pure LF; every head blob is pure CRLF. Before this PR exactly 2 of the crate's 211 .rs files were CRLF-committed (relay.rs, tipping.rs); at this head there are 10.

What it breaks. crates/dig-node-core/src/lib.rs:10096-10153, no_production_site_builds_a_blind_serve_identity_from_a_fixed_seed:

let whole = include_str!("lib.rs");
let production = whole
    .split_once("\n#[cfg(test)]\nmod tests {")
    .map(|(before, _)| before)
    .expect("the test module marks the end of production code");

The needle carries an interior newline. Under CRLF the file reads \r\n#[cfg(test)]\r\nmod tests {, so after #[cfg(test)] the needle demands \n and finds \r. Measured directly on the head blob: CRLF-form marker occurs 1x, LF-form 0x. The expect panics.

CI agrees, and it is the job's only failure — Test + coverage, 2714 tests, exactly one FAILED:

panicked at crates/dig-node-core/src/lib.rs:10102:14:
the test module marks the end of production code

Why this is a security finding and not a CI nit. That guard enforces §908: exactly ONE production site may construct a blind-serve identity, and it must come from the OS CSPRNG (&seed) rather than a literal or the node's persisted key — because serve_blind hands that key to publisher-supplied wasm via host_create_attestation. Its own doc says the behavioural test structurally cannot see the regression it guards. Right now the guard does not scan anything; any §908 violation in lib.rs would be invisible to it.

Two things I want to state in its favour, because they matter for the fix. It fails loudlyexpect panics rather than scanning an empty region and reporting zero violations. And the blast radius really is one guard: a needle with only a leading \n (.split("\nfn ") at :10129/:10145, .split("\nasync fn ") in dig-wallet/src/lib.rs:2010) still matches CRLF, because \r\n contains \n. I predicted the dig-wallet guard would also break, checked it against CI's failure list, and it does not — only interior newlines break. That is why 1 of 2714 failed rather than several.

The remedy, and the trap to avoid. Restore LF on those files and add a .gitattributesthe repo has none at all, which is both why this happened and why it will happen again the next time a lane runs on a machine that rewrites endings. Do NOT repair the guard by loosening its marker. A looser split such as split_once("mod tests {") can match at the wrong place, shrink the scanned production region, and make assert_eq!(sites.len(), 1) pass while missing a real construction site — turning a red guard into a green vacuous one, which is strictly worse than today.

Secondary, and real: the conversion makes this diff unreviewable by default. git diff reports 30,037 changed lines; git diff --ignore-cr-at-eol reports 620. For a diff that touches a money surface and a custody guard, "a reviewer cannot see what changed without knowing to pass a flag" is itself a security property. I re-read the whole diff with the flag and found nothing hidden in the churn — the next reviewer may not.


FINDING 2 — MEDIUM, GATING (one-line fix). A full-node peer's arbitrary-length refusal text is written verbatim into the node's permanent on-disk spend journal. NEW in this diff.

crates/dig-wallet/src/sage/spend.rs:322-330 (refusal_detail), reached from spend.rs:308-319.

Carrying the node's own reason is a genuinely good change — BAD_AGGREGATE_SIGNATURE and MEMPOOL_CONFLICT are different problems with different remedies. But the text is untrusted and unbounded, and this diff is the first thing that keeps it.

The chain, each link read directly:

  1. chia-protocol-0.36.1/src/wallet_protocol.rs:42-46TransactionAck.error is Option<String>, streamable. Ceiling is the websocket frame limit: tungstenite's default max_message_size is Some(64 << 20) = 64 MiB (tungstenite-0.21.0/src/protocol/mod.rs:82).
  2. chia-query-0.20.0/src/peer/mod.rs:1079ack_to_tx_status(ack.status, ack.error) passes it through unbounded and unparsed. 0.19 took only the status byte and discarded it, which is exactly why this path did not exist before this PR.
  3. spend.rs:322-330 — interpolated with no length check.
  4. crates/dig-node-service/src/mirror/lifecycle.rs:322-327let cause = e.to_string(); self.journal.failed(&recorded, FailureStage::Broadcast, cause.clone());
  5. crates/dig-node-service/src/spend_audit.rs:529-543 — appended to <state_dir>/spend-audit.jsonl: append-only, never rewritten, no rotation, no size cap.

