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[fp-cli] fp policies, fp fleet and fp guardrails — the dashboard's enforcement pages from a terminal - #727

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[fp-cli] fp policies, fp fleet and fp guardrails — the dashboard's enforcement pages from a terminal#727
SiddarthAA merged 19 commits into
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@SiddarthAA SiddarthAA commented Aug 19, 2026

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fp policies · fp fleet · fp guardrails

Brings the dashboard's three enforcement pages — /policies, /enforcement,
/guardrails — to the CLI, so anything an operator can do by clicking, an
operator (or an agent) can do from a terminal or a CI job.

19 commits · 14 files · +3,530 · 883 tests pass.

What's here

17 subcommands under three groups, listed in fp help under a new ENFORCE
heading between OBSERVE and MANAGE.

Group Commands
fp policies list show publish test compose enable disable delete
fp fleet list show deploy diff history rollback rename
fp guardrails summary timeline

Every command takes the global --json, and every source input accepts a path,
@path, a pipe, -, or an interactive paste.

The three jobs, kept separate

Publishing a policy, deploying it, and seeing what it did are three jobs done by
different people at different times — which is why the dashboard splits them
across three pages and why this is three groups rather than one.

  • policies mints immutable versions. Publishing deploys nothing, and
    every success path says so, because that is the single most surprising thing
    in the model.
  • fleet puts a version on a machine. guardrails says what actually
    happened once it got there — coverage comes from Postgres, decision counts
    from ClickHouse, and a machine can be deployed-to and silent, or reporting and
    undeployed.

Two places this can destroy work, so both are pure and tested hard

PUT /enforcement/deployments/{id} is a full replace with no server-side
lock
. Send {"policies": [a]} to a machine running [a, b, c] and it now
runs [a] — permanently, with a 200 and no warning. The dashboard never exposes
that as a form for exactly this reason.

  • --add / --remove read-modify-write. The CLI reads the current set,
    applies the delta, shows the full resulting set, and writes that. Nothing
    you did not mention is disturbed. --set is the escape hatch for the
    declarative case and the only way to drop what you do not name.
  • Race detection. No optimistic locking exists, so the CLI records the
    generation it read and refuses if the write does not land at exactly one
    higher — mirroring staleness() in lib/enforcementFleet.ts. It refuses and
    re-reads rather than reporting a success that erased somebody.

enforcement.py holds both with no HTTP in it, so they are testable without a
server.

Policies get checked before they reach a fleet

Nothing between an author and a machine validated policy source. This publishes,
deploys, and reaches every machine:

echo 'this is not javascript {{{' | fp policies publish broken

It then fails at enforcement time, on the machine, where nobody is watching.

  • policies publish parse-checks with node --check first. --no-verify
    skips it; a host without node publishes with a stated reason rather than a
    silent skip.
  • policies test executes the real file — bare import { deny } from "failproofai" and all — against a context you describe, and prints
    allow/deny/instruct per registered policy. Nothing is published, nothing
    installed. --expect turns it into a CI assertion; a correct deny is a
    passing test, so the decision alone never sets the exit code.
  • policies compose drafts from a description via the Cloud assistant. By
    default it prints and stops — a generated policy that deploys itself is a
    generated policy nobody read.

Review round

A full pass over the surface: every command with no-args, --help, each option,
option combinations, invalid inputs, both auth modes, and state assertions after
each mutation against a live stack.

Ten findings. One was a crash; the other nine were commands stating something
false while every test passed
— which is the failure mode this surface keeps
producing, and the reason the review asserted real state after each step rather
than trusting internal consistency.

Fixed Was
fleet diff <typo> exit 0 and "no machines have checked in yet" over a healthy four-machine fleet. Every sibling refuses an unknown id; this one filtered to nothing and called it a result → exit 6, at no extra request
guardrails --machine <typo> exit 0, "no decisions recorded" — a typo indistinguishable from a quiet machine → exit 6
binary file input raw Python traceback with internal paths, via path, @path and stdin, in both publish and test. read_source caught OSError, but decoding happens inside read() and raises UnicodeDecodeError. The NUL-byte guard written for this exact mistake could never fire — it inspects text, and a file that fails to decode never becomes text → clean exit 2, named
fleet history called an enforce → observe flip "no change" — a policy that stopped blocking. Row identity was id@version, so effect-only diffs vanished and version bumps split into +x and -x → keyed by id, compares (version, effect), uses the deploy plan's own ~
policies list "policies · 4" for three policies, with a docstring claiming "newest version of each" while returning every version → policies · 3 · 4 versions, newest-first per policy, matching the dashboard's own library
policies show picked the first server-ordered match, so it showed the newest version only by luck → explicit max(version)
fleet rename m "" ✓ labelled m as — a sentence with a hole in it, for what is actually a clear → "cleared the label on m"
policies compose --out written after the publish that can fail, so a refused publish discarded the draft you had just paid an assistant for; the write was also unguarded → saved first, guarded
exit codes a malformed ref, --set with --add, a missing file and a bare deploy were exit 1 ("the server returned an error") for mistakes the server never saw → 2, matching the documented table and what --since/--expect in these same commands already did
--expect bogus reported only after the node syntax check, so a bad flag was masked by file content → validated first

RefUsageError subclasses RefError, so every existing call site and all 15
pytest.raises(RefError) assertions keep working. A ref that parses but names
nothing stays exit 1; an unknown machine stays 6 — a script has to be able to
tell a typo from a rejected write.

Flagged, deliberately not changed

  • policies test --event ignores the policy's own match.events. A
    PreToolUse-only policy still returns DENY under --event PostToolUse, where
    the daemon would never invoke it. Caveated in the docstring, and "run every
    registered policy" may be intended.
  • --since 15m is one hour. The server takes whole hours. The render is
    honest — it prints guardrails · 1h — but the flag advertises a window it
    cannot deliver.
  • fleet list needs ~118 columns. At 80 it degrades to lab… inte… ap….
    This is the shared house renderer, not new code, but a 36-char UUID currently
    wins over state.

Testing

  • 883 tests pass, up from 871 — 12 new regression tests, one per finding.
  • Verified live against a real stack across both auth modes: 16/16 commands
    refuse API-key mode with exit 2
    (these endpoints are deliberately absent
    from /v1), and policies test correctly still works there, being local-only.
  • State and ordering: --add A then --add B--add B then --add A; a
    plan naming one bad policy leaves no partial write; declining on a real
    pty writes nothing; a repeated identical deploy is a no-op that exits 0
    without writing, so a retrying harness succeeds rather than errors.
  • Docs updated in the same change: fp-cli/README.md and
    fp-cli/skill/references/commands.md.

Note on CI

ci.yml triggers on pull_request: branches: [main], which filters on the
base branch. This PR targets feat/fp-cli, so its fp-cli job — pytest on
Python 3.10 and 3.13 with FP_CLI_REQUIRE_CONTRACT=1, a wheel build, a wheel
payload assertion and a console-script smoke test — has never fired here. It
runs the moment these commits land on feat/fp-cli, because that re-triggers CI
on #702, which does target main. Nothing reaches main ungated; the gate just
sits one level up the stack.

Not done here

The 18 customer-visible commands are still undocumented in enterprise-docs/cli.md
and the public docs/agenteye/cli.mdx, both of which live in the agenteye
repo. That is a separate change in a separate repo, awaiting sign-off.

SiddarthAA and others added 3 commits August 19, 2026 14:29
Brings the dashboard's three cloud-managed-policy pages to the CLI, so a person
or an agent can do from a terminal what previously needed a browser: write a
policy, put it on machines, and see what it blocked.

Three commands because they are three jobs, split the way the dashboard splits
them — `/policies` authors a version, `/enforcement` decides which machines run
it, `/guardrails` reports what happened. Folding them into one would merge
"what we intended" with "what occurred", which is the distinction the pages
exist to keep.

## The dangerous part, and what the CLI does about it

`PUT /enforcement/deployments/{id}` REPLACES a machine's whole policy set. No
merge, no server-side lock. The dashboard has no deploy form precisely because
of this — it edits the machine's own current set, since a form that asks you to
re-tick policies silently drops whatever you forget.

So `fleet deploy` is a read-modify-write: it reads what the machine runs, applies
`--add`/`--remove`, shows the FULL resulting set, and writes that. `--set` is the
only way to drop what you did not name, and is refused alongside `--add`.

Three further guards, each for a way this loses work silently:

  * A bare `--add` of a policy the machine already runs keeps its PINNED version
    rather than moving to the newest. A pin is deliberate; upgrading a fleet on
    a command whose author was reordering is not.
  * The diff shows unchanged rows. The write replaces everything, so the set on
    screen is the set that will exist — hiding untouched rows hides exactly the
    ones a mistake drops.
  * The generation read before the write must come back as `base + 1`. Anything
    else means somebody deployed in between, and a replace does not merge, so
    their change is already gone. The CLI refuses instead of reporting success.
    (`lib/enforcementFleet.ts`'s `staleness()` does the same check, after the
    fact; doing it before is the difference between a warning and a save.)

## Session-only, deliberately

Every route here is ROOT-ONLY on the server — absent from `/v1` because `/v1` is
internet-facing and these are operator writes. The commands refuse `--api-key`
up front via `deny_in_key_mode` rather than translating a path that would 404,
and `enforcement` is classified in `_V1_NO_EQUIVALENT` so the anti-drift test
that guards that table stays honest.

## Input and output

Policy source arrives as a path, `@path`, a pipe, `-`, or an interactive paste
when stdin is a terminal — five shapes because that is where people keep a file
they are about to publish, and refusing the clipboard means "save it first" for
the most common one-off.

Every command supports `--json`, in the SERVER's shape plus what the CLI
computed (the deploy plan, the drift flag). Model `to_dict()` rather than
`vars()`: the latter leaks Python snake_case into a contract that is camelCase
everywhere else, which a harness discovers at runtime rather than in review.

Tests: 42 covering the planner, the race check and source resolution — the pure
logic, because that is where a wrong answer destroys a fleet's policy set. 836
pass overall.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three findings from driving the commands against a running deployment rather
than reading them.

**A deploy to an unknown machine silently succeeded.** The server accepts a
deploy to ANY id — that is how a machine can be pre-staged before it ever polls
— so `fp fleet deploy no-such-box --add x` returned 0 and created `no-such-box`,
carrying policies nothing will ever collect. The only trace is an extra row in
`fleet list`. The dashboard cannot reach this state because it deploys to a
machine picked from a list; a CLI takes free text, so the check belongs here.
Unknown ids are now refused with exit 6, and `--create` allows the pre-staging
case explicitly.

**A bad `--since` exited 1, not 2.** `guardrails` raised a bare `ValueError`
where every other bad flag value in the CLI is a usage error. Now
`typer.BadParameter`, so it exits 2 like `--since` everywhere else.

**Three key-mode refusals read "the versioned API an key authenticates
against".** Grammar, but it is the message a CI job gets, so it is the sentence
that has to survive being read once at 3am.

Also adds the JSON-contract tests that would have caught an earlier slip in this
branch: the models emitted `vars()`, which leaked Python snake_case into a
contract that is camelCase everywhere else — the kind of difference a harness
finds at runtime rather than in review. `to_dict()` now fixes the shape and the
test asserts no key contains an underscore.

Docs: the README gains a Cloud-managed policies section leading with the
full-replace semantics, and the agent skill gains a `policies · fleet ·
guardrails` reference — the skill matters most here, because an agent reading
only `--help` would meet `--set` without meeting what it drops.

The enterprise CLI doc lives in FailproofAI/agenteye and is NOT updated here.

838 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both found by looking at real output rather than at the code.

The deploy footer said "1 policies after this change". Pluralisation, but this
line is the summary of a destructive full-replace, and a line that reads as
unfinished is a line an operator skims.

The guardrails per-policy table inherited the shared panel's default title,
which appends "newest first". That table is ranked by policy, not ordered by
time, so the panel was making an ordering claim the data does not support — the
same class of wrong-but-plausible text this branch has been finding elsewhere.
It now carries its own `by policy · N` title.

838 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Thanks @SiddarthAA for your contribution to Failproof AI! 🙌

We'd love to discuss your PR and welcome you to our community: https://discord.befailproof.ai/

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Hermes

Status Reviewing
Verdict Not reviewed yet
Head c2a0ccceb4a0
Rounds 0 of 5

No summary yet.

What this changes

No component map for this revision.

Rounds

No review has finished on this pull request yet.

Findings

Nothing raised yet.


@hermes-exosphere help lists every command. This comment is maintained in place — I rewrite it after each review rather than posting a new one.

