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Security: archid21/trim

SECURITY.md

Security

Report a vulnerability

Report it in private. Do not open a public issue.

  • On this repo, open the Security tab and press "Report a vulnerability" (GitHub private vulnerability reporting), or
  • email hello@aivalue.blog (subject: trim).

You get a reply within 7 days.

In scope

  • The trim plugin code in this repo: the hooks and the /trim:* skills.
  • A way for trim to write outside ~/.claude/trim/ (or the folder TRIM_HOME names), or to leave a file there readable by other users.
  • A way for a trim hook to run a command you did not pass, or to hide part of a command from a permission or deny rule.
  • A way for a tool result (a connector answer, a subagent report, a page) to forge a trim note, such as a false "Full copy:" path.
  • A way for trim to leak session content.

Out of scope

  • What Claude does with a full copy it opens. trim only names the path.
  • Estimates in /trim:report. They are labeled estimates.

Design limits

  • No network calls and no background process. Hooks are local Python scripts (standard library only).
  • Hooks fail open: on any error they print nothing, and Claude gets the original result.
  • Full copies and logs live in ~/.claude/trim/: folder mode 700, files mode 600, deleted or pruned on a schedule (see the README).
  • Each feature has an off switch (see the README).
  • Do not put secrets in tool output you do not want saved: a full copy of a shortened result is written to disk for 7 days.

There aren't any published security advisories