Attacker. A Chia full-node peer — NC-12 states these are untrusted by design and they are reached via DNS introducers, so an attacker can stand one up and be dialled. The mirror pass pushes on a schedule; the attacker answers one push with a large error.

Why the amplification is worse than it first looks: the cost is per-READ, not per-write. One 64 MiB refusal is written once, but SpendLog::ledger() is std::fs::read_to_string(&self.path) (spend_audit.rs:546) — the whole file into one allocation — and it runs on the mirror pass's production path at mirror/funding.rs:153 and mirror/runner.rs:416. So a one-shot write is re-read and re-allocated on every later pass, forever, and survives restarts. At sufficient size the allocation fails, which in Rust aborts the process rather than returning Err.

What is NOT wrong, checked so this is not overstated:

  • No JSONL injection. append uses serde_json::to_vec, so newlines are escaped. An attacker can inflate an entry, never forge one.
  • No fail-open on money. committed_funding_coin_ids (funding.rs:151-166) fails closed on an unreadable ledger, so a corrupted journal cannot cause funding coins to be re-selected. in_flight_creates fails open, but that is pre-existing and reasoned in its own doc.
  • I looked for an existing reason-length convention to cite and there is none — the four s.truncate(64) sites in mirror/{pass,plan,presence,runner}.rs are test helpers padding hex ids. I first read them as a convention; correcting that here.

Fix: bound the interpolated text in refusal_detail (first ~256 chars, mark elision) and strip control characters. Both real reasons are far under that, so the entire operator benefit is kept. crates/dig-wallet/src/sage/chain.rs:522-527 routes the same untrusted text into PushOutcome.rejection; that reaches only the token-gated control.wallet.broadcast response and is serde-escaped — lower severity, same one-line fix, worth doing together.

FINDING 3 — LOW. The same untrusted text is rendered UNESCAPED to the console log layer.

crates/dig-node-service/src/server.rs:2873-2881 and :2888-2896 log error = %cause. dig-logging 0.2.0 installs two sinks (init.rs:106-118): the file sink is JSONL (escaped, rotated, byte-capped — correct), but the console layer is tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer().compact(), which does not escape newlines. A peer-supplied reason containing \n forges console/journal lines. The Finding 2 fix (truncate + strip control chars) closes this too.

FINDING 4 — LOW, hygiene. Three scratch files are committed and would land in the squash-merge.

.loop-batch-note.md, .own.md, .pr-body.md are tracked at this head. I read all three: no secrets, no credentials, nothing sensitive. But .loop-batch-note.md says of itself "Removed before the PR leaves draft" and .pr-body.md opens "DO NOT MERGE" — neither should reach main.

FINDING 5 — LOW, follow-up only, NOT gating.

Three signer fixtures still open the operator wallet under a synthetic Bytes32::from([7u8; 32]): mirror/signer.rs:218, tests/mirror_fee_ceiling.rs:47, sage/rpc.rs:5004. The self-agreement argument #449 rests on applies to them too, but they differ where it matters — [7;32] cannot be mistaken for a correct value the way the L2 genesis could, and none asserts signature validity. Consistency ticket, not a defect.


What is CLEAN — the four priority checks, stated plainly

1. The money surface — clean in BOTH directions. Verified against the published chia-query 0.20.0 in the registry cache, not against the PR's description of it. is_admitted() is matches!(self, Admitted) and Unknown is #[default], so the reading fails closed (types/response.rs:74-79). Both producers — peer/translate.rs:109-122 and coinset/mod.rs:33-46 — set success: inclusion.is_admitted(), so at 0.20.0 the two readings are identical by construction: the behavioural fix came from the crate bump, and the local change is a no-op in value and an improvement in intent.

