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chore(deps): update dependency altcha to v1 [security] - #858
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This PR contains the following updates:
0.2.0→1.0.0ALTCHA Proof-of-Work Vulnerable to Challenge Splicing and Replay
CVE-2025-68113 / GHSA-6gvq-jcmp-8959
More information
Details
Impact
A cryptographic semantic binding flaw in ALTCHA libraries allows challenge payload splicing, which may enable replay attacks. The HMAC signature does not unambiguously bind challenge parameters to the nonce, allowing an attacker to reinterpret a valid proof-of-work submission with a modified expiration value. This may allow previously solved challenges to be reused beyond their intended lifetime, depending on server-side replay handling and deployment assumptions.
The vulnerability primarily impacts abuse-prevention mechanisms such as rate limiting and bot mitigation. It does not directly affect data confidentiality or integrity.
Patches
This issue has been addressed by enforcing explicit semantic separation between challenge parameters and the nonce during HMAC computation.
Users are advised to upgrade to patched versions.
Workarounds
As a mitigation, implementations may append a delimiter to the end of the
saltvalue prior to HMAC computation (for example,<salt>?expires=<time>&). This prevents ambiguity between parameters and the nonce and is backward-compatible with existing implementations, as the delimiter is treated as a standard URL parameter separator.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:LReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
ALTCHA Proof-of-Work Vulnerable to Challenge Splicing and Replay
CVE-2025-68113 / GHSA-6gvq-jcmp-8959 / GO-2025-4239 / PYSEC-2026-1115
More information
Details
Impact
A cryptographic semantic binding flaw in ALTCHA libraries allows challenge payload splicing, which may enable replay attacks. The HMAC signature does not unambiguously bind challenge parameters to the nonce, allowing an attacker to reinterpret a valid proof-of-work submission with a modified expiration value. This may allow previously solved challenges to be reused beyond their intended lifetime, depending on server-side replay handling and deployment assumptions.
The vulnerability primarily impacts abuse-prevention mechanisms such as rate limiting and bot mitigation. It does not directly affect data confidentiality or integrity.
Patches
This issue has been addressed by enforcing explicit semantic separation between challenge parameters and the nonce during HMAC computation.
Users are advised to upgrade to patched versions.
Workarounds
As a mitigation, implementations may append a delimiter to the end of the
saltvalue prior to HMAC computation (for example,<salt>?expires=<time>&). This prevents ambiguity between parameters and the nonce and is backward-compatible with existing implementations, as the delimiter is treated as a standard URL parameter separator.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:LReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
ALTCHA Proof-of-Work Vulnerable to Challenge Splicing and Replay
CVE-2025-68113 / GHSA-6gvq-jcmp-8959 / GO-2025-4239 / PYSEC-2026-1115
More information
Details
Impact
A cryptographic semantic binding flaw in ALTCHA libraries allows challenge payload splicing, which may enable replay attacks. The HMAC signature does not unambiguously bind challenge parameters to the nonce, allowing an attacker to reinterpret a valid proof-of-work submission with a modified expiration value. This may allow previously solved challenges to be reused beyond their intended lifetime, depending on server-side replay handling and deployment assumptions.
The vulnerability primarily impacts abuse-prevention mechanisms such as rate limiting and bot mitigation. It does not directly affect data confidentiality or integrity.
Patches
This issue has been addressed by enforcing explicit semantic separation between challenge parameters and the nonce during HMAC computation.
Users are advised to upgrade to patched versions.
Workarounds
As a mitigation, implementations may append a delimiter to the end of the
saltvalue prior to HMAC computation (for example,<salt>?expires=<time>&). This prevents ambiguity between parameters and the nonce and is backward-compatible with existing implementations, as the delimiter is treated as a standard URL parameter separator.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:LReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the PyPI Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
altcha-org/altcha-lib-py (altcha)
v1.0.0Compare Source
Configuration
📅 Schedule: (UTC)
🚦 Automerge: Enabled.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
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