I welcome reports about every proxy engine:
- Proxy bypass: ways to make network connections from
RUNsteps that evade the Buildcage proxy (other than the known domain fronting limitation) - Network isolation escape: bypassing CNI isolation or iptables rules to reach the internet directly
- DNS filtering bypass: getting a DNS query, or what it carries, out past the builder's own resolver
- Rule bypass: ways to reach a destination, method or path that the rules do not permit: a request that escapes its path rule under
inspect, a forgedHostor SNI that changes where the proxy connects, or a name resolved to somewhere the rules never named - GitHub Actions setup: vulnerabilities in the
setuporreportactions (e.g., injection, credential leak)
The following are out of scope (please report to the respective projects instead):
- Vulnerabilities in BuildKit, Docker, or other upstream dependencies
- Issues that require the attacker to already have privileged access to the host
- Domain fronting via shared CDN infrastructure (documented in Security Details)
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 4.x | ✅ |
| 1.x to 3.x | ❌ |
Buildcage ships one Docker image at ghcr.io/buildcage/docker, published per engine: release
vX.Y.Z is tagged X.Y.Z-inspect for the default inspect engine and X.Y.Z-universal for the
universal engine (the image tag drops the release tag's leading v and carries the engine
suffix). Each release is signed keylessly with cosign and
carries a GitHub build-provenance attestation, both issued via GitHub Actions OIDC at release time.
There is no long-lived signing key to leak or rotate. The setup action verifies this
automatically, in-process, on every run (see
Image Provenance Verification for exactly how);
to verify a release manually instead:
cosign verify ghcr.io/buildcage/docker:X.Y.Z-<engine> \
--certificate-identity 'https://github.com/buildcage/docker/.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml@refs/tags/vX.Y.Z' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/buildcage/docker:X.Y.Z-<engine> --repo buildcage/dockerThe image tag is X.Y.Z-<engine>, but the identity names the release tag vX.Y.Z. Pinning the
exact workflow rejects a signature from any other workflow, ref or repository.
The Sigstore bundle for each release is also attached as a downloadable asset
(buildcage-container-universal.sigstore.json and buildcage-container-inspect.sigstore.json) on the
corresponding GitHub Release.
- Dependencies are pinned: JS packages via
pnpm-lock.yaml, Go modules viago.sum, GitHub Actions by commit SHA (with a version comment for readability), and container base images by digest. - Renovate opens dependency, GitHub Actions, and base-image update PRs automatically; each still goes through CI and manual review before merging.
- New dependencies are chosen for necessity, an OSI-approved license, and active maintenance; the standard library is preferred where practical.
- Trivy rebuilds each engine's image from source and scans it for known vulnerabilities on a monthly schedule (and on manual dispatch), and Dependabot alerts are enabled on the repository; both report into this repository's Security tab.
- A daily check fails while the CA bundle in the latest release's images differs from the newest one in their Alpine branch, as it does once Alpine removes a root CA.
Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.
Use GitHub Security Advisories to report vulnerabilities privately:
- Go to the Security tab of this repository
- Click Report a vulnerability
- Fill in the details and submit
- Description of the vulnerability and its impact
- Steps to reproduce
- Proof of concept, if possible
- Affected versions
This project is maintained by a single developer. Realistic timelines:
- Acknowledgment: within 1 week
- Validation: a few days to 2 weeks, depending on complexity
- Fix release: varies by severity and complexity; critical issues are prioritized
I'll credit reporters in the security advisory unless they prefer to remain anonymous.
All code is public and I welcome security reviews. If you prefer to audit the code yourself, feel free to fork it.