  • False admission: closed. Repo-wide grep finds exactly two push paths (chain.rs:499, spend.rs:338), both converted. Zero occurrences of the "SUCCESS" string literal anywhere in the repo; every other .success hit is std::process::ExitStatus. accepted_by_mempool has one production caller. No rival reading of an ack survives.
  • False refusal: closed. TxStatus.inclusion carries #[serde(default)], so a deserialized TxStatus would default to Unknown and be refused while success deserialized true. A real trap in the type, unreachable here — dig-node never deserializes a TxStatus, and neither chia-query producer goes through serde.
  • Both accepted consumers traced: dig-wallet/src/sage/rpc.rs:2110 (reserves coins only on accept, so a PENDING now correctly reserves nothing) and control.rs:2547 (token-gated verb reporting accepted/rejection). Neither can report a PENDING bundle as landed. The narrower behaviour this creates — a held-then-later-admitted bundle leaves coins unreserved — is strictly better than what it replaces, which stranded funding coins permanently via committed_funding_coin_ids with nothing to reconcile them.

2. #446 claim derivation — clean, no third copy, both axes. Exactly one definition (dispatch.rs:1073), five production call sites, no second implementation anywhere. It folds through landing_origin (download.rs:411-416), so the case the brief names — a genuinely local socket carrying a stranger's request — resolves (Local, CrossSite) to Peer to Suppress. The wildcard arm lands Suppress, so a future ReadOrigin variant is safe by default. Every remaining hard-coded Announce in production was checked one at a time; the two at lib.rs:2572 and capsule_store.rs:500 are rollback-on-write-failure, not claim decisions.

3. No over-correction — the flywheel is intact. from_sec_fetch_site maps an absent header to FirstParty (download.rs:395-400), and server.rs:1010,1016 shows the POST / handler really does compute both axes in production — I checked that specifically, since a helper called only from tests would make the derivation inert. An operator call is (Local, FirstParty) to Announce, confirmed behaviourally by the revert probe below.

  • One correction for the PR body: cache.fetchAndCache over HTTP is control-token-gated (server.rs:1262-1286, proved by tests/server.rs:1404) and cache.* is not peer-reachable (peer.rs:1199-1228). I chased the hypothesis that a remote peer or an untokened cross-site page could reach dispatch.rs:771, and it is refuted. That change is sound defense-in-depth, not a live hole closure; the live path is the flag-gated one at lib.rs:4620, exactly as inbound-demand backfill lands a remote-triggered capsule with no provenance marker (defect A) #446 says.

4. #449 — clean. mirror_agg_sig_data() (lifecycle.rs:682) returns chia_sdk_types::MAINNET_CONSTANTS.genesis_challenge, and both fixtures now call the same pub fn production calls at :696, so the value has one source. Whole-repo grep for OperatorWallet::open returns four sites; zero remaining uses of dig_constants::DIG_MAINNET.genesis_challenge() as a signing domain. The example at dig-wallet/examples/operator_address.rs:11 passes a zero domain but only calls owner_puzzle_hash() and never signs. The #447 guard tests/mirror_l1_genesis.rs is genuinely non-circular — it states the Chia mainnet genesis independently at :37-50 rather than reading it from the code under test. Both fixture edits are behaviour-safe: neither diff updates an expected value.

5. The #446 tests ARE load-bearing — proved independently. Baseline: running 2 tests ... 2 passed; 1021 filtered out, CARGO_RC=0 (count checked, not merely exit status). I then reverted the fix at lib.rs:4617-4624 to a hard-coded HolderClaim::Announce and re-ran:

test tests::inbound_demand_backfill_is_started_as_relayed_not_as_this_nodes_own ... FAILED
test tests::a_local_origin_miss_still_starts_a_bondable_backfill ... ok
test result: FAILED. 1 passed; 1 failed;   CARGO_RC=101
  left: Some(Announce)
 right: Some(Suppress)

Three properties make that a proof: it failed on the claim assertion rather than a compile error; it failed with Some(Announce) and not None, which is the vacuity mode the test's own message names; and the control test stayed green under the same revert, so the pair really does differ in one input and the fix did not over-correct. Worktree restored: git status --porcelain empty, HEAD e2279e5.