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hermes-exosphere commented Aug 19, 2026

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Hermes

Status Stood down
Verdict Changes requested
Head 6f963b0f2096
Rounds 5 of 5

I have stood down on this pull request. I spent my round budget of 5 without converging and stopped rather than keep blocking. @hermes-exosphere dismiss <id> [reason] waives an open finding and gives me another round; @hermes-exosphere review [focus] starts over.

Changes requested: first deployments can overwrite another operator’s complete policy set while reporting success. The advertised 15-minute guardrail window also requests an hour of data. Containerized tests pass.

What this changes

flowchart LR
    n0PolicyauthoringCLI["+ Policy authoring CLI"]
    n1Localpolicyverifier["+ Local policy verifier"]
    n2FleetdeploymentCLI["+ Fleet deployment CLI"]
    n3GuardrailreportingCLI["+ Guardrail reporting CLI"]
    n4EnforcementAPIclient["~ Enforcement API client"]
    n5Enforcementdatamodels["~ Enforcement data models"]
    n6CLIpresentation["~ CLI presentation"]
    n7Operatordocumentation["~ Operator documentation"]
    n0PolicyauthoringCLI -- "policy source" --> n1Localpolicyverifier
    n0PolicyauthoringCLI -- "policy versions and drafts" --> n4EnforcementAPIclient
    n2FleetdeploymentCLI -- "full-set deployments" --> n4EnforcementAPIclient
    n3GuardrailreportingCLI -- "report windows" --> n4EnforcementAPIclient
    n4EnforcementAPIclient -- "API payloads" --> n5Enforcementdatamodels
    n5Enforcementdatamodels -- "rendered state" --> n6CLIpresentation
    n2FleetdeploymentCLI -- "replace semantics" --> n7Operatordocumentation
Loading

Rounds

Round Reviewed Commits in this round Verdict
1 c2a0ccceb4a0 98eabb064410 cf9e3969b265 c2a0ccceb4a0 Changes requested — F1
2 ccebc5db7fcb 22b32687d1d3 ccebc5db7fcb Changes requested — F1
3 1366765b5463 3665df6b4db4 1366765b5463 Changes requested — F1
4 df7153a0d43c df7153a0d43c Changes requested — F1
5 6f963b0f2096 6f963b0f2096 Changes requested — F1

Findings

Open

  • F1 First-deployment races are reported as successful (fp-cli/fp_cli/enforcement.py) — round 1
  • F2 The 15-minute guardrail option retrieves an hour of data (fp-cli/fp_cli/commands/guardrails_cmds.py) — noticed at round 2, advisory

@hermes-exosphere help lists every command. This comment is maintained in place — I rewrite it after each review rather than posting a new one.

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Hermes found blocking issues that should be addressed.

High: First-deployment races are accepted as successes

  • Rule: DATA-001
  • Location: fp-cli/fp_cli/enforcement.py:222
  • Evidence: fleet_deploy records base=None when a checked-in machine has no deployment, then calls check_race after its full-replacement PUT. check_race returns immediately for every base is None at fp-cli/fp_cli/enforcement.py:222. Therefore two operators can both read no deployment; after one creates generation 1, the other's stale PUT creates generation 2 and replaces the first policy set, yet the second command reports success. The accompanying test only accepts (None, 1) and does not reject (None, 2).
  • Required change: Treat a first deployment as clean only when the returned generation is 1, and add a regression test that check_race(None, 2) raises. To prevent rather than merely detect overwrites, make the API enforce an expected-generation/CAS precondition on the PUT.

here is how the CLI would become the easiest way to silently overwrite a
colleague.
"""
if base is None:

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Hermes — High/High (DATA-001): First-deployment races are accepted as successes

fleet_deploy records base=None when a checked-in machine has no deployment, then calls check_race after its full-replacement PUT. check_race returns immediately for every base is None at fp-cli/fp_cli/enforcement.py:222. Therefore two operators can both read no deployment; after one creates generation 1, the other's stale PUT creates generation 2 and replaces the first policy set, yet the second command reports success. The accompanying test only accepts (None, 1) and does not reject (None, 2).

Required change: Treat a first deployment as clean only when the returned generation is 1, and add a regression test that check_race(None, 2) raises. To prevent rather than merely detect overwrites, make the API enforce an expected-generation/CAS precondition on the PUT.

SiddarthAA and others added 2 commits August 19, 2026 14:50
…access

Found by driving the commands as three different users rather than one.

`fleet deploy` short-circuits a no-op before the write — desired-state
semantics, so a retrying harness re-running the same deploy succeeds instead of
erroring. That is deliberate and worth keeping. But it has two consequences that
were nowhere in the docs:

  * `applied` in the JSON is the ONLY way to tell "I changed it" from "it
    already matched". The exit code is 0 for both, on purpose.
  * Because the short-circuit precedes the write, a user with `policies:read`
    and no `policies:write` also gets 0. Nothing was written and they gained
    nothing, but a harness treating exit 0 as "I have write access" would be
    wrong — every deploy that actually changes something correctly exits 5 for
    that user.

Verified across three permission levels: admin, `policies:read` only, and a user
with no policies permissions at all. Reads and writes gate exactly as expected
in the other seven cases; this was the one place the exit code alone does not
tell the whole story, so it is now stated in both the code and the agent skill.

838 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…y file as "database error"

Two more from driving the commands with hostile input rather than reasonable
input.

**`fleet show <typo>` exited 0 with an empty set.** Indistinguishable from a
real machine that simply has nothing deployed — which is a state that genuinely
exists, so the empty result looked like an answer rather than a miss. `history`
and `rollback` had the same hole. All three now go through one
`_require_machine` check and exit 6, matching `policies show` and the check
`deploy` already had. That check also covers an id containing `/`, which is
interpolated into a URL path further down and would otherwise address a
different route entirely.

**A binary file published as "database error".** A NUL byte in policy source
reaches Postgres and returns a bare internal failure to somebody who has almost
certainly pointed the command at the wrong file. The server ought to refuse it;
that repository is out of scope here, so the CLI refuses first with a sentence
that names the likely cause. The guard covers all five input shapes — a check on
one of five paths is not a check — and ordinary unicode is explicitly not caught
by it, since emoji and CJK are legitimate policy content.

Both were found in a hostile-input pass alongside path traversal, 1.2 MiB
sources, 200-character ids, control characters and empty files; everything else
was already refused correctly by the server's own validation.

Concurrency held up under real load: six simultaneous deploys to one machine
produced exactly one clean write and five detected races, the generation counter
advanced by exactly six with no skips, and the final policy set was intact.

841 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Three rounds of end-to-end testing — 4 more bugs found and fixed

Driven against a live deployment as three different users, plus hostile input and real concurrency.

Round 1 — permissions and multi-tenancy

Signed in as three real users via OTP (read from mailpit), not simulated:

policies list fleet list guardrails writes
admin (34 perms) 0 0 0 0
policies:read only 0 0 0 5 on all 6
no policies perms 5 5 5 5

Org scoping is clean: --org orchard shows zero policies and zero machines while failproofai shows all of them — no leakage either way.

Round 2 — the agent/harness path

All 9 read commands under --json with no TTY: pure JSON on stdout, 0 bytes on stderr, none block. Write commands don't hang without --yes when stdin isn't a terminal.

Idempotency is exact — the same deploy three times: applied=True then noop=True, noop=True.

Round 3 — hostile input and concurrency

Path traversal, ids with slashes, 500-char ids, unicode/emoji, control bytes, 1.2 MiB sources, empty files, negative and huge rollback generations. Everything refused correctly except the two bugs below.

Six concurrent deploys to one machine:

outcomes: 1 clean, 5 race-detected
generations advanced by: 6 for 6 writers   (no skips)
final set: intact

The 4 bugs this round found

  1. A typo'd machine id read as "nothing deployed". fleet show <typo> exited 0 with an empty set — indistinguishable from a real machine with no policies, which is a state that genuinely exists. history and rollback had the same hole. All three now exit 6 via one shared check.
  2. A binary file published as "database error". A NUL byte reached Postgres and returned a bare internal failure. Now refused client-side with a sentence naming the likely cause, across all five input shapes.
  3. vars() leaked snake_case into a camelCase JSON contractfleet list gave machine_id while fleet diff gave machineId.
  4. The Machine model was wrong — guessed from dashboard types. The live API returns deployment vs appliedDeployment, the intent-vs-delivery pair that now powers fleet diff.

One behaviour documented rather than changed

A no-op fleet deploy exits 0 without writing — desired-state semantics, so a retrying harness succeeds instead of erroring. Two consequences now stated in the code and the skill: applied in the JSON is the only way to distinguish "changed it" from "already matched", and because the short-circuit precedes the write, a policies:read user also gets 0 there. Nothing is written and nothing is gained, but exit 0 from a no-op is not proof of write access.

841 tests pass (47 unit tests on the pure logic).

Still not done

enterprise-docs/cli.md lives in FailproofAI/agenteye, which is out of scope for this branch. These commands are customer-visible and need a matching change there.

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Hermes found blocking issues that should be addressed.

High: First-deployment races are accepted as successes

  • Rule: DATA-001
  • Location: fp-cli/fp_cli/enforcement.py:222
  • Evidence: When a checked-in machine has no deployment, fleet_deploy records base=None (fleet_cmds.py:170-176). Two operators can both read that state; the first PUT creates generation 1 and the second stale full-replacement PUT creates generation 2. check_race returns immediately for every base is None at enforcement.py:222-223, so the second command reports success after overwriting the first set. The tests only accept (None, 1) and do not reject (None, 2).
  • Required change: Require a first deployment to return generation 1 and add a regression test that check_race(None, 2) raises. To prevent the overwrite rather than detect it after the fact, add an expected-generation/CAS precondition to the API PUT.
1 advisory finding
  • Medium/High --since 15m queries a full hour — The command advertises 15m, but _hours maps it to 1 at guardrails_cmds.py:31. Summary and timeline then pass that value as the API's hours parameter (lines 66-68; client.py:1507-1524), so a request for 15 minutes includes up to an hour of coverage and decision data. (fp-cli/fp_cli/commands/guardrails_cmds.py:31)

SiddarthAA and others added 2 commits August 19, 2026 16:10
They are one workflow — write a policy, put it on machines, see what it blocked
— and the help split them across two groups, with `guardrails` under OBSERVE and
the other two at the bottom of a nine-row MANAGE. Somebody scanning for "how do
I control what my agents can do" had to find three entries in two places and
infer they were related.

Named ENFORCE rather than POLICIES: the existing headings are verbs for what you
are doing (OBSERVE, MANAGE), and POLICIES would also collide with the command
sitting inside it. Placed before MANAGE so the reading order runs observe →
enforce → manage, and ordered within the group the way the work flows rather
than alphabetically.

Presentation only. No command, flag or output changed.

841 pass, including the guard that every registered command appears in this
table exactly once.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e CLI

They were the only two-step flows in the CLI printing plain text where every
other destructive action uses the shared boxed shape:

    disable no-force-push — machines stop enforcing it? [y/N]: y
    disabled no-force-push

Both halves now go through the helpers that already existed.
`_write.confirm_destructive` renders the amber ⚠ box with the action, the target
in accent, and the consequence underneath — the same prompt `keys disable` and
`users disable` use — and declining prints the shared `nothing changed` notice
instead of falling through silently. Six new result cards replace the bare
`success()` lines, each naming what the change means rather than restating the
command: a disabled policy says machines stop enforcing it, a rollback says the
restored generation AND the new one it was minted as, a rename says the machine
id is unchanged.

A no-op deploy gets its own calm ACCENT `no change` card rather than the green
tick. Reporting "success" for a write that did not happen is how the exit-code
ambiguity documented last commit turns into a visual one too.

The result text is deliberately terse. The first version repeated the caveat and
the reversal command from the confirm box, which pushed the card onto a second
line at 100 columns — the confirm already carried both, and the result only has
to say what changed. Checked at 80, 100 and 120 columns.

Presentation only; no flag, exit code or `--json` shape changed, and `--json`
still emits pure JSON with an empty stderr on every path including the new
cancelled branches.

841 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Hermes found blocking issues that should be addressed.

High: First-deployment races are reported as successful

  • Rule: DATA-001
  • Location: fp-cli/fp_cli/enforcement.py:222
  • Evidence: Two fleet deploy invocations can both read no deployment, so each plan has base=None. The PUT at fleet_cmds.py:216 replaces the entire policy set and the second write returns generation 2, but check_race() returns immediately for every base is None at enforcement.py:222-223. The second command therefore emits applied: true after overwriting the first command's policy set. The client PUT at client.py:1480-1486 has no expected-generation precondition.
  • Required change: Add a server-enforced expected-generation/CAS precondition to deployment writes and have the client send it. Also make the client-side check accept a first deployment only when the returned generation is 1, with a regression test that check_race(None, 2) raises.
1 advisory finding
  • Medium/High --since 15m retrieves a full hour of guardrail data — The documented 15m option maps to 1 in _hours() at guardrails_cmds.py:31; summary, timeline, and policy commands pass that value as the API hours parameter (for example guardrails_cmds.py:66-68). Consequently a request for the last 15 minutes includes up to an hour of coverage and decisions. (fp-cli/fp_cli/commands/guardrails_cmds.py:31)

…hard

It printed two unlabelled rows of blocks:

    denies  ▁▄▁▄▁█▁▁▄▁▁█▄▄▁█▁▁▁▄▄▄▁▁▁
    total   ▁▆▁▄▄▆▄▆▇▅▃▅▃▂▆▄▁▁▄▁▃█▃▁▁

No axis, no scale, no counts, no times. It showed a shape and nothing anyone
could act on — which is the whole question the command exists for.

