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Security: eggstack/stegoeggo

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Version Supported
0.4.x Yes
0.3.x Yes
0.2.x Yes
Earlier than 0.2 No

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public GitHub issue for a security vulnerability. Contact the maintainer using the email address in the crate metadata or GitHub profile. Include a description, reproduction steps, and potential impact. A suggested fix is welcome but optional.

CLI downloads

Release binaries are not code-signed. Installers download over HTTPS and check the SHA-256 sidecar and candidate version before installation. The sidecar is served by the same GitHub Release as the binary, so this detects corruption or mismatched assets but does not independently authenticate the publisher.

The updater uses the stable stegoeggo-cli version on crates.io to select the matching release asset. It verifies the sidecar and candidate before replacing the installed executable. Checksum, identity, or network failures do not trigger a Cargo fallback. See the installation guide for the full update contract.

Image protection limits

Rights metadata can be copied, edited, or removed. Hidden markers are optional and best effort; image transformations can damage or remove them. Neither channel prevents scraping or proves that a model used an image.

A payload protected only by CRC32 has corruption detection, not cryptographic authentication. HMAC can verify a marker against a shared secret, but anyone who knows that secret can create a valid marker. HMAC does not establish copyright ownership, signer identity, or publication time.

Use the byte-processing APIs when metadata must be written or preserved. A DynamicImage round-trip works on pixels and does not preserve file-level metadata. Same-format JPEG processing uses a byte-preserving path when the JPEG structure is supported; generic image re-encoding can alter coefficients or strip metadata.

Signed manifests

The signatures feature is experimental. Ed25519 signatures authenticate the signed manifest bytes, including any image digest recorded in the manifest. They do not establish who controls a public key unless the application trusts that key independently, and they do not establish legal ownership. Trust evaluation is caller-owned; the library provides no implicit trust store.

There aren't any published security advisories