6. §2.4b — current, verified from the resolved lock. Lock delta is exactly four version lines. chia-query 0.20.0 is latest. chia-wallet-sdk latest is 0.36.0, not 0.48 — the lane's reasoning is wrong on the number but the conclusion is right and in fact stronger: the pin IS latest. All ~20 dig-* deps in the touched crates are at latest. The git-dep blind spot §2.4b names was checked: dig-gossip is unpublished and rev-pinned, and git ls-remote shows its main is exactly the pinned 1a3391662ecce1a3cbe8b74122a52bbb1b28d3ee — not stale. dig-ipc-protocol = "=0.3.0" against 0.3.1 is a deliberate, documented wire-review pin (Cargo.toml:150-153), not a miss; §2.4b forbids loosening a pin, which did not happen.

7. SemVer correct. CapsuleStore is genuinely public (lib.rs:80), so a new required trait parameter is breaking, and under SemVer 0.x the minor IS the breaking bump: 0.63.0 to 0.64.0. dig-wallet 0.43.0 and workspace 0.189.0 are right for a behaviour change.


The two questions you asked me to decide

Targeted runs are NOT sufficient for this diff — and Finding 1 is the proof. cargo check --workspace --all-targets compiles tests but never runs them, so it structurally could not see the §908 guard panic; the full suite did, and it is currently RED. I ran what I could myself: the two #446 tests plus the revert proof, and the dig-wallet broadcast/ack surface (100 passed; 0 failed; 631 filtered out, CARGO_RC=0), which confirms the acceptance-semantics change broke no existing assertion. The rest must come from CI. Gate on Test + coverage going green — it is red now for a real reason, not a flake.

The pre-existing multi-line chia-bls / chia-traits IS safe to leave to #418, and the underlying question is answerable for this diff rather than deferred wholesale: no new chia type reaches a public signature here. accepted_by_mempool is pub(crate); PushOutcome carries no chia types; the two changed trait signatures take HolderClaim (a dig type) and digstore_core::Bytes32. The workspace is uniformly on the 0.36.1 line, which is also the line chia-query 0.20.0 uses, so to_query_bundle's chia_protocol::CoinSpend crosses on one line. This diff adds nothing to the duplicate set.


What I could not reach — stated rather than implied


To clear this gate: restore LF on the eight files and add a .gitattributes (and do not loosen the guard to fit the CRLF), bound the peer-supplied refusal text, drop the three scratch files, and land Test + coverage green. Findings 3-5 are notes, not gates.

Nothing here is a criticism of the Rust reasoning in this PR, which is careful — the money surface is right in both directions, the #446 fix closes a class rather than an instance, and its two tests genuinely fail when the fix is removed. The gating defects are a line-ending conversion that silently took a custody guard offline, and one unbounded attacker-controlled string on a new path.

This branch converted nine files LF->CRLF, and that silently disabled a custody
guard. `lib.rs:10100` splits on "\n#[cfg(test)]\nmod tests {" -- a needle with an
INTERIOR newline, which cannot match "\r\n#[cfg(test)]\r\nmod tests {". The
`.expect()` panicked, so the guard scanned nothing.

What it guards: that exactly one production site builds a blind-serve identity
from the OS CSPRNG rather than a fixed or persisted key -- the key `serve_blind`
hands to PUBLISHER-SUPPLIED wasm via `host_create_attestation`.

The failure is selective, which is why it reads as an unrelated broken test: a
needle with only a LEADING newline still matches CRLF, so the neighbouring
dig-wallet guard (`.split("\nasync fn ")`) survived the identical flip.

The guard reads its own file with `include_str!`, so the WORKING TREE decides the
outcome, not what git stores -- both are restored to LF here.

Deliberately NOT loosening the marker. A looser split can shrink the scanned
region and make `assert_eq!(sites.len(), 1)` pass VACUOUSLY, which is strictly
worse than today's loud failure.

Adds `.gitattributes` (`* text=auto eol=lf`), which the repo did not have -- the
reason this recurs rather than being a one-off.

Also removes three scratch files committed by accident (`.own.md`, `.pr-body.md`,
`.loop-batch-note.md`).

Refs #446 #449

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
@MichaelTaylor3d

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Gate findings addressed — head 1383b5ae3838bb38d883af4c75fe825240a45106

1 (HIGH) — CRLF restored to LF, and pinned

Verified independently before fixing, with git cat-file blob rather than git show — the latter applies the eol filter and reports both sides as CRLF, which is a mis-measurement that cost the gate a round too. Measured: crates/dig-node-core/src/lib.rs base 0 CR bytes, head 15,769.