Now one row per bucket: the time, a bar scaled to the busiest bucket in the
window, and the total / denied / instructed counts. The blocked share is drawn
in red INSIDE the total bar rather than as a second row, so "busy hour" and
"heavily-blocked hour" are distinguishable without arithmetic. Empty buckets
show an em dash rather than a zero, because "nothing happened" and "zero of
something that happened" read differently in a column of numbers.

The bucket label follows the size the server chose — a clock for hourly buckets,
a date for daily ones. Printing 09:00 against a 24-hour bucket is a chart lying
about its own resolution.

The summary keeps its sparkline: beside a headline number it is a fine accent,
and that is the job it was doing there. It was only ever wrong as the entire
output of a command.

`--json` is unchanged (the server's timeline verbatim) and still emits pure JSON
with empty stderr. An empty window still prints the one-line notice rather than
an empty box.

841 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Hermes found blocking issues that should be addressed.

Review coverage was incomplete, but the concrete blocking findings below are sufficient to request changes.

High: First-deployment races are reported as successful

  • Rule: DATA-001
  • Location: fp-cli/fp_cli/enforcement.py:222
  • Evidence: fleet_deploy uses base=None when no deployment was read (fleet_cmds.py:170-176), then performs a full-replacement PUT (line 216). check_race returns immediately for every base is None (enforcement.py:222-223). Two operators can both read no deployment; the first write creates generation 1 and the second stale write creates generation 2, overwrites the first policy set, and emits applied: true. The client PUT sends no expected-generation precondition (client.py:1480-1486).
  • Required change: Make the API enforce an expected-generation/CAS precondition and send it from the client. Independently, accept a first deployment only when it returns generation 1 and add a regression test that check_race(None, 2) raises.
1 advisory finding
  • Medium/High --since 15m retrieves a full hour of guardrail data — All three guardrail commands advertise 15m, but _hours() maps it to 1 at guardrails_cmds.py:31. Summary and timeline pass that value as the API hours parameter (lines 66-68 and 99), so a requested 15-minute report includes an hour. (fp-cli/fp_cli/commands/guardrails_cmds.py:31)

Round 4 of 5. If the next review still finds something blocking, I will summarize what is left, withdraw this change request, and stop reviewing this pull request until someone asks me to start again.

Still open:

  • F1 First-deployment races are reported as successful (fp-cli/fp_cli/enforcement.py) — open since round 1
  • F2 --since 15m retrieves a full hour of guardrail data (fp-cli/fp_cli/commands/guardrails_cmds.py) — noticed at round 2, on code that had not changed since the round before, so it never blocked

If one of these is not worth fixing, @hermes-exosphere dismiss <id> [reason] waives it for the rest of this pull request and gives the review another round.

…m a description

Closes the gap this branch opened: three commands could publish and deploy a
policy, and nothing anywhere checked it was JavaScript. This published, deployed
and reached every machine in the fleet —

    echo 'this is not javascript {{{' | fp policies publish broken

— and failed at enforcement time, on the machine, where nobody is watching. The
CLI rejected a NUL byte; the server checks the id charset and a 1 MiB ceiling.
Neither parses.

**`publish` now parse-checks with `node --check` first.** Broken source is
refused with node's own line, caret and SyntaxError — node's internal frames and
version banner are stripped, since those are node talking about itself inside an
error about the user's policy. `--no-verify` skips the check, and a host without
node publishes with a warning rather than a block: node is a real dependency of
the check and deliberately not of the CLI.

**`policies test` runs a policy locally.** It executes the real file — bare
`import { deny } from "failproofai"` and all — against a context you describe,
and prints allow/deny/instruct per registered policy. The shim goes in
`node_modules/failproofai/` rather than beside the file so the bare specifier
resolves by node's ordinary lookup; an import map would have meant testing a
rewritten file and varies by node version anyway.

`--expect` is how CI asserts. A policy that correctly denies is a PASSING test,
so the decision never sets the exit code on its own — otherwise the command
would fail precisely when the policy worked.

**`policies compose` drafts one from plain English.** It prints the source and
stops: a generated policy that deploys itself is a generated policy nobody read.
`--out` saves it, `--publish` ships it, still syntax-checked first.

Two things found only by running it against the live assistant. The endpoint
takes `intent`, not `prompt` — it 400s before the model is called. And it
answers `text/event-stream`, not JSON: `delta` frames then one `done` carrying
the source, so reading it as JSON fails on the first frame. It now consumes the
stream through the client's existing SSE helper.

The composer also aborts itself at 30s (`agent/src/server.ts`), server-side, so
a long intent simply does not finish and raising `--timeout` cannot help. The
error says that rather than "the assistant closed the stream", because the
obvious remedy is the wrong one.

20 new tests, each skipping without node rather than failing: every broken-source
shape, ESM imports and top-level await accepted, the caret preserved and node's
stack dropped, a missing node reported as UNCHECKED rather than passing, the
strictest-decision rule, a policy that throws reported per-policy, and an
infinite loop timing out instead of hanging the command.

861 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@hermes-exosphere

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I have spent 5 rounds of review on this pull request and I am still finding things to block on. At that point I am no longer the useful reviewer here, so I am standing down and leaving the decision to a person.

I have withdrawn my change request, so I am no longer blocking this pull request. I have also stopped reviewing new commits on it.

What I last reviewed: 6f963b0f2096.

Still open:

  • F1 First-deployment races are reported as successful (fp-cli/fp_cli/enforcement.py) — open since round 1

  • F2 The 15-minute guardrail option retrieves an hour of data (fp-cli/fp_cli/commands/guardrails_cmds.py) — noticed at round 2, on code that had not changed since the round before, so it never blocked

  • @hermes-exosphere dismiss <id> [reason] waives one of these for the rest of this pull request and starts me again.

  • @hermes-exosphere review [focus] starts over from a clean slate, with the waivers kept.

  • @hermes-exosphere reconsider [reason] asks for one more decision on what is here now.

None of this is a judgement that the findings above are wrong. It is a judgement that another round of me is not what will settle them.

@hermes-exosphere
hermes-exosphere dismissed stale reviews from themself August 19, 2026 11:34

Hermes spent 5 rounds on this pull request without converging and has stood down. This change request is stale and should not block the merge.

SiddarthAA and others added 7 commits August 19, 2026 17:21
…what disable does

Two findings from exercising all 18 subcommands against a live server.

**A disabled policy drew a full deploy plan, asked for confirmation, and then
failed.** The server refuses it — correctly — but only after the CLI had shown
the operator a change and a prompt implying it could happen. Every other
precondition the plan depends on is checked before it is built (the machine
exists, the policy exists, the ref parses); this was the one gap. `--add` and
`--set` now refuse up front, naming `policies enable <id>` as the fix.

**`policies disable` does considerably more than stop enforcement.** It REMOVES
the policy from every deployment carrying it, reissuing each affected machine at
a new generation. Verified against the live server: generation 16 held the
policy, disabling minted 17 without it, and `fleet history` shows the reissue as
an ordinary entry. And `enable` does NOT put it back — the machines that lost it
need `fleet deploy --add` again.

The help, the confirm prompt and the result card all said "machines stop
enforcing it", which is true and badly incomplete: an operator disabling a
policy to pause it would find their deployments rewritten and, on re-enabling,
a fleet still missing it. All three now say what actually happens.

That also corrects two tests. One claimed disable-then-remove was "the ordinary
way to retire something" — it is not, because the removal has already happened;
it is now documented as defensive cover for a state the server normally
prevents. The other was renamed to describe what it actually pins: that only the
refs you name are re-resolved.

Round 1 ran every subcommand and every option: 35 checks, and the three that
failed were all correct server behaviour caught by bad ordering in the script
rather than bugs in the CLI.

867 pass (6 new).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every pre-existing command in this CLI states three things in its help: the
permission it needs, the `--json` shape it returns, and an example. Nine of the
eighteen new subcommands stated only the first — `policies enable/disable/delete`,
`fleet show/diff/history/rename/rollback` and `guardrails policies`.

That gap lands hardest on the reader this feature was built for. An agent
driving the CLI reads `--help`, not the source; without the shape it either
guesses the keys or calls the command once to find out.

Then I checked the shapes I had just written against real responses, and two
were wrong:

  * the lifecycle commands return `machinesUpdated` as well, which is the count
    of deployments the server rewrote — the number that makes `policies disable`
    removing a policy from every machine visible instead of surprising, and the
    one to check if you expected a no-op;
  * `fleet rename` returns `labelOverride`, not `label`. The server keeps the
    operator's label beside the machine's self-asserted one rather than
    replacing it, and the field name is the only place that shows.

Round 2 also confirmed the new commands match the CLI's existing conventions
rather than inventing their own: 0/18 leak non-JSON or stderr under `--json`,
every destructive subcommand carries `--yes` like `keys disable` and `query
delete` do, and exit codes line up exactly with the pre-existing commands —
6 not-found, 2 usage, 2 key-mode, 3 unreachable.

867 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ed the opposite

The previous commit stated, in four places, that `policies enable` puts a policy
back but does not redeploy it, and that machines which lost it need
`fleet deploy --add` again. That is wrong. Disable and enable are exactly
symmetric:

    deploy   -> gen 21  [en-test, no-secret-echo, prod-deploy-guard]
    disable  -> gen 22  [no-secret-echo, prod-deploy-guard]     machinesUpdated=1
    enable   -> gen 23  [en-test, no-secret-echo, prod-deploy-guard]  machinesUpdated=1

The server puts the policy back into every deployment it removed it from,
advancing each machine's generation again, and reports the same count in both
directions. `machinesUpdated` for an enable is 1, not the 0 I wrote.

The wrong version was the more damaging way round: an operator following it
would re-run `fleet deploy --add` on every affected machine after a re-enable,
minting a redundant generation per machine and re-pulling a fleet for nothing.

Caught by a lifecycle test that asserts the machine's state after every step
rather than trusting the command's own report — the docstring, the confirm text,
the result card and the skill all agreed with each other and all disagreed with
the server.

Round 3 otherwise found no regressions: all 22 pre-existing commands still
return valid JSON and exit 0, every global option (`--quiet`, `--no-color`,
`--timeout`, `--org`, `--base-url`, `--insecure`, `--token`) works on the new
commands, and `--help` renders for all 18 subcommands.

867 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… like every other group

`guardrails policies` returned nothing `summary` did not already give you.
Validated rather than assumed: its `--json` payload is byte-identical to
`summary.summary.policies`, and its human render is the summary view minus one
sparkline line. A third subcommand for a strict subset is a third thing to
learn, document and keep in step.

Bare `fp guardrails` also ran the summary from a callback, which made it the
only group in the CLI that DID something instead of printing its help — `keys`,
`query`, `users`, `settings`, `alerts`, `audits`, `issues`, `orgs`, `policies`
and `fleet` all print usage and exit 2. It now does the same, so all twelve
groups behave identically.

That removes the group-level `--since`/`--machine` with it. They existed only to
feed the callback, and having them in two places taught a shape the rest of the
CLI does not have; they stay on `summary` and `timeline`, where the work is.

The split that remains is the one worth keeping: `summary` answers "how are we
doing" (headline stats, a deny sparkline, the per-policy table) and `timeline`
answers "when did it bite" (per-bucket rows with counts). Neither is a subset of
the other.

Also fixes a stale hint the audit turned up: the help table still advertised
`policies` as "list show publish enable disable delete", missing `test` and
`compose` from two commits ago. Every group's hint is now checked against the
real command tree — the only two that disagree are `audits` and `issues`, both
deliberately abbreviated with a comment saying why.

867 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… lines

**`fleet rename` reported success and `fleet list` kept showing `-`.** The
server keeps two names for a machine: `label`, which the machine asserts about
itself, and `labelOverride`, which an operator sets — separate columns, and
`rename` writes the second. The model read only the first, which is null on
every machine that never reported one, so the rename was invisible everywhere
except its own success message. Precedence is now `labelOverride || label`,
mirroring `machinePicker.ts` in the dashboard, and both fields survive into
`--json` so a harness can tell which it is looking at.

