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Security: buildcage/docker

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Scope

I welcome reports about every proxy engine:

  • Proxy bypass: ways to make network connections from RUN steps that evade the Buildcage proxy (other than the known domain fronting limitation)
  • Network isolation escape: bypassing CNI isolation or iptables rules to reach the internet directly
  • DNS filtering bypass: getting a DNS query, or what it carries, out past the builder's own resolver
  • Rule bypass: ways to reach a destination, method or path that the rules do not permit: a request that escapes its path rule under inspect, a forged Host or SNI that changes where the proxy connects, or a name resolved to somewhere the rules never named
  • GitHub Actions setup: vulnerabilities in the setup or report actions (e.g., injection, credential leak)

The following are out of scope (please report to the respective projects instead):

  • Vulnerabilities in BuildKit, Docker, or other upstream dependencies
  • Issues that require the attacker to already have privileged access to the host
  • Domain fronting via shared CDN infrastructure (documented in Security Details)

Supported Versions

Version Supported
4.x ✅
1.x to 3.x ❌

Verifying Releases

Buildcage ships one Docker image at ghcr.io/buildcage/docker, published per engine: release vX.Y.Z is tagged X.Y.Z-inspect for the default inspect engine and X.Y.Z-universal for the universal engine (the image tag drops the release tag's leading v and carries the engine suffix). Each release is signed keylessly with cosign and carries a GitHub build-provenance attestation, both issued via GitHub Actions OIDC at release time. There is no long-lived signing key to leak or rotate. The setup action verifies this automatically, in-process, on every run (see Image Provenance Verification for exactly how); to verify a release manually instead:

cosign verify ghcr.io/buildcage/docker:X.Y.Z-<engine> \
  --certificate-identity 'https://github.com/buildcage/docker/.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml@refs/tags/vX.Y.Z' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/buildcage/docker:X.Y.Z-<engine> --repo buildcage/docker

The image tag is X.Y.Z-<engine>, but the identity names the release tag vX.Y.Z. Pinning the exact workflow rejects a signature from any other workflow, ref or repository.

The Sigstore bundle for each release is also attached as a downloadable asset (buildcage-container-universal.sigstore.json and buildcage-container-inspect.sigstore.json) on the corresponding GitHub Release.

Dependency Management

  • Dependencies are pinned: JS packages via pnpm-lock.yaml, Go modules via go.sum, GitHub Actions by commit SHA (with a version comment for readability), and container base images by digest.
  • Renovate opens dependency, GitHub Actions, and base-image update PRs automatically; each still goes through CI and manual review before merging.
  • New dependencies are chosen for necessity, an OSI-approved license, and active maintenance; the standard library is preferred where practical.
  • Trivy rebuilds each engine's image from source and scans it for known vulnerabilities on a monthly schedule (and on manual dispatch), and Dependabot alerts are enabled on the repository; both report into this repository's Security tab.
  • A daily check fails while the CA bundle in the latest release's images differs from the newest one in their Alpine branch, as it does once Alpine removes a root CA.

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.

Use GitHub Security Advisories to report vulnerabilities privately:

  1. Go to the Security tab of this repository
  2. Click Report a vulnerability
  3. Fill in the details and submit

What to include

  • Description of the vulnerability and its impact
  • Steps to reproduce
  • Proof of concept, if possible
  • Affected versions

Response Timeline

This project is maintained by a single developer. Realistic timelines:

  • Acknowledgment: within 1 week
  • Validation: a few days to 2 weeks, depending on complexity
  • Fix release: varies by severity and complexity; critical issues are prioritized

I'll credit reporters in the security advisory unless they prefer to remain anonymous.

Code Auditing

All code is public and I welcome security reviews. If you prefer to audit the code yourself, feel free to fork it.

Learn more about advisories related to buildcage/docker in the GitHub Advisory Database