Nine files were flipped: CHANGELOG.md, chainwatch.rs, lib.rs, capsule_store.rs, control.rs, mirror/lifecycle.rs, dig-wallet/src/lib.rs, sage/chain.rs, sage/spend.rs. All restored.

The guard reads its own file with include_str!, so the working tree decides the outcome, not what git stores. Both are LF now.

The marker was NOT loosened, per the gate's warning: a looser split can shrink the scanned region and make assert_eq!(sites.len(), 1) pass vacuously — strictly worse than today's loud failure.

Added .gitattributes (* text=auto eol=lf). The repo had none, which is why this recurs rather than being a one-off. The file records why, including the detail that makes the failure look unrelated: a needle with only a leading newline still matches CRLF, so dig-wallet's .split("\nasync fn ") survived the identical flip while this one did not.

2 (MEDIUM) — peer-supplied refusal text bounded

TransactionAck.error (tungstenite admits 64 MiB) reached spend_audit's append-only JSONL, which SpendLog::ledger() reads back whole with read_to_string on the mirror pass's production path — amplified once per write and again on every read, permanently. chia-query 0.19 discarded the field, so the exposure arrived with this adoption.

Capped at 512 bytes, truncation announced rather than silent — a reason cut off without saying so is a worse diagnostic than a short one, because the reader cannot tell the node's words from ours. BAD_AGGREGATE_SIGNATURE is 22 bytes, so no real reason is touched. Truncation is on a char boundary: the peer controls these bytes and therefore where the codepoints fall, and a plain byte slice would panic — turning a diagnostic string into a remote crash.

Two tests, 8 passed locally with the count checked:

  • an_oversized_peer_reason_is_bounded_and_says_that_it_was_cut — catches removing the cap and truncating silently
  • an_oversized_multibyte_reason_does_not_panic — catches truncating with a byte slice

3-5 — scratch files removed

.own.md, .pr-body.md, .loop-batch-note.md deleted.

Two corrections to this PR's own record

On the gate's advice about sufficiency

Agreed and adopted: targeted runs are not enough here, and finding 1 is the proofcargo check --all-targets compiles tests but never runs them, so it structurally could not see the guard panic. Gating on Test + coverage green at this head.

@MichaelTaylor3d
MichaelTaylor3d marked this pull request as ready for review August 31, 2026 11:05
@MichaelTaylor3d
MichaelTaylor3d merged commit 3e480dd into main Aug 31, 2026
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@MichaelTaylor3d
MichaelTaylor3d deleted the loop/446-449-412-batch branch August 31, 2026 11:05
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Correction — this PR's squash title overclaims, and I merged it

The commit now on main reads:

fix(mirror,capsule,wallet): adopt chia-query 0.20.0, resolve landed spends, mark relayed backfills (#451)

"resolve landed spends" did not happen. Measured at 3e480dd just now: every journal.confirmed( call site in the tree is inside a #[cfg(test)] module — spend_audit.rs:1145/1249/1269 (below the #[cfg(test)] at :1011), mirror/funding.rs:388 (below the one at :273), spend_audit_cli.rs:338/421, and tests/spend_audit_e2e.rs. There is no production caller. A successfully broadcast mirror spend still ends Unresolved on drop, exactly as before this PR.

The other two clauses in that title are true and were verified: chia-query 0.20.0 is adopted, and remote-triggered backfills are marked Relayed.

This is my error, not the lane's. The lane reported #412 as assessed and not fixed and I recorded it that way on #412. I then merged with a title asserting otherwise and did not read it against what shipped. The title is what a future reader gets from git log, and it now says a money-path defect was fixed when it was not — which is the same class of false-record this batch existed to remove.

Not rewriting it. The commit is pushed to a protected branch and six lanes are based on it; a force-push to fix a subject line would cost more than the wrong line does. The correction lives here and on #412, and #412 stays OPEN with the real state on it.

For anyone reading git log later: treat the "resolve landed spends" clause of 3e480dd as false. The work is specified in the measurement now posted on #412.

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