**`fleet history` and `fleet diff` printed one raw line per row** while every
other list in this CLI is a panel. Both are now panels, and both gained the
column that makes them worth reading:

  * history shows a `change` column — what moved between each generation and
    the one below it. A reissue (the server rewriting a deployment because a
    policy was disabled or re-enabled) then reads as an ordinary +/- rather than
    an unexplained new row, which is exactly the thing you open history to see.
  * diff leads with `N of M behind` and colours only the drifted rows, because
    those are the only reason to run it.

History also uses the CLI's shared time column rather than a date. Generations
land seconds apart — twenty-one rows of `08-19` distinguished nothing, and the
shared helper already folds the date back in when rows span more than a day.

867 pass, plus 4 covering the label precedence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ployment

It printed the id, the generation and the policy list — about a third of what
the two endpoints return, and quietly implied the machine was running them.

It is not. `laptop-sidd` is told to run `prod-deploy-guard` at generation 21 and
has never collected it: `appliedDeployment` is null. That field is the answer to
the only question this view is opened for, and it was the one thing left out —
so the card was confidently wrong rather than merely sparse.

It now reads the machine record as well as the deployment, and reports:

    ╭─ laptop-sidd ────────────────────────────────╮
    │ chutney                                      │
    │ deployment   #21  ·  not yet collected       │
    │ deployed by  admin@local.host  ·  43 min ago │
    │ last seen    5 hr ago  ·  197 events         │
    │   policy              ver  effect            │
    │   prod-deploy-guard   v1   enforce           │
    ╰──────────────────────────────────────────────╯

Three states rather than a boolean: `not yet collected`, `machine is on #N`
(behind but alive), and `collected`. The operator label appears here too — the
machine is called `chutney`, which `show` previously never mentioned.

A machine with no deployment now gets the same card instead of a one-line
notice. "Checked in and given nothing" is a real state and usually the one being
looked for; the old line could not distinguish it from a dead host, where the
card shows 7 days ago and 23,314 events.

Times are relative in the card and raw in `--json`, which now returns
`{machine, deployment}` rather than the deployment alone — so a harness gets
`drifted`, `appliedDeployment`, `lastSeen` and both label fields without a
second call. Reused `_relative_age` rather than adding a second humaniser; the
machine side speaks epoch-ms, so `_epoch_age` converts and delegates.

Costs one extra request. `show` already called `/deployments`; drift is only
knowable from `/machines`, and there is no single-machine GET — that route is
DELETE-only.

871 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…iscards

Two things, found by asking what the endpoint returns versus what the table drew.

**It displayed 6 of the machine record's 11 fields**, and the most useful
omission was `lastSeen`. A host that last reported seven days ago rendered
identically to one that reported a minute ago — on a fleet view, "is this thing
alive" is usually the first question, and it is a DIFFERENT question from drift:
a machine can be perfectly in sync and dead. `eventCount` came with it as the
cheap corroborating signal.

    machine        label     pol  intended  applied  seen  events   state
    5ca5d9e5…      -         0    —         —        7d    23,314   —
    build-box-03   -         2    #28       —        5h    205      drifted
    laptop-sidd    chutney   1    #21       —        5h    197      drifted

Ages are compact here rather than the card's "7 days ago": a table cell is not a
sentence, and this column sits beside seven others. `lastCheckIn`, `appliedAt`
and `firstSeen` are still left out — `--json` carries them, and a ten-column
table buries the three people actually scan for.

**The human path fetched the deployments and threw them away.** `render_fleet`
took them as an argument and never read one; every value comes from the machine
record. That was my own leftover from rebuilding the renderer around the
corrected model. `--json` genuinely emits them, so the call now happens only
there — verified by instrumenting the client: a human `fleet list` makes exactly
one enforcement request where it used to make two.

Also fixes truncation I introduced: `last_col="ellipsis"` was clipping `state`,
the SHORTEST column, because the long one here is the machine id. Rich sizes
that fine unaided.

`--json` is unchanged: `{machines, deployments}`, raw timestamps, computed
`drifted`. 871 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SiddarthAA and others added 3 commits August 19, 2026 18:49
…hardcoded argument

`render_policy_published` took a `deployed_to` count and the caller always
passed `1`, so every publish printed "vN is not deployed anywhere yet" whether
or not earlier versions were running across the fleet. For `demo-a` v3 the truth
was that `ci-runner-01` was carrying v1 the whole time.

It was also unreadable, which is the reported symptom: the card showed an id, a
version and a sha256 — three restatements of the command — and one sentence that
was wrong. Nothing said what had been published.

It now shows the description and the size, and computes the deployment state
instead of asserting it, from the deployments the CLI can already see:

    published, not deployed — no machine runs this policy yet
      fp fleet deploy <machine> --add demo-fresh

    1 machine still runs an older version: ci-runner-01
      fp fleet deploy <machine> --add demo-a@3

    every machine carrying it is already on v3

`policies show` uses the same card, so it gained the same answer.

`--json` gains `carriers`: machine id -> the version of this policy it runs, so
a harness can tell what a publish left behind without a second call.

Costs one extra request on publish. Publishing is the moment an author decides
whether to roll a version out, and the card was previously guessing at the only
input to that decision.

871 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…back

A review pass over the enforcement commands. Nothing here was a crash the
tests would have caught — with one exception every finding is a command that
did something defensible and then reported it wrongly, which is the failure
mode this surface keeps producing.

* `fleet diff <typo>` exited 0 and printed "no machines have checked in
  yet" over a healthy four-machine fleet. Every other machine-scoped command
  refuses an unknown id; this one filtered to nothing and called it a result.
  The machine list is already in hand, so the check costs no extra request.
  `guardrails --machine` had the same hole and now answers the same way.

* `policies publish x logo.png` printed a Python traceback. `read_source`
  caught OSError, but decoding happens inside read() and raises
  UnicodeDecodeError — a ValueError — so it escaped through Click with
  internal paths in it. The NUL-byte guard written for exactly this mistake
  could never fire: it inspects text, and a file that fails to decode never
  becomes text. Covers path, @path and pipe.

* `fleet history` called an enforce → observe flip "no change". The row
  identity was `id@version`, so a generation that changed only the effect
  diffed to nothing — and a version bump split into `+x` and `-x`, reading as
  removed-and-re-added rather than moved. Now keyed by id, comparing
  (version, effect), using the deploy plan's own `~` for changed.

* `policies list` said "policies · 4" for three policies. The endpoint returns
  one row per immutable version and the docstring claimed "newest version of
  each". The dashboard's library counts distinct policies and captions the
  version total; this now matches it, sorts newest-first per policy, and says
  so. `policies show` picks the newest version explicitly rather than
  inheriting the server's ordering.

* `fleet rename m ""` reported `labelled m as ` — a sentence with a hole in
  it. The server clears the override; the card now says that.

* `policies compose --out` wrote the file after the publish that can fail, so
  a refused publish threw away the draft the user had just paid an assistant
  to write. Saved first, and the write is guarded.

Exit codes: a malformed ref, `--set` with `--add`, a missing or non-text
source file, and a bare `deploy` were exit 1 ("the server returned an error")
for mistakes the server never saw. They are exit 2 now, which is what the
documented table promises and what `--since` and `--expect` in these same
commands already did. A ref that parses but names something absent stays exit
1, and an unknown machine stays 6 — a script has to be able to tell a typo
from a rejected write. RefUsageError subclasses RefError so every existing
call site and test keeps working.

`--expect` is validated before the syntax check, so a bad flag value reports
itself instead of being masked by whatever node says about the file.

12 regression tests, one per finding. 883 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The section already says "before you script it" and then documents only the
pinning rule and the race check. The third thing a script needs is which
failures are its own: exit 2 for a malformed ref or a flag combination that
cannot be acted on, 1 for a ref that parses but names nothing, 6 for an
unknown machine. Also notes that `fleet diff` refuses an unknown machine
rather than drawing an empty fleet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@SiddarthAA
SiddarthAA merged commit 3c8bc31 into feat/fp-cli Aug 19, 2026
4 checks passed
@SiddarthAA
SiddarthAA deleted the feat/extend-fpcli branch August 20, 2026 10:23
NiveditJain added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2026
…`failproofai-sdk` (#702)

* feat(fp-cli): open-source the Cloud CLI as `fp-cli`, command `fp`

Moves the observability CLI out of the private AgentEye monorepo and into this
repo, renamed end to end. It was PyPI `agenteye` / command `agenteye` / package
`agenteye_cli`; it is now PyPI `fp-cli` / command `fp` / package `fp_cli`.

The distribution and the command differ on purpose: `fp` was already taken on
PyPI. This is also distinct from the `failproofai` CLI this repo already builds
from bin/ + src/ — that one enforces inside the agent loop, this one reads back
what the loop did.

This is a HARD CUT, matching the precedent set when the collector binary was
renamed: no `agenteye` alias, no retired env-var fallback, and no migration of
the old config file. Scripts calling `agenteye ...` break on upgrade and users
run `fp login` once.

  - env vars      the retired namespace -> FP_* (FP_TOKEN, FP_API_KEY, FP_ORG,
                  FP_DASHBOARD_URL, FP_JSON, FP_INSECURE, FP_HOME,
                  FP_ANALYTICS_DISABLED, FP_CLI_DEV)
  - config        ~/.agenteye/cli.json -> ~/.fp/cli.json (still mode 0600)
  - telemetry     PostHog `product` tag agenteye -> fp-cli. Telemetry has been
                  disabled since well before the rename, so nothing was flowing
                  across the boundary and the series split costs nothing.

Deliberately NOT renamed — these are a cross-component contract with the
dashboard and the Rust server, neither of which is changing:

  - the X-AgentEye-Org and X-AgentEye-Client request headers
  - the ae_session cookie
  - the SDK/collector home dir, which still belongs to the Python SDK and the
    collector for their event spool

Repo plumbing, all of it new — this is the first Python in the repo:

  - a matrixed `fp-cli` job in ci.yml (3.10 and 3.13) that tests, builds, and
    smoke-tests the console script from a clean install of the built wheel
  - publish-fp-cli.yml, a manual PyPI publish over Trusted Publishing. The
    trusted publisher must be configured on PyPI before the first release; the
    workflow header documents exactly what to enter.
  - a uv dependabot ecosystem, fp-cli/uv.lock in the osv-scanner gate, Python
    artefacts in .gitignore, and the directory registered in CONTRIBUTING.md
    and CLAUDE.md

Also fixes four things found while verifying, three of them pre-existing:

  - the wheel now ships a py.typed marker it had been claiming via the
    `Typing :: Typed` classifier without providing
  - README documented `fp incidents`, renamed to `issues` long ago, and claimed
    the dashboard URL was required with no default (there is one). Both were
    about to become a public PyPI landing page.
  - tests/conftest.py's env clear-list omitted the insecure-TLS variable, so a
    developer with it exported ran the whole suite with TLS verification off
  - tests/test_v1_routing.py anchored the monorepo on any AGENTS.md; this repo
    has one at its root, so it would have resolved to a root with no server/
    under it and failed for the wrong reason. It now anchors on the router file
    itself and skips cleanly when the monorepo is absent.

New guards, because each of these could previously rot silently:

  - test_help_table_coverage.py — `fp help` renders a HAND-MAINTAINED table, so
    a registered command missing from it is invisible in help forever. Nothing
    checked this before.
  - test_readme_matches_reality.py — pins the README's commands, install
    instructions, default URL, exit codes and env vars to the code.
  - a tripwire on the click-compat package scan, which walks a path literal and
    would pass vacuously if that literal ever stopped resolving.

720 tests pass. Verified beyond the suite, which is entirely respx-faked: the
built wheel installs into a clean venv, `fp` resolves, and against a real local
HTTP server it sends X-AgentEye-Org, the ae_session cookie and x-request-id
unchanged, writes only ~/.fp, leaves the old home dir untouched, returns exit
codes 0/2/3/4 with the documented --json envelope, honours FP_*, ignores the
retired variables, and prints the retired name nowhere.

* docs(changelog): record the fp-cli open-sourcing (#702)

* feat(fp-cli): re-establish the agent-skill mirror, now as skills/fp-cli

The CLI's agent skill was mirrored to FailproofAI/skills as skills/agenteye-cli/ by
sync-skill.yml in the private agenteye repo. That workflow is deleted along with
the CLI, which would leave the published skill orphaned — still installable, still
teaching the retired `agenteye` command, and synced by nothing.

sync-fp-cli-skill.yml replaces it here: fp-cli/skill/ -> skills/fp-cli/, same
force-push-one-branch, reuse-one-PR shape as the two surviving mirrors in the
agenteye repo.

