Security posture of SteemVM as of release v0.0.8 (mainnet SteemVM-Manaslu-81630, launched
from genesis on v0.0.8): what the chain enforces, what it trusts, what is known and not yet fixed,
and how the published images are built.
Reporting a vulnerability. Don't open a public issue. Contact the maintainers privately, for example with a GitHub security advisory on this repository.
| Component | Version |
|---|---|
| Go toolchain | 1.26.9 (go.mod toolchain; images build on golang:1.26.9-trixie) |
| Cosmos SDK | v0.54.4 |
| cosmos/evm | v0.7.3 (includes the upstream fix that makes EVM state commits atomic when precompiles run) |
| CometBFT | v0.39.4 |
| ibc-go | v11.2.0 |
| gRPC | v1.84.0 |
| cosmovisor | v1.7.3, rebuilt against current x/crypto, x/net and gRPC (see below) |
Validator identity. Every validator's moniker must be an ACTIVE Steem name link owned by its
operator, and its details must carry the account's owner/active/posting public keys.
app/stakinggate wraps x/staking's MsgServer, so the rule holds on every route: direct txs,
authz, ICA, governance, and the EVM staking precompile 0x…0800, which is built on the same gated
server. Only Ethereum txs go to cosmos/evm's ante handler; every Cosmos tx, including one with the
dynamic-fee extension, runs this chain's own ante chain. MsgCreateValidator/MsgEditValidator
also can't be granted or executed through authz. Re-check the staking provider on every SDK bump and
re-diff app/ante_steembridge.go against upstream on every cosmos/evm bump.
Bridge attestations. Deposits, name registrations and withdrawal payouts resolve once
validators holding at least 2/3 of bonded voting power attest the same facts. Attestations are
tallied per distinct fact-set, so a minority can't fix the facts by attesting first. Attestations
for Steem blocks below the chain's genesis anchor (relayer_start_block) are rejected, so a
previous chain's history can't be replayed here.
Payouts. A bridge-out is paid as one Steem transaction: the transfer, carrying the user's own
memo, and a custom_json naming the withdrawal that only svm.bank's active authority can sign.
Memos mean nothing to the bridge. MsgAttestWithdrawalPayout carries the observed recipient, memo,
amount and asset, and both the chain and the relays compare them with the withdrawal. Unpaid
withdrawals are refunded automatically after withdrawal_timeout_blocks (~3.5 days).
No unbacked supply. Bridge-out is limited per asset to what was bridged in (minted includes the
genesis allocation, which launch-genesis.sh requires to be funded on Steem before the anchor).
Bridge-outs to the gateway itself, and memos over 256 bytes or with control characters, are
refused. A gateway-to-itself transfer is never a deposit.
Module accounts. Every module account is blocked in x/bank (v0.0.7). This also keeps cosmos/evm from mirroring precompile transfers into module balances.
Gas floor. The feemarket min_gas_price is 1 gwei (app.EVMGasFloor), set in genesis and by the
upgrade handlers, so EVM fees are never zero. It must not go above 1 gwei: all three oracle clients
pay exactly 1 gwei for price-feed txs, which aren't fee-exempt. Bridge attestations and name
confirmations are fee-exempt (capped per validator per block).
svm.bank signer keys. The oracle's multisig signer uses only the validator's Steem active key. It refuses to start if an owner key, posting key or master password is configured, if the active key doesn't belong to the validator's verified Steem account, or if it is also an owner key.
- Validators holding 2/3 of bonded power are trusted for the bridge. Together they can attest
deposits that never happened, mint against them and bridge out, and the signers pay because the
chain says the withdrawal is valid. On 2026-11-09 (22,266.6 STEEM bonded) that took about 44,533
STEEM of new stake. The planned mitigation is client-side: signers check every minted deposit
against Steem itself before approving any
svm.banktransaction. - Governance can lower
bridge_confirmation_threshold. Params validation only requires0 < threshold ≤ 1. A proposal passed while nobody else votes (quorum 33.4%, about 11,167 STEEM today) could set it low enough for one validator to mint. Validators should watch every parameter-change proposal and vote NoWithVeto on one like this. A chain-side minimum of 2/3 is planned. svm.bankdirect control needs 75% of signer weight, which follows stake.- A very late payout can race the automatic refund and pay twice. Signers never propose a
payout within
ORACLE_MULTISIG_PAYOUT_MARGIN_BLOCKS(default 14,400) of the refund; an attestation after a refund is a no-op that emitswithdrawal_payout_attested_after_refund. - Public JSON-RPC exposes
debug_*. The entrypoint enables it for explorers. Rate-limit or filter it at the proxy.
CI runs govulncheck as a separate, non-blocking job. Open findings at v0.0.8:
| Finding | Status |
|---|---|
klauspost/compress GO-2026-6865 |
Fixed upstream in v1.20.2; pending a dependency bump |
crypto/x509 GO-2026-6809 |
Fixed in Go 1.26.10; pending a toolchain bump |
x/crypto/openpgp GO-2026-5932 |
Newer x/crypto pseudo-version available; pending a bump |
pion/dtls v2 GO-2026-4479 |
No fix upstream |
cosmos/evm GO-2025-3684 |
Believed a false positive: v0.7.3 reverts precompile state atomically (RunNativeAction), and both custom precompiles use it |
Dependency bumps that touch the state machine ship as a coordinated release, not a patch rebuild.
The last full image scan (docker scout cves <image> --only-severity critical,high) was done for
the v0.0.4-1 rebuild: no Critical findings in any of the four images. Re-run it for each release.
cosmovisor is built inside a throwaway module. go install pkg@version ignores local module
context, and cosmovisor v1.7.3 still pins x/crypto 0.32.0, x/net 0.34.0 and gRPC 1.70.0, which
were every remaining Critical in the node image. The Dockerfile creates a scratch module, adds
cosmovisor as a tool dependency, upgrades those three, runs go mod tidy and builds from there.
cosmovisor is only a process supervisor: not part of consensus, never touches app state, and its
binary-download path is disabled (DAEMON_ALLOW_DOWNLOAD_BINARIES=false). Collapse this back to a
plain go install once an upstream release ships current dependencies.
The JS oracle drops npm and runs on trixie. node:22-trixie-slim is Debian 13, and npm's own
vendored dependency tree, the largest source of findings, is removed from the runtime stage (the
runtime only runs node dist/main.js).
Known unfixed in images: util-linux Highs that Debian marks not fixed, present in every
Debian-based image; and cosmovisor's own pins of cosmos-sdk 0.50 / cometbft 0.38 / go-getter,
which can't be upgraded without patching cosmovisor (Highs, not Criticals; go-getter is the
disabled download path).
Version string. steemvmd version comes from the Makefile's VERSION and must match the
on-chain upgrade plan name: docker-entrypoint.sh stages the binary at
cosmovisor/upgrades/v$(steemvmd version)/bin/.