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Bump certifi to 2026.10.19 (eMudhra CA compromise, GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2) - #351

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vedharish merged 1 commit into
browserstack:mainfrom
rahul-bs:security/certifi-2026-10-19-sc-14462
Oct 21, 2026
Merged

vedharish merged 1 commit into
browserstack:mainfrom
rahul-bs:security/certifi-2026-10-19-sc-14462

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What

Bump certifi from 2024.7.4 to 2026.10.19 in requirements.txt.

Why

On 17 Oct 2026 the private keys of 8 eMudhra (emSign) intermediate CAs were found to be recoverable, so anyone can issue trusted HTTPS certificates for any domain. certifi releases before 2026.10.19 still trust the affected emSign root (GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2, critical), and requests uses certifi's bundle by default. 2026.10.19 removes it.

Test

2026.10.19 installs cleanly alongside the pinned requests==2.33.0 and httplib2==0.32.0; the resulting bundle no longer contains emSign ECC Root CA - G3. Nothing else in the repo pins certifi.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

certifi below 2026.10.19 still trusts the emSign ECC Root CA - G3,
whose intermediates were compromised (GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2). requests,
PyGithub and httplib2 verify TLS against this bundle. SC-14462.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@vedharish
vedharish merged commit 822f008 into browserstack:main Oct 21, 2026
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2 participants