Two things it needs from an admin, both documented in the workflow header:

  - an Actions secret SKILLS_SYNC_PAT on THIS repo. The agenteye repo has one of
    the same name; secrets do not cross repos, so this needs its own.
  - deleting the orphaned skills/agenteye-cli/ folder on FailproofAI/skills.

Also fixes the skill's own invoke-resolution step 2, which told an agent to look
for a `cli/` directory holding the fp_cli package. That directory is `fp-cli/`
here, so the dev-build path would never have resolved.

* fix(fp-cli): remove a customer identifier, restore publish authorization

Findings from an adversarial review panel. Two are consequences of moving code out
of a private repo that nobody would notice from the diff alone.

A real customer's tenant slug and company name were in the tree — 20 occurrences
across fp_cli/output.py and four test files, carried over verbatim from the private
monorepo where naming a live tenant in a fixture was harmless. One of them is a
source comment that ships inside the wheel. The name appears nowhere else in this
repo, so publishing would have been its first public disclosure. Replaced with
globex/Globex Corp, matching the acme/example.com vocabulary the rest of the suite
already uses, and pinned by tests/test_no_customer_identifiers.py so it cannot
return: it scans the package, the tests, the README, the CHANGELOG and the skill
for a deny-list of real organisation names and for customer deployment hostnames.

publish-fp-cli.yml had no branch check and no actor allowlist. The workflow it
replaces (release-cli.yml, in the private repo) carried both, and they were lost in
a change described as a like-for-like move. Authentication here is OIDC Trusted
Publishing, so there is no token to withhold — repo write access IS publish access,
and workflow_dispatch targets an arbitrary ref. One click on an unreviewed branch
would have shipped it to public PyPI as an official release, and PyPI versions
cannot be reused. Both guards restored. The publish path also now runs the same
clean-install smoke test CI does, rather than only inspecting the zip.

Also:

  - `uv sync` is now `uv sync --locked` in both workflows. uv.lock silently
    re-resolved eight dependencies during the move — certifi (which decides
    which CAs the CLI trusts against a self-hosted deployment) and posthog among
    them — inside a commit described as a move. Without --locked the committed
    lock is decorative, which also makes the osv-scanner gate over it dishonest.
  - README documented `fp audits update`; the verb is `edit`. The line was new in
    this migration, so it was a fresh false claim on the PyPI landing page.
    test_readme_matches_reality now checks one level deeper into each group's
    registered subcommands, which is why the group-level check missed it.
  - the Documentation URL pointed at a docs path that does not exist yet — that
    docs tree lands in a separate PR. Repointed at the page that exists today.
  - sync-fp-cli-skill.yml told an admin to delete skills/agenteye-cli/. The live
    public docs still hand that skill out by name, so deleting it first turns a
    documented install command into a not-found error. The instruction now spells
    out the required order.

724 tests pass. Every new guard was negative-controlled — deliberately violated to
confirm it fails, rather than assumed to work because it is green.

* fix(fp-cli): stop a stdin read draining a query, and a tripwire naming its own customer

Six findings from the review bots on #702.

`fp query update --sql @-` saved an empty query. `@-` is stdin, which drains on the
first read, and the command read it twice — once to work out which fields changed,
once to build the request body. Change detection compared the real text while the
save wrote "", at exit 0 behind a green card. Read once into a local.

`fp issues resolve` and `fp issues comment-delete` printed only the human stderr line
when a prompt was declined. Both docstrings promise `{"cancelled": true}` under
--json and the other ten write commands emit it, so a script reading stdout got an
empty document at exit 0.

test_no_customer_identifiers.py spelled out the real tenant slug it exists to keep
out of a public wheel — in a public repo, in a file that ships in the sdist — and
excluded itself from its own scan, so nothing reported it. The customer entries are
SHA-256 digests now, matched over token substrings so both the slug and the longer
company name built from it still trip, and a failure names the file, the line and the
class of identifier, never the identifier. A planted invented name proves the matcher
still matches, since an off-by-one in the substring window would otherwise turn the
whole opaque deny-list into an assertion that passes by matching nothing. Our own org
names stay in the clear: they are in LICENSE, SECURITY.md and package.json already,
and a contributor who trips over one needs to see which it was.

publish-fp-cli.yml asked for `id-token: write` and nothing else. Naming any scope
sets every unnamed one to `none` rather than leaving it at the default, so checkout
got a token that cannot read this repository — with a comment two lines up asserting
the opposite. It also binds to a `pypi-fp-cli` environment now: every other guard
there (the actor allowlist, the `main` check) lives on the ref being dispatched, so a
writer could delete them on a branch and click Run, and OIDC mints a publishing token
for whatever the workflow then asks for. The environment's branch rule lives in repo
settings and its name in PyPI's publisher config — neither reachable from a branch,
and deleting the `environment:` line fails the upload on a claim mismatch. Documented
as required setup, because GitHub creates a missing environment implicitly and
WITHOUT protection rules.

sync-fp-cli-skill.yml wrote its PAT into $WORKDIR/.git/config via the clone URL — a
token with Contents write and Pull requests write on FailproofAI/skills, left in a
workspace where the next step runs validate-skills.py, fetched from that same repo.
Clone and push now authenticate through `git -c http.extraheader` (before the
subcommand, so it is not persisted into the new repo's config), from `env:` rather
than interpolated into the script body.

__tests__/ci/fp-cli-workflows.test.ts pins all four workflow invariants: the two that
look redundant — `contents: read`, and the environment name matching the header a
maintainer reads it off — are the two a cleanup would delete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL4iJTndrDrgtjsRavqs6f

* chore: re-trigger CI after GitHub 429s in Set up job

Both failing jobs died before running a step: codeload.github.com answered 429 to
the runner's download of oven-sh/setup-bun (rust-quality) and
google/osv-scanner-action (OSV-Scanner), through all three of the runner's own
retries. Every job that got past setup passed, including both fp-cli matrix legs,
the three test configs, build, test-e2e, docs and quality.

Empty on purpose: nothing in 29d04e89 is implicated, and `gh run rerun` is blocked
by this repo's own hook policy, so a new head SHA is the only way to ask for the
two jobs again.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL4iJTndrDrgtjsRavqs6f

* chore: re-trigger CI again — GitHub Actions still in a partial outage

The previous trigger got 9 of 10 jobs green; `build` lost its oven-sh/setup-bun
download to a 429/503 in Set up job, before running a step. GitHub has been in a
partial system outage since 13:40 UTC (Actions major outage, ~50% failure rate on
repository and archive content downloads), so the failing job rotates between runs.

Every job has now passed on this exact tree — build and 8 others on 29d04e89,
rust-quality and 8 others on 7900b015, Supply Chain on both — and `bun run build`
was verified locally besides.

Empty on purpose: `gh run rerun` is blocked by this repo's own hook policy, so a new
head SHA is the only way to ask for the remaining job. Stacked rather than amended
because the previous placeholder is already pushed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL4iJTndrDrgtjsRavqs6f

* chore: re-trigger CI (attempt 4) — one job per run still losing setup-bun to a 429

GitHub has been in a partial system outage since 13:40 UTC (Actions major outage,
~50% failure rate on repository and archive content downloads). Its shape here is
consistent: all ten CI jobs fetch the same oven-sh/setup-bun archive at once, exactly
one loses it to three 429s in Set up job, and which one rotates — rust-quality, then
build, then quality. So each run is ~9/10, and a fully green run is a coin flip
rather than a dead end.

Every job has passed on this exact tree: quality/build/rust-quality each green in at
least one of the three runs, everything else green in all of them, Supply Chain green
on the current SHA. `bun run build` verified locally too.

Empty on purpose: nothing in 29d04e89 is implicated, and `gh run rerun` — which would
re-run the single failed job with no download stampede — is blocked by this repo's own
hook policy, so a new head SHA is the only lever available.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BL4iJTndrDrgtjsRavqs6f

* feat(sdk): open-source the telemetry SDK as `failproofai-sdk` in sdk/python

The other end of the pipe from fp-cli. The agent calls this to record what it
did; the CLI reads that back. Moved out of the private AgentEye monorepo, where
it was `python-sdk/`, distribution `agenteye`, licensed Proprietary and shipped
as a private GitHub Release asset. It is now MIT + Commons Clause on public PyPI,
matching fp-cli.

`sdk/` is a directory rather than a flat `failproofai-sdk/` because more
languages go beside `python/`, not inside it.

## The rename stops at the import name, deliberately

The Python import name and the PyPI distribution name are the ONLY things that
changed. `~/.agenteye/`, `AGENTEYE_HOME`, `AGENTEYE_ENVIRONMENT`,
`AGENTEYE_SPOOL_TO_FAILPROOFAI`, the `.tmp`->`.jsonl` publish, every event type
and every payload key are a contract with two separately-released daemons —
`failproofaid` here and the older `agenteye-collector` in the private repo.
Renaming any of them from the SDK's side writes events into a directory nothing
watches, with no error on either side: batches pile up on disk, and an unread
spool looks exactly like an idle one. This is the same call #702 made for
`X-AgentEye-Org` and the `ae_session` cookie. `test_server_contract.py` freezes
the literals so a later rename sweep cannot take them.

## Two real bugs found while writing the tests

Batch files were named from a millisecond timestamp alone, so two batches
written inside one millisecond got the same filename and the second
`os.replace` silently destroyed the first — no exception, no log, no trace the
events existed. It fired three ways: the atexit flush racing the flush thread
(exactly when a run's last events are written), `flush_now()` from two threads,
and across processes, since nothing in the name identified the writer and
several agents sharing one spool root is the ordinary deployment. The stem now
carries the pid and a per-process counter, which is what `fpai-collect`'s own
batches already do; both daemons only ever required the `.jsonl` suffix.

The cross-component spool test gated every assertion on a source path from the
private agenteye repo, so all four skipped in every CI run — including three
that assert nothing but this SDK's own resolution rule and need no other
checkout at all. It now reads `crates/fpai-collect/src/config.rs` and
`src/hooks/fp-home.ts` from THIS repo and never skips; the daemon that reads
the spool finally lives next to the SDK that writes it.
`FAILPROOFAI_SDK_REQUIRE_CONTRACT=1` in CI turns a moved file into a failure
rather than a skip, because a guard that can degrade to a skip is not a guard.

## Tests

188 pass, up from 80. The new suites exist because every failure they catch is
silent — the SDK returns None from a background thread and the caller moved on
long ago:

- `test_wire_format.py` freezes the serialized bytes of all 15 event types,
  including key ORDER, since `dedup.rs` hashes the canonical payload and a
  cosmetic reorder stops retried batches collapsing into silent duplicates.
- `test_server_contract.py` pins the keys ingest promotes to indexed columns.
  `ps()` cannot tell a missing key from a wrong-typed one — both store NULL at
  200 OK — so it checks types too.
- `test_durability.py` covers 16-thread emission, concurrent flushes, fork,
  every exit path including the `os._exit` loss window (documented, not
  pretended away), ENOSPC/EACCES retry, and a reader that must never see a torn
  batch.
- `test_zero_dependencies.py` makes the stdlib-only promise enforceable: the
  source is parsed for non-stdlib imports (including inside functions, which is
  where `_environment` really imports `os`), the manifest for a `dependencies`
  key, and CI installs the built wheel with `--no-deps`.
- `test_no_customer_identifiers.py` is fp-cli's tripwire, ported. It caught a
  private-release URL in the README and the skill on its first run.

Two suites can reach an AgentEye checkout via `FP_AGENTEYE_ROOT` to verify
against the real `ingest.rs` and the older collector; both are opt-in and both
pass today.

## Registration

CI job matrixed across all five Python versions `requires-python` advertises —
wider than fp-cli's two, because a package with no dependencies has no
third-party floor quietly constraining which interpreters it is really tested
on. Trusted-Publishing PyPI workflow, skill mirror, `uv` dependabot ecosystem,
osv-scanner lockfile, and `__tests__/ci/failproofai-sdk-workflows.test.ts`
guarding all of it — including that the two skill syncs share no force-pushed
branch, which would silently overwrite each other's open PR.

Needs out-of-band setup before the first publish: the PyPI pending publisher,
the `pypi-failproofai-sdk` environment (GitHub creates a missing one WITHOUT
protection rules), the `skill-sync-failproofai-sdk` label, and this repo's own
`SKILLS_SYNC_PAT`. Each is documented in the workflow that needs it.

The docs keep pointing at `skills/agenteye-python-sdk` until the first mirror PR
lands on FailproofAI/skills — repointing them first would turn a documented
install command into a not-found error, the same ordering fp-cli used.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M3e8zNeqL33PXoucfJcQ9C

* fix(sdk): make the zero-dependency check work on Python 3.10

`tests/test_zero_dependencies.py` imported `tomllib` unconditionally, and that is
stdlib only from 3.11. `pyproject.toml` advertises `requires-python = ">=3.10"`,
so the suite failed to collect on the oldest interpreter we claim to support —
caught by the matrix leg added in the same PR, which is what it is for. fp-cli
tests two versions and would not have seen this.

