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Security: blazeapps007/SteemVirtualMachine-EVM

Security

SECURITY.md

Security

Security posture of SteemVM as of release v0.0.8 (mainnet SteemVM-Manaslu-81630, launched from genesis on v0.0.8): what the chain enforces, what it trusts, what is known and not yet fixed, and how the published images are built.

Reporting a vulnerability. Don't open a public issue. Contact the maintainers privately, for example with a GitHub security advisory on this repository.

Dependency set

Component Version
Go toolchain 1.26.9 (go.mod toolchain; images build on golang:1.26.9-trixie)
Cosmos SDK v0.54.4
cosmos/evm v0.7.3 (includes the upstream fix that makes EVM state commits atomic when precompiles run)
CometBFT v0.39.4
ibc-go v11.2.0
gRPC v1.84.0
cosmovisor v1.7.3, rebuilt against current x/crypto, x/net and gRPC (see below)

What the chain enforces

Validator identity. Every validator's moniker must be an ACTIVE Steem name link owned by its operator, and its details must carry the account's owner/active/posting public keys. app/stakinggate wraps x/staking's MsgServer, so the rule holds on every route: direct txs, authz, ICA, governance, and the EVM staking precompile 0x…0800, which is built on the same gated server. Only Ethereum txs go to cosmos/evm's ante handler; every Cosmos tx, including one with the dynamic-fee extension, runs this chain's own ante chain. MsgCreateValidator/MsgEditValidator also can't be granted or executed through authz. Re-check the staking provider on every SDK bump and re-diff app/ante_steembridge.go against upstream on every cosmos/evm bump.

Bridge attestations. Deposits, name registrations and withdrawal payouts resolve once validators holding at least 2/3 of bonded voting power attest the same facts. Attestations are tallied per distinct fact-set, so a minority can't fix the facts by attesting first. Attestations for Steem blocks below the chain's genesis anchor (relayer_start_block) are rejected, so a previous chain's history can't be replayed here.

Payouts. A bridge-out is paid as one Steem transaction: the transfer, carrying the user's own memo, and a custom_json naming the withdrawal that only svm.bank's active authority can sign. Memos mean nothing to the bridge. MsgAttestWithdrawalPayout carries the observed recipient, memo, amount and asset, and both the chain and the relays compare them with the withdrawal. Unpaid withdrawals are refunded automatically after withdrawal_timeout_blocks (~3.5 days).

No unbacked supply. Bridge-out is limited per asset to what was bridged in (minted includes the genesis allocation, which launch-genesis.sh requires to be funded on Steem before the anchor). Bridge-outs to the gateway itself, and memos over 256 bytes or with control characters, are refused. A gateway-to-itself transfer is never a deposit.

Module accounts. Every module account is blocked in x/bank (v0.0.7). This also keeps cosmos/evm from mirroring precompile transfers into module balances.

Gas floor. The feemarket min_gas_price is 1 gwei (app.EVMGasFloor), set in genesis and by the upgrade handlers, so EVM fees are never zero. It must not go above 1 gwei: all three oracle clients pay exactly 1 gwei for price-feed txs, which aren't fee-exempt. Bridge attestations and name confirmations are fee-exempt (capped per validator per block).

svm.bank signer keys. The oracle's multisig signer uses only the validator's Steem active key. It refuses to start if an owner key, posting key or master password is configured, if the active key doesn't belong to the validator's verified Steem account, or if it is also an owner key.

Trust assumptions and known risks

  • Validators holding 2/3 of bonded power are trusted for the bridge. Together they can attest deposits that never happened, mint against them and bridge out, and the signers pay because the chain says the withdrawal is valid. On 2026-11-09 (22,266.6 STEEM bonded) that took about 44,533 STEEM of new stake. The planned mitigation is client-side: signers check every minted deposit against Steem itself before approving any svm.bank transaction.
  • Governance can lower bridge_confirmation_threshold. Params validation only requires 0 < threshold ≤ 1. A proposal passed while nobody else votes (quorum 33.4%, about 11,167 STEEM today) could set it low enough for one validator to mint. Validators should watch every parameter-change proposal and vote NoWithVeto on one like this. A chain-side minimum of 2/3 is planned.
  • svm.bank direct control needs 75% of signer weight, which follows stake.
  • A very late payout can race the automatic refund and pay twice. Signers never propose a payout within ORACLE_MULTISIG_PAYOUT_MARGIN_BLOCKS (default 14,400) of the refund; an attestation after a refund is a no-op that emits withdrawal_payout_attested_after_refund.
  • Public JSON-RPC exposes debug_*. The entrypoint enables it for explorers. Rate-limit or filter it at the proxy.

govulncheck

CI runs govulncheck as a separate, non-blocking job. Open findings at v0.0.8:

Finding Status
klauspost/compress GO-2026-6865 Fixed upstream in v1.20.2; pending a dependency bump
crypto/x509 GO-2026-6809 Fixed in Go 1.26.10; pending a toolchain bump
x/crypto/openpgp GO-2026-5932 Newer x/crypto pseudo-version available; pending a bump
pion/dtls v2 GO-2026-4479 No fix upstream
cosmos/evm GO-2025-3684 Believed a false positive: v0.7.3 reverts precompile state atomically (RunNativeAction), and both custom precompiles use it

Dependency bumps that touch the state machine ship as a coordinated release, not a patch rebuild.

Image build

The last full image scan (docker scout cves <image> --only-severity critical,high) was done for the v0.0.4-1 rebuild: no Critical findings in any of the four images. Re-run it for each release.

cosmovisor is built inside a throwaway module. go install pkg@version ignores local module context, and cosmovisor v1.7.3 still pins x/crypto 0.32.0, x/net 0.34.0 and gRPC 1.70.0, which were every remaining Critical in the node image. The Dockerfile creates a scratch module, adds cosmovisor as a tool dependency, upgrades those three, runs go mod tidy and builds from there. cosmovisor is only a process supervisor: not part of consensus, never touches app state, and its binary-download path is disabled (DAEMON_ALLOW_DOWNLOAD_BINARIES=false). Collapse this back to a plain go install once an upstream release ships current dependencies.

The JS oracle drops npm and runs on trixie. node:22-trixie-slim is Debian 13, and npm's own vendored dependency tree, the largest source of findings, is removed from the runtime stage (the runtime only runs node dist/main.js).

Known unfixed in images: util-linux Highs that Debian marks not fixed, present in every Debian-based image; and cosmovisor's own pins of cosmos-sdk 0.50 / cometbft 0.38 / go-getter, which can't be upgraded without patching cosmovisor (Highs, not Criticals; go-getter is the disabled download path).

Version string. steemvmd version comes from the Makefile's VERSION and must match the on-chain upgrade plan name: docker-entrypoint.sh stages the binary at cosmovisor/upgrades/v$(steemvmd version)/bin/.

There aren't any published security advisories