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Security: ariadata/traefik-proxy-manager

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Version Supported
1.x (latest release / main) Yes
Older tags / forks No

Security fixes ship on the latest 1.x release line. Upgrade to the newest tagged release before reporting that a patched issue still reproduces.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public GitHub Issue for security findings.

Prefer one of these private channels:

  1. GitHub Security Advisories (preferred):
    Report a vulnerability
  2. Email: pcmehrdad@gmail.com with subject TPM security: <short title>

Include as much of the following as you can:

  • Affected version / image tag (v1.0.0, ghcr.io/ariadata/traefik-proxy-manager:…)
  • Deployment shape (Compose, bind address, reverse proxy in front)
  • Steps to reproduce
  • Impact (auth bypass, secret exposure, RCE, SSRF, path traversal, etc.)
  • Proof of concept (redacted if needed)

You should receive an acknowledgement within a few days. We will coordinate disclosure timing after a fix is available or the report is declined with rationale.

Scope

In scope for this project:

  • Admin authentication / session handling
  • Authorization of control-plane API routes
  • Encryption of secrets at rest (TPM_SECRETS_KEY)
  • Handling of uploaded PEM material, backups, and Traefik-rendered YAML
  • Unsafe handling of operator-supplied host/WAF/header configuration that leads to unexpected privilege or secret exposure inside TPM

Out of scope (unless TPM clearly worsens them):

  • Misconfiguration of Traefik, DNS, or the host firewall
  • Publishing the admin panel on 0.0.0.0 without additional access controls
  • Weak admin passwords chosen by the operator
  • Compromised TPM_SECRETS_KEY, .env, volume mounts, or backup archives
  • Vulnerabilities solely in Traefik, Node.js, or base images (report upstream; we will bump dependencies when fixes land)

Operator hardening (baseline)

  • Keep DC_TPM_HTTP_PORT on loopback (or put the panel behind a trusted SSO / VPN).
  • Set a long random TPM_SECRETS_KEY (openssl rand -hex 32) before storing DNS tokens or BasicAuth users; never commit it.
  • Use a strong admin password; change it after first boot.
  • Restrict filesystem permissions on data/, logs/, and backup archives.
  • Prefer HTTPS to the panel when it is reachable beyond localhost (cookie Secure follows the request / X-Forwarded-Proto).

See docs/OPERATOR.md for day-2 security notes.

There aren't any published security advisories