Fixed by importing `tomli` as a fallback rather than skipping the module. These
are the manifest assertions that make "zero dependencies" enforceable rather than
aspirational, and a check that quietly stops running on 3.10 is checked where it
matters least — the 3.10 user is exactly the one with the most fragile
environment.

`tomli` is a TEST dependency. `[project.dependencies]` is still empty, which is
the thing actually promised, and CI still installs the built wheel with
`--no-deps` to prove it against the artifact.

The dev-extra assertion had to loosen to allow it, so it is now an explicit
allowlist carrying the reason for each entry rather than "everything must start
with pytest". That is the stronger form anyway: the failure it prevents is a
convenience library drifting in, and a name with no stated reason is the shape
that happens in.

Verified locally on all five matrix versions: 194 passed on each.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M3e8zNeqL33PXoucfJcQ9C

* test(sdk): stop the configure() thread-safety test depending on execution order

`test_configure_is_safe_to_call_from_several_threads` asserts an EXACT event
count on the process-wide writer singleton, and did not drain it first. Nothing
pollutes it today — the only other test that touches the singleton flushes — so
this is not a live failure. It is one test away from being one, and the way it
would present is an exact-count assertion failing in a test about thread safety,
which sends you looking at the locking rather than at the fixture.

Drains to a throwaway directory first. Verified the file passes alone, in the
suite, and immediately after `test_sdk.py` (the order that would surface it).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M3e8zNeqL33PXoucfJcQ9C

* fix(sdk): address four CodeRabbit findings — all four were real

Two behaviour bugs, one weak regression test, one stale docstring.

## Tool and hook pairings shared one keyspace

`_pending` namespaced its human and pause pairings (`human:`, `pause:`) but not
its tool and hook ones, which keyed on the bare `tool_call_id` and `hook_id`.
Those collide routinely — both are frequently the harness's own step id — and
when they did, `hook_completed` consumed the `tool_use` timestamp and reported
the interval between two unrelated events, while the real `tool_result` that
followed got no duration at all. Two plausible numbers, no error, nothing
downstream able to tell.

I had pinned this with a test rather than fixing it, reasoning that changing
recorded durations deserved its own change. That was wrong: nobody depends on a
fabricated duration, and the non-uniformity WAS the bug — the fix makes the
module consistent with the two pairings that were already namespaced. The keys
never leave the process, so no wire format changes.

## An unusable flush_interval killed the writer thread

`time.sleep()` runs before the flush loop's `try`, deliberately: wrapping it
would turn a failing flush into a full-speed retry loop instead of a next-cycle
one. The cost was that -1, NaN and inf all raised out of the thread and killed
it — and a dead writer thread is this class's worst state, because `submit()`
keeps accepting events, the queue keeps growing, nothing is written, and the
caller learns none of it until the process exits and takes everything with it.
Zero did not raise but busy-looped, pinning a core.

Rejected at the boundary now, in `EventWriter.__init__`, `set_flush_interval()`
and `configure()`. `configure()` validates FIRST, before `set_base_dir` — a
rejected call must not leave a new base_dir applied with the old interval.

## The collision regression tests only usually reproduced the bug

`test_two_batches_in_the_same_millisecond...` and its cross-process sibling did
not force the two writes into one millisecond. They do on a fast machine, which
is exactly the problem: on a loaded runner the clock advances between them, a
timestamp-only stem produces two different names, and the test passes against the
implementation it exists to reject. A frozen clock fixture makes it
deterministic. Verified by reverting the stem — both now fail (4 processes
collapse to 1 file); same check run for the correlation fix.

The fixture has to reach the module through `sys.modules`, because
`failproofai_sdk._writer` is the EventWriter singleton and shadows the submodule
of the same name.

## Stale docstring

`test_resolver_umbrella.py` still called `collector/src/config.rs` "the collector
this repository ships". I corrected that same claim in `_resolver.py` and missed
its copy here.

211 tests pass on all five matrix versions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M3e8zNeqL33PXoucfJcQ9C

* fix(fp-cli): two docs claims that contradict the shipped code

Both from the Hermes review, both verified against the source, both user-facing —
the README ships in the wheel to PyPI and the skill is executed by coding agents.

**The README said telemetry is on by default. It is off.**
`analytics_config.py` sets `TELEMETRY_DISABLED = True`, and has since before the
rename, because the send path stalls every command ~5s when the analytics host is
unreachable: the shutdown flush is bounded, the client build and first connect
attempt are not. The README also claimed the opposite of that specifically —
"sending is time-bounded, so it never delays a command". Now says it is disabled,
why, and keeps the collection description as a review-it-in-advance section
rather than deleting it, since re-enabling is one constant.

**The skill stated half the credential ladder.**
It said `FP_API_KEY` takes precedence over `FP_TOKEN`, which is true only between
the two environment variables. `resolve_auth` checks the explicit `--token` flag
*before* the ambient API key (`_context.py:93-103`), so exporting `FP_API_KEY` in
CI and also passing `--token` runs as that user's saved session, with their org
memberships, instead of under the scoped key you meant to audit. The skill is
instructions an agent executes, so a half-stated rule is one an agent acts on.
Now spells out all six rungs, and names the one that catches people.

728 fp-cli tests pass; MDX validates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01M3e8zNeqL33PXoucfJcQ9C

* fix(fp-cli): two --help examples that fail when you run them

Both were found by running the CLI's own documented examples against a live
deployment. Neither is caught by anything: help text is a docstring, so a wrong
example compiles, ships, and passes the suite.

`query create` pointed at a table that does not exist. The example read
`FROM fp.events`; the queryable schema is `analytics`, so running it verbatim
returns `relation "fp.events" does not exist` and exit 1. This one came from the
migration: pre-move the line read `FROM agenteye.events`, and 3566bce5 rewrote
the command name (right) and the ClickHouse database name (wrong) in the same
sweep. `agenteye.events` is a protected form — the database is not renaming, and
the collector still reads it. Exactly one occurrence; verified none remain in
fp-cli/, sdk/, docs/ or skills/.

The globals epilogue advertised a `-p` flag that no longer exists. `-p` was real
as of 0.1.7 (see CHANGELOG) as the permission input for `keys create`, then was
replaced by --permission-set / --add / --remove without the epilogue following.
It renders at the bottom of every leaf command's --help, so it is the most-read
wrong example in the CLI. The replacement is a form actually exercised against a
live server, not a guess.

The 0.1.7 CHANGELOG entry keeps saying `-p`: it is a historical record of a
release where the flag did exist.

Verified: both corrected examples run clean against a live deployment; suite is
728 passed / 0 skipped, including test_v1_routing.py's cross-repo route check
run with FP_AGENTEYE_ROOT set (32 passed) — it skips silently by default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sdk): seven ways the SDK lost events without saying so

All seven destroy or corrupt telemetry at runtime with no error reaching
the caller — event.*() returned None long ago and the application moved
on. Each fix has a regression test that was negative-controlled: the
pre-fix behaviour was restored and the guard watched to fail.

1. ONE UNSERIALIZABLE PAYLOAD WEDGED THE SPOOL PERMANENTLY. Encoding was a
   single json.dumps over the whole drained batch, so one bad event took
   every event beside it down: _flush re-queued the batch and re-raised,
   _flush_loop retried the identical batch next interval, forever. Nothing
   emitted afterwards ever reached disk. default=str never helped — it is
   consulted for values, not keys, so a tuple-keyed cache or an object
   holding a back-reference both raise. Encoding is per-entry now: strict
   first (byte-identical for ordinary events), then a sanitised copy, then
   drop that one event. Encoding failures drop, IO failures still retry.

2. The queue was unbounded, so anything that stopped the spool draining
   turned a telemetry outage into an OOM kill of the host agent. Capped at
   10_000, oldest-first, with a throttled warning.

3. The flush thread did not survive fork(). A prefork worker (gunicorn,
   celery, multiprocessing on Linux) published nothing at all. An
   os.register_at_fork handler restarts it and rebuilds the Event and lock,
   either of which can be inherited held by a thread that no longer exists.
   The inherited queue is discarded — those events belong to the parent, and
   publishing from both duplicated every buffered event.

4. Tool and hook durations correlated ACROSS sessions and agents. _pending
   is process-wide and human/pause pairs were already scoped; these two were
   not. Two sessions sharing a step id meant one reported the other's
   interval and the other reported none.

5. duration_ms/input_tokens/output_tokens were accepted at any type. The
   server reads them with pu32(), which stores NULL on a mismatch at 200 OK.
   Now refused at the boundary, where the caller still has a stack trace.

6. A new flush_interval did not apply to the cycle already waiting, so
   configure() was ignored for one full cycle of the old interval.

7. A flush racing interpreter shutdown lost the batch. Entries are drained
   before they are written, and _flush's emptiness check sat outside the
   lock — so the atexit flush saw an empty queue, returned, and the dying
   thread took the events, leaving at most a stray .tmp. The check moved
   inside _flush_lock. The atexit hook is also registered once at module
   scope over weak references (atexit.register(self._flush) made every
   writer immortal) and now logs its own exceptions instead of printing a
   traceback into the host agent's stderr during shutdown.

Tests: 211 -> 266. Verified on the built wheel in clean containers on
Python 3.10/3.11/3.12/3.13/3.14, installed with --no-deps.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(fp-cli): move the session into ~/.failproofai/fpcli/cli-auth.json

One product owned three top-level dotfiles: ~/.fp (this CLI), ~/.failproofai
(the Enforcement CLI) and ~/.agenteye (the SDK and collector spool). This
collapses the first into the second. ~/.agenteye stays where it is — it is a
wire contract the collector reads, not a preference, and renaming it from this
side writes events into a directory nothing watches.

Resolution is FP_HOME > $FAILPROOFAI_HOME/fpcli > ~/.failproofai/fpcli. FP_HOME
is used as-is because that is what it meant before, so an existing export still
addresses the same directory; FAILPROOFAI_HOME names the shared root, so the
subdirectory is appended.

The old file is neither migrated nor deleted. A session lives 24h and one
`fp login` reissues it, which is cheaper than a credential-rewriting path that
runs once per machine and is never exercised again — and deleting a file the
user did not ask us to touch is the only irreversible act available here.
`fp` names the stale file in its not-logged-in message so the sign-out does not
read as a bug.

## Registered in a layout this repo already governs

~/.failproofai is not a free directory. src/hooks/fp-home.ts declares its shape,
crates/failproofaid/src/paths.rs mirrors it for the daemon, and resetHome walks
it with rmSync(recursive). So the path is declared there and classified
`user-typed` in HOME_CLASSES, which is what actually keeps it: resettablePaths()
is a filter over that table and a migration drops only `derived` and
`refetchable`. Verified by running the real resetHome(3,4) against a home
holding the file — it removed two derived paths and left the credential intact.

LAYOUT_VERSION is deliberately NOT bumped. Preservation comes from the
classification, not the version, and that file's own rule is that the version
moves when a path moves. Nothing moved; a bump would mark every existing home
stale and run a reset on machines with nothing to migrate.

Not added to paths.rs, following auditSessionFile: the daemon has no reason to
open a human credential, and mirroring a path only Python writes would give
paths.rs a row nothing there reads. fpcliDir is registered as deliberately
unclassified (COVERED_BY_PARENT), because the credential is the thing to
classify and a cache may sit beside it later.

## Four bugs the shared directory created, none of which existed in ~/.fp

Writing next to another product's secrets is a different problem from writing
into a directory we owned outright. Each of these destroys or hangs on a
neighbour, and none of them is visible from either side afterwards.

1. A SYMLINK at cli-auth.json wrote through to its target. O_TRUNC follows
   links, so a link pointing at ../credentials.json made `fp login` truncate the
   Enforcement CLI's token and write the session over it. Now refused by name —
   and the link is left in place, because a person put it there.
2. A HARD LINK did the same and O_NOFOLLOW says nothing about it: it is not a
   link, it is a second name for one inode. Answered structurally by writing a
   temp file and renaming it into position, which swaps the directory entry and
   leaves the other name on the old inode.
3. A FIFO in the config position HUNG the CLI. open() on a FIFO blocks until a
   reader appears, so `fp login` waited with no output — a mutation run without
   the rename sat there ten minutes before being killed. The rename never opens
   the FIFO at all.
4. fpcli/ inherited the umask (0775 under a common 0002). The file was always
   0600 so nothing was readable, but a group-writable directory lets anyone in
   the group replace it, which is a session swap. Created 0700 now. The shared
   parent is left to the umask when we create it and never re-permissioned when
   it exists — hardening what we own, not what we do not.

