🔒 Fix SQL injection vulnerability in DuckDB execute - #35
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Refactored PySUS DuckDB query building to use safe parameterization ($1) when passing arbitrary strings as file paths. Instead of using f-strings to place paths into queries, paths are now passed securely to execute().
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🎯 What:
Fixed a critical SQL injection vulnerability in
pysus/api/client.py. Theread_parquetfunction dynamically built SQL queries using f-strings for user-provided paths (e.g.,f"SELECT * FROM '{path}'").If left unfixed, this allowed an attacker to inject arbitrary SQL statements by providing carefully crafted file paths. Given this operates on DuckDB, it could allow arbitrary operations.
🛡️ Solution:
Refactored the query generation logic to safely use DuckDB's parameterized statements (
$1placeholder). Since DuckDB accepts list arrays forread_parquetand binds them securely natively, paths are now provided in the parameters argument ofduckdb.execute(). We also cleaned up branching logic since single files and multi-files can now share the same array parameterization logic safely.PR created automatically by Jules for task 456115586314976520 started by @devdudumuniz