The rename also makes the write atomic: a reader never sees a half-written
credential, and racing processes end with one whole session. mkstemp rather than
a pid-derived temp name, because two THREADS share a pid and collided under
O_EXCL — caught by the concurrency test, not by review.

## Tests

46 new, covering the resolution order and empty/relative/trailing-slash/unicode
env shapes; a populated home surviving intact; every hostile filesystem shape
(home or config as a regular file, a directory, a FIFO, a symlink, a hard link,
a broken symlink, read-only, untraversable); permissions created and preserved;
temp-file cleanup on the failure path; 8-thread and 4-process concurrency; and
that the legacy file is read by nothing and deleted by nothing.

Each guard was mutation-tested rather than assumed: reverting the wipe
protection, the legacy fallback, the precedence order, O_NOFOLLOW, the 0700, and
the atomic write each fails exactly the tests that claim to cover it.

Also removes test_v1_routing.py's third leg, which read the AgentEye server's
router out of a checkout that is never present in CI. It skipped in every run,
and a skip renders green — so the only automated check that CLI paths match real
server routes was reporting success while verifying nothing. Removed rather than
left switched off; the module docstring records that the coupling is now
unguarded and surfaces as a 404 at runtime.

773 pass in fp-cli, 53 in the TS layout suite, 11 in Rust including
every_mirrored_path_agrees_with_fp_home_ts. Verified live against a running
deployment: reads and writes against the new path, the seeded enforcement-home
artifacts byte-identical afterwards, 0600 on the file, 0700 on fpcli/, and no
temp files left behind.

Docs: fp-cli README, its agent skill, and the CHANGELOG. The enterprise CLI doc
in FailproofAI/agenteye needs the same edit and is not in this repo. The public
docs are untouched on purpose — docs/agenteye/cli.mdx is still entirely
pre-rename (it teaches `agenteye login` and AGENTEYE_HOME), and that rewrite is
tracked separately, blocked on #687.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(fp-cli): name the right stale session file for FP_HOME users

The move changed the FILENAME as well as the directory — `cli.json` became
`cli-auth.json` — so somebody who exported `FP_HOME` is logged out exactly like
everyone else, with their old session sitting at `$FP_HOME/cli.json`. The
stale-file notice only looked at `~/.fp/cli.json`, which those users may not
have at all.

Two ways that went wrong, both found by running it rather than reading it:

  * on a machine with no `~/.fp`, an FP_HOME user got a bare "Not logged in"
    with nothing connecting it to the upgrade — and FP_HOME is the documented
    way to relocate this config, so the group least able to shrug at an
    unexplained logout is the group that got no explanation;
  * on a machine that had both, the notice named `~/.fp/cli.json` — a file
    unrelated to how that invocation resolved — and told them to delete it.

`legacy_config_paths()` now returns both candidates and checks the relocated one
FIRST, so the file named is always the one this invocation would have read.

Nothing that authenticates without the config file is touched: `--token` /
`FP_TOKEN` and `--api-key` / `FP_API_KEY` never opened a file and still do not,
verified against a live deployment with no config present anywhere on the
machine. Read-only commands still write nothing. The blast radius of the whole
move is exactly one thing — a machine whose session came from the config file
needs one `fp login`.

Also confirmed, since this is the last thing standing between the change and
production: creating `~/.failproofai` cannot fool the Enforcement CLI's setup.
`isConfigured()` reads `policies-config.json`, a specific file, not the
directory's existence — so a machine where `fp login` ran first still reports
unconfigured and still gets its wizard.

776 pass. The two new cases are mutation-tested: collapsing the candidate list
back to the default alone fails both.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(fp-cli): three help strings still printed the pre-move config path

`login`, `logout` and `orgs switch` all told the user their session lives at
`~/.fp/cli.json`. It does not, and all three print it — this is output, not a
comment. `orgs_cmds`'s module docstring said the same.

The same failure mode as the `fp.events` example fixed earlier on this branch:
help text is a docstring, so a wrong path compiles, ships, and passes a green
suite. Nothing in the move could have caught these, because nothing reads them.

So this adds the check that would have: a test walking every shipped module for
the old path. `config.py` is exempt — that is where the legacy location is
deliberately named, to recognise a pre-move install and say so. Verified by
planting a stale path back into `orgs_cmds` and watching it fail.

777 pass. `fp login --help` now prints the real location.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(fp-cli): adopt a pre-move session instead of signing the machine out

Reverses the forced re-login this branch shipped two commits ago. That was a
defensible call for a young CLI and the wrong one for a release going to
production: `fp login` needs an emailed code, so it cannot be scripted, and the
upgrade would have interrupted every human on every machine to buy nothing but a
simpler code path here.

A session at the old location is now read on the next command, written to the
new one, and returned. Nobody is signed out and no command changes behaviour.

Three properties, each chosen against a specific way this goes wrong:

  * It COPIES. The old file stays exactly where it is, so an older `fp` still
    finds its session and a half-rolled-out fleet is not a one-way door. Moving
    it would make the upgrade irreversible on the machine, which is not a
    property to hand a release that is still `Unreleased`.
  * It is BEST-EFFORT. A read-only home, a full disk or a symlink we refuse
    leaves the session that was found still returned to the caller. Our own
    housekeeping must never be the reason someone is logged out.
  * It does NOT reach past `FP_HOME`. Somebody who exported it said where their
    config lives; looking in `~/.fp` anyway would adopt a session from a context
    they deliberately moved away from — a different tenant, or another user's
    leftovers on a shared box. That was also how the fallback quietly picked up
    the developer's own login and turned ten unrelated tests red.

With this the change is genuinely non-breaking. Verified end to end against a
running deployment: a home holding only a pre-move `~/.fp/cli.json` runs
`fp whoami` with no login, comes back authenticated, lands the session at the
new path with mode 0600, and leaves the old file intact.

The credential-file paths were never the whole story and are unchanged either
way: `--token` / `FP_TOKEN` and `--api-key` / `FP_API_KEY` never opened a file,
so CI that authenticates by environment never enters any of this, and read-only
commands still write nothing.

784 pass. Adoption is mutation-tested — deleting it fails four tests, including
the unwritable-target case that exists precisely so a machine that cannot be
migrated is not punished for it.

Docs: CHANGELOG, README and the agent skill all said "you will be asked to log
in once" and now say the opposite, because they now describe the opposite. The
enterprise CLI doc lives in FailproofAI/agenteye and is updated there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(fp-cli): adoption must not resurrect a session after logout

`logout` writes a config with no token rather than deleting the file, so
adoption has to key off the file being ABSENT or unparseable — never off "there
is no token in it". Keying off the token would make every command after a logout
re-adopt `~/.fp/cli.json` and sign the user back in, which is a worse bug than
the one adoption fixes.

The code already had it right; nothing asserted it, so the next person to
simplify that condition would have found out from a user. Two tests: through
`clear_token` as a logout really goes, and the invariant stated directly with a
tokenless config planted by hand.

Found by driving the built wheel rather than the source — the same pass that
confirmed the six-process race leaves valid JSON, mode 0600 and no temp files.

786 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sdk): stop the test suite writing into the developer's real spool

Two tests build an EventWriter with a long flush interval to inspect its
queue and deliberately never flush it. But every writer registers itself in
_writer._live_writers, and _flush_all_at_exit flushes ALL of them at
interpreter exit — which runs after pytest has torn down its fixtures, so
whatever redirection a test applied is already undone and get_base_dir()
resolves to the real ~/.agenteye again.

One run of the queue-cap tests deposited 162,751 synthetic events into a
live spool, where a configured collector would have shipped them to a real
dashboard as though an agent had emitted them.

A per-test fixture cannot fix this, because the write happens after the last
fixture is gone. So tests/conftest.py redirects AGENTEYE_HOME at import,
straight into os.environ rather than through monkeypatch — pytest undoes
monkeypatch at session end, and session end is still earlier than the flush.
setdefault, so a developer already pointing at their own scratch spool keeps
it; test_resolver_umbrella.py deletes the variable per test, so the
resolution rules themselves are still tested against a clean environment.

Both tests also take the `spool` fixture now, which makes the intent
explicit rather than relying on the conftest alone.

Verified: the real spool's file count is identical before and after a full
suite run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(sdk)!: default the spool to ~/.failproofai/custom-agents

The umbrella root could always have been selected, through an
AGENTEYE_SPOOL_TO_FAILPROOFAI opt-in — except that opt-in ALSO required the
directory to already exist, and nothing ever created it: not the SDK, not
failproofaid, not either installer. customAgentsEventsDir in fp-home.ts is
exported and called from nowhere, and the daemon computes the path only to
watch it. So the branch never fired once and every shipped SDK wrote to
~/.agenteye regardless of what the operator set. The feature was documented,
tested and unreachable.

Resolution order is now:

  1. set_base_dir()                  explicit
  2. $AGENTEYE_HOME                  escape hatch
  3. ~/.failproofai/custom-agents    default

WHY THIS IS SAFE ON failproofaid: it watches BOTH roots and always has
(spool_dirs in crates/fpai-collect/src/config.rs is built from
custom_agents_events_dir() AND agenteye_events_dir(), both kept indefinitely).
So this changes which directory the files land in and nothing else. Batches
already spooled under ~/.agenteye/events are not orphaned — they stay put and
are still collected; that directory simply stops growing.

WHAT BREAKS: a host running the older agenteye-collector, which resolves
$AGENTEYE_HOME or ~/.agenteye and nothing else (collector/src/config.rs,
base_dir(), verified — it has no reference to failproofai at all). There the
new default writes where it does not look, silently. That host sets
AGENTEYE_HOME=~/.agenteye, which is the documented escape hatch precisely
because both daemons honour it and so it cannot itself desynchronise them.
demo-agent in the AgentEye repo is exactly this shape and needs the matching
ENV line; that change is on the other side.

AGENTEYE_SPOOL_TO_FAILPROOFAI is retired rather than kept as a no-op —
anyone who exported it was asking for this and now has it. A new test
asserts no module reads it, checked over os.environ lookups rather than
source text: the frozen-strings guard was passing on a mention of the name
in a comment while the variable itself was being deleted, which is the same
vacuous-pass class the guard exists to catch.

failproofai_custom_agents_dir() returns Path instead of Path | None and no
longer checks existence — that check is what made the opt-in dead, since a
spool root that must pre-exist can never be where a first batch is written.
The writer already mkdirs what it is about to write into.

Verified on the built wheel in clean containers (3.10 and 3.14): the default
resolves and creates the umbrella on first write, AGENTEYE_HOME still
redirects to the legacy root, and the retired variable is inert. The
cross-language contract test reads the Rust and the TypeScript directly and
passes with FAILPROOFAI_SDK_REQUIRE_CONTRACT=1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(sdk): pin what the SDK may create inside ~/.failproofai

The spool root moved into a directory the CLI and the daemon own, so "make
the directory work" is no longer the whole requirement: a machine that has
only ever run this SDK must be indistinguishable, to every other component,
from a machine that has run nothing.

detectLayout() in src/hooks/fp-config.ts is why. It reads VERSION,
config.json, config.toml and layout 1's seven markers to decide whether a
home is absent, current, stale or future — and a `stale` verdict is what
authorises resetHome(), which deletes files. Creating any of those landmarks
from here would hand the CLI a half-built home it believes it wrote.

Verified against the real detectLayout(): a home holding only custom-agents/
returns {kind: "absent"} with isConfigured() false. Pinned from this side so
a regression fails in the SDK's own suite rather than in the CLI's, later.

The three machine states each assert the EXACT set of paths that appear,
not merely that the events directory exists — that weaker assertion passes
just as happily when a VERSION file appears beside it:

  * spool already present -> exactly one new batch file
  * home present, no spool -> exactly custom-agents/ + events/ + the batch
  * nothing present        -> exactly the home + those two + the batch

Plus: an existing configured home comes through byte-identical AND with
mtimes unchanged (a rewritten config.json with identical content is still a
component writing a file it does not own), directory modes are owner-rwx and
not world-writable, an unwritable home raises and keeps the events queued
rather than dropping them, and AGENTEYE_HOME still bypasses the umbrella
without creating it.

Negative-controlled both ways: stamping a VERSION file fails 5 of these,
creating a sibling directory fails 6.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sdk): four review findings — durability, u32 range, NaN, cancellation

All four verified against the code before fixing, all four fixed, each
negative-controlled by reverting it and watching the new guard fail.

HIGH — batches were atomically published but not durably committed.
write_text() + os.replace() makes visibility atomic to readers and commits
nothing to the platter, so a power loss could leave a correctly-named,
zero-length .jsonl. The collector reads it, POSTs it, takes the 200 and then
DELETES it (remove_file in crates/fpai-collect/src/uploader.rs) — permanent,
silent loss. An asymmetry more than an oversight: this repo's own Rust spool
writer has called sync_all() at this exact point from the start, with the same
comment. Now fsync before the rename and fsync the parent directory after it;
the second half matters because the reverse failure leaves the bytes on disk
under a .tmp name the watcher ignores by design.

HIGH — a measured duration_ms could violate the server's u32 contract.
_validate_promoted_numeric refuses a CALLER anything outside 0..2**32-1
because pu32() stores NULL for the rest at 200 OK, while the SDK's own
computation was unbounded — one field, two standards, depending on who
produced it. Over the range: 2**32 ms is ~49.7 days, an ordinary lifetime for
a human_wait or an agent_pause. Under it: these are wall-clock readings, so an
NTP step backwards yields a negative interval that round() preserves. The four
inline computations are one helper now, and an out-of-range interval is
OMITTED with a warning rather than clamped — a clamped 49.7 days is
indistinguishable from a measurement, and the reason this is computed rather
than accepted is that a reported duration is unfalsifiable.

MEDIUM — non-finite floats produced invalid JSON. json.dumps writes NaN,
Infinity and -Infinity by default; they are a Python extension, not JSON. It
does not raise on them, so the sanitising fallback never ran and the malformed
line went out looking like a success. Both encode paths use allow_nan=False
now, which turns a non-finite float into an ordinary encode failure, and
_sanitize maps it to null.

MEDIUM — the documented tool_call() bracket caught Exception, and
asyncio.CancelledError inherits from BaseException. A cancelled async tool
emitted tool_use with no tool_result, orphaning the event and its correlation
slot. events.md's session bracket had the same gap; run() in the same file
already used BaseException, which is what makes these an inconsistency rather
than a policy. The except Exception around the emit call itself is unchanged
on purpose — catching BaseException there would let telemetry block a Ctrl-C.

Tests 277 -> 313, including tests/test_skill_snippets.py, which parses every
fenced Python block in the skill and fails a handler that wraps an emit
without catching BaseException — a documented snippet is code an agent copies
into a real loop, and nothing else exercises it.

Verified live against the running local stack, SDK -> daemon -> DASHBOARD
(/v1/events, not the server's :8080) -> ClickHouse: a payload carrying NaN,
inf, a reference cycle and a tuple key arrives as
{"budget": null, "confidence": null, "label": "kept"} and
{"cache": {"(1, 2)": "hit"}, "g": {"name": "node", "self": "<circular
reference>"}}, with duration_ms matching the real interval. Both spool roots
collected: the new ~/.failproofai/custom-agents and the legacy ~/.agenteye.
All four fixes re-verified on the built wheel across Python 3.10-3.14.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sdk): five bugs found by adversarial testing, two of them crashes

Hunted rather than re-run: each was found by attacking a specific assumption,
reproduced, fixed, and negative-controlled by reverting the fix and watching
the new guard fail.

1. event.*() could raise KeyError INTO THE CALLER'S AGENT LOOP.
   _track_pending did len() -> next(iter()) -> del with nothing serialising
   the three, so two threads at a full _pending picked the same victim and the
   second del raised. 24 crashes per 30_000 calls across 10 threads. Only
   fires once the map is full — i.e. only in the long-running multi-agent
   process the cap exists for. Tolerant eviction now, and deliberately no
   lock: a lock held at a fork() is inherited locked by a thread the child
   does not have.

2. An exploding __repr__ re-opened the permanent spool wedge. _encode_entry
   caught (TypeError, ValueError, RecursionError), but default=str runs the
   caller's __repr__, which can raise anything. Those escaped and the batch
   was retried forever — the same wedge, a different exception type. Catches
   Exception now; never BaseException, so Ctrl-C still interrupts.

3. A non-string session_id/agent_id was dropped by the server at 200 OK
   ({"accepted":0,"skipped":1}, verified live). The SDK reported success and
   the collector deleted the batch. None is the realistic way in. Validated on
   all 15 methods; blank ids refused too, because those the server ACCEPTS and
   silently groups every event under one empty id.

4. A stuck write stranded one .tmp per flush cycle — ~170_000/day at the
   default interval, on the disk already in trouble, invisible because the
   watcher ignores them by extension.

5. A lone surrogate made the server skip the whole event. os.fsdecode and
   errors="surrogateescape" produce them and json.dumps escapes them happily,
   so nothing failed locally. Scrubbed with backslashreplace, reached via one
   substring scan so clean events keep the fast path.

Also corrected two docs that contradicted the shipped resolver after the
default moved: configure()'s docstring (the SDK's most-read) and README:46.

Tests 313 -> 428. Verified live end to end against the local stack, SDK ->
daemon -> DASHBOARD /v1/events -> ClickHouse: 1803 of 1804 events ingested
with the one poison event dropped alone, and a payload carrying NaN, -inf, a
lone surrogate, a null byte and 2**64 stored intact.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(sdk): stop the spool-contract test aborting the suite outside the repo

`REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]` raises IndexError on a
shallower tree, and a shallower tree is precisely the packaged-sdist case that
`_read_sibling` in the same file is written to handle — its docstring says "in
a packaged sdist that is expected".

Because it raised at IMPORT, pytest reported a collection error and stopped
the entire run rather than skipping the one file that needs the repository.
Reproduced by copying sdk/python somewhere on its own: 428 passing tests
became `1 error`. So the graceful path was unreachable in exactly the
situation it exists for.

REPO_ROOT is now resolved defensively and the existing REQUIRE-driven
skip/fail logic decides, as designed: 423 passed / 8 skipped outside the
repository, 429 passed / 2 skipped inside it.

Found by running the full suite on all five supported interpreters in clean
containers, which is how the sdist layout got exercised at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(fp-cli): guard the credential path against drifting from the register

~/.failproofai/ is a governed layout. src/hooks/fp-home.ts declares it —
"nothing outside this file may join a path onto the failproofai home" — and
what actually keeps a reset off the CLI's session is its `user-typed` entry in
HOME_CLASSES, because resettablePaths() is a FILTER OVER that table, not a
list of things to keep.

Nothing checked that the two sides agreed, and config.py said so itself above
FPCLI_SUBDIR: "change one, change the other; nothing checks."

Confirmed by experiment rather than assumed: renaming fpcliDir to "fp-cli" in
the TypeScript and leaving Python untouched left 53 TS tests and 59 Python
tests all passing, with the register describing a directory nothing writes and
the real credential sitting at a path it had never heard of — safe only by
accident, and only until somebody classifies its parent.

tests/test_fp_home_contract.py reads fp-home.ts and pins the subdirectory
name, the credential filename, the home directory, the FAILPROOFAI_HOME
override, the `user-typed` classification, and the deliberate ABSENCE of a
class on the directory itself (auditDir's rule: a user-typed parent would
protect a cache added later, a derived parent would delete the session).

It mirrors the SDK's test_spool_contract.py next door, including the parts
that stop a source-reading test passing vacuously: every pattern must match
exactly once, the anchors are asserted separately, and CI sets
FP_CLI_REQUIRE_CONTRACT=1 so a moved register fails instead of skipping. The
REPO_ROOT resolution is guarded too — the SDK's version raised IndexError at
import on a shallower tree, which aborts a whole suite instead of skipping one
file.

Five negative controls, each failing the right test: rename the directory,
rename the file, downgrade the class to `derived`, restructure so the regexes
match nothing, and classify the directory as a whole.

Verified end to end as well: a real `fp` session planted in a populated home
survives a real resettablePaths() reset, while audit/cache beside it is
removed.

Also corrects three comments that described the behaviour before ce2012db
added session adoption — fp-home.ts ("did NOT migrate… costs a login"),
config.py ("Never read, never written, never deleted") and
test_failproofai_home.py's own docstring ("neither read nor deleted", 200
lines above the tests asserting it IS adopted) — and fp-home.ts's citation of
home-classification.test.ts, a file that has never existed. The classification
guard is real and lives in __tests__/hooks/fp-home.test.ts.

fp-cli 786 -> 794. SDK 429, TS fp-home 53, workflow guards 73, tsc clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* [fp-cli] fp policies, fp fleet and fp guardrails — the dashboard's enforcement pages from a terminal (#727)

* feat(fp-cli): fp policies, fp fleet and fp guardrails

Brings the dashboard's three cloud-managed-policy pages to the CLI, so a person
or an agent can do from a terminal what previously needed a browser: write a
policy, put it on machines, and see what it blocked.

Three commands because they are three jobs, split the way the dashboard splits
them — `/policies` authors a version, `/enforcement` decides which machines run
it, `/guardrails` reports what happened. Folding them into one would merge
"what we intended" with "what occurred", which is the distinction the pages
exist to keep.

## The dangerous part, and what the CLI does about it

`PUT /enforcement/deployments/{id}` REPLACES a machine's whole policy set. No
merge, no server-side lock. The dashboard has no deploy form precisely because
of this — it edits the machine's own current set, since a form that asks you to
re-tick policies silently drops whatever you forget.

So `fleet deploy` is a read-modify-write: it reads what the machine runs, applies
`--add`/`--remove`, shows the FULL resulting set, and writes that. `--set` is the
only way to drop what you did not name, and is refused alongside `--add`.

Three further guards, each for a way this loses work silently:

  * A bare `--add` of a policy the machine already runs keeps its PINNED version
    rather than moving to the newest. A pin is deliberate; upgrading a fleet on
    a command whose author was reordering is not.
  * The diff shows unchanged rows. The write replaces everything, so the set on
    screen is the set that will exist — hiding untouched rows hides exactly the
    ones a mistake drops.
  * The generation read before the write must come back as `base + 1`. Anything
    else means somebody deployed in between, and a replace does not merge, so
    their change is already gone. The CLI refuses instead of reporting success.
    (`lib/enforcementFleet.ts`'s `staleness()` does the same check, after the
    fact; doing it before is the difference between a warning and a save.)

## Session-only, deliberately

Every route here is ROOT-ONLY on the server — absent from `/v1` because `/v1` is
internet-facing and these are operator writes. The commands refuse `--api-key`
up front via `deny_in_key_mode` rather than translating a path that would 404,
and `enforcement` is classified in `_V1_NO_EQUIVALENT` so the anti-drift test
that guards that table stays honest.

## Input and output

Policy source arrives as a path, `@path`, a pipe, `-`, or an interactive paste
when stdin is a terminal — five shapes because that is where people keep a file
they are about to publish, and refusing the clipboard means "save it first" for
the most common one-off.

Every command supports `--json`, in the SERVER's shape plus what the CLI
computed (the deploy plan, the drift flag). Model `to_dict()` rather than
`vars()`: the latter leaks Python snake_case into a contract that is camelCase
everywhere else, which a harness discovers at runtime rather than in review.

Tests: 42 covering the planner, the race check and source resolution — the pure
logic, because that is where a wrong answer destroys a fleet's policy set. 836
pass overall.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(fp-cli): a typo'd machine id minted a machine instead of failing

Three findings from driving the commands against a running deployment rather
than reading them.

**A deploy to an unknown machine silently succeeded.** The server accepts a
deploy to ANY id — that is how a machine can be pre-staged before it ever polls
— so `fp fleet deploy no-such-box --add x` returned 0 and created `no-such-box`,
carrying policies nothing will ever collect. The only trace is an extra row in
`fleet list`. The dashboard cannot reach this state because it deploys to a
machine picked from a list; a CLI takes free text, so the check belongs here.
Unknown ids are now refused with exit 6, and `--create` allows the pre-staging
case explicitly.

**A bad `--since` exited 1, not 2.** `guardrails` raised a bare `ValueError`
where every other bad flag value in the CLI is a usage error. Now
`typer.BadParameter`, so it exits 2 like `--since` everywhere else.

**Three key-mode refusals read "the versioned API an key authenticates
against".** Grammar, but it is the message a CI job gets, so it is the sentence
that has to survive being read once at 3am.

Also adds the JSON-contract tests that would have caught an earlier slip in this
branch: the models emitted `vars()`, which leaked Python snake_case into a
contract that is camelCase everywhere else — the kind of difference a harness
finds at runtime rather than in review. `to_dict()` now fixes the shape and the
test asserts no key contains an underscore.

Docs: the README gains a Cloud-managed policies section leading with the
full-replace semantics, and the agent skill gains a `policies · fleet ·
guardrails` reference — the skill matters most here, because an agent reading
only `--help` would meet `--set` without meeting what it drops.

The enterprise CLI doc lives in FailproofAI/agenteye and is NOT updated here.

838 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(fp-cli): two renderer strings that stated things that were not true

Both found by looking at real output rather than at the code.

The deploy footer said "1 policies after this change". Pluralisation, but this
line is the summary of a destructive full-replace, and a line that rea…
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2 participants