To net-next: tcp/ipv6: re-resolve route after binding the ephemeral source port - #2
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tcp_v6_connect() resolves the route before the ephemeral source port is bound: fl6->fl6_sport is still 0 and, since commit 65e9024 ("ip: load balance tcp connections to single dst addr and port"), FLOWI_FLAG_ANY_SPORT makes rt6_multipath_hash() substitute a random source port so that connections to a single destination still spread over the available next hops. The resulting dst is cached on the socket by ip6_dst_store() and, unlike tcp_v4_connect() which re-resolves via ip_route_newports(), it is never refreshed with the port that inet6_hash_connect() goes on to bind. Every later route rebuild for the socket goes through inet6_csk_route_socket(), which starts from a zeroed fl6 and fills in the real inet->inet_sport. So under a port-based multipath hash policy (fib_multipath_hash_policy 1 or 3) the connect-time next hop and the steady-state next hop are hashed from different source ports, and in general are not the same next hop. The difference stays hidden while the cached dst is valid. IPv6 socket dst entries are revalidated against the FIB node cookie, so when something invalidates the cached dst -- unrelated route churn in the same table, or, since commit 658eb69 ("tcp: rehash onto different local ECMP path on retransmit timeout"), a retransmission timeout -- the socket re-resolves and the established flow silently moves to a different next hop mid-connection. This is harmless for ordinary unicast multipath, where every next hop reaches the same destination. It breaks configurations where per-next-hop state matters, e.g. an anycast destination whose next hops each NAT to a different backend and keep per-path connection state: the flow arrives at a next hop that holds no state for it and is reset. Commit 658eb69 ("tcp: rehash onto different local ECMP path on retransmit timeout") addressed the equivalent problem for fib_multipath_hash_policy 0, by keying fl6->mp_hash on sk_txhash and selecting the initial path with it so that the connect-time and steady-state lookups agree. Policies 1 and 3 hash the source port and are still exposed. Fix those the same way IPv4 does: once inet6_hash_connect() has bound the ephemeral port, install it in fl6, clear FLOWI_FLAG_ANY_SPORT and resolve again, so the next hop cached on the socket is the one every subsequent lookup will select. The source address is already final at this point -- the first lookup selected it and wrote it back into fl6->saddr. The second lookup only runs when the port was not already bound before connect(), and it is a no-op for policy 0, where fl6->mp_hash carries the first lookup's decision. Fixes: 51ebd31 ("ipv6: add support of equal cost multipath (ECMP)") Signed-off-by: Loic Lambiel <loic.lambiel@exoscale.com>
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[ Upstream commit 163e5f2 ] When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault occurs if an event fails to open. For example: perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite Error: cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat' perf: Segmentation fault #0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366 #1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378 #2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722 #3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090] #4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862 #5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943 #6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075 #7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888 #8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374 #9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349 #10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 #11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448 #12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555 #13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72] #14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0 The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL evlist pointer and causes a segfault. To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist is properly initialized. Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option") Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ad891bb ] The IPv4 code path in __ip_vs_get_out_rt() calls dst_link_failure() without ensuring skb->dev is set, leading to a NULL pointer dereference in fib_compute_spec_dst() when ipv4_link_failure() attempts to send ICMP destination unreachable messages. The issue emerged after commit ed0de45 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") started calling __ip_options_compile() from ipv4_link_failure(). This code path eventually calls fib_compute_spec_dst() which dereferences skb->dev. An attempt was made to fix the NULL skb->dev dereference in commit 0113d9c ("ipv4: fix null-deref in ipv4_link_failure"), but it only addressed the immediate dev_net(skb->dev) dereference by using a fallback device. The fix was incomplete because fib_compute_spec_dst() later in the call chain still accesses skb->dev directly, which remains NULL when IPVS calls dst_link_failure(). The crash occurs when: 1. IPVS processes a packet in NAT mode with a misconfigured destination 2. Route lookup fails in __ip_vs_get_out_rt() before establishing a route 3. The error path calls dst_link_failure(skb) with skb->dev == NULL 4. ipv4_link_failure() → ipv4_send_dest_unreach() → __ip_options_compile() → fib_compute_spec_dst() 5. fib_compute_spec_dst() dereferences NULL skb->dev Apply the same fix used for IPv6 in commit 326bf17 ("ipvs: fix ipv6 route unreach panic"): set skb->dev from skb_dst(skb)->dev before calling dst_link_failure(). KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000328-0x000000000000032f] CPU: 1 PID: 12732 Comm: syz.1.3469 Not tainted 6.6.114 #2 RIP: 0010:__in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:233 RIP: 0010:fib_compute_spec_dst+0x17a/0x9f0 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:285 Call Trace: <TASK> spec_dst_fill net/ipv4/ip_options.c:232 spec_dst_fill net/ipv4/ip_options.c:229 __ip_options_compile+0x13a1/0x17d0 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:330 ipv4_send_dest_unreach net/ipv4/route.c:1252 ipv4_link_failure+0x702/0xb80 net/ipv4/route.c:1265 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:437 __ip_vs_get_out_rt+0x15fd/0x19e0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c:412 ip_vs_nat_xmit+0x1d8/0xc80 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c:764 Fixes: ed0de45 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Slavin Liu <slavin452@gmail.com> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit ffb8c27 upstream. Jakub reported an MPTCP deadlock at fallback time: WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.18.0-rc7-virtme #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- mptcp_connect/20858 is trying to acquire lock: ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_try_fallback+0xd8/0x280 but task is already holding lock: ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x352/0xaa0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&msk->fallback_lock); lock(&msk->fallback_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by mptcp_connect/20858: #0: ff1100001da18290 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg+0x114/0x1bc0 #1: ff1100001db40fd0 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x2cb/0xaa0 #2: ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x352/0xaa0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 20858 Comm: mptcp_connect Not tainted 6.18.0-rc7-virtme #1 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xa0 print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xc0/0xcd validate_chain+0x2ff/0x5f0 __lock_acquire+0x34c/0x740 lock_acquire.part.0+0xbc/0x260 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x38/0x50 __mptcp_try_fallback+0xd8/0x280 mptcp_sendmsg_frag+0x16c2/0x3050 __mptcp_retrans+0x421/0xaa0 mptcp_release_cb+0x5aa/0xa70 release_sock+0xab/0x1d0 mptcp_sendmsg+0xd5b/0x1bc0 sock_write_iter+0x281/0x4d0 new_sync_write+0x3c5/0x6f0 vfs_write+0x65e/0xbb0 ksys_write+0x17e/0x200 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0xfd0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7fa5627cbc5e Code: 4d 89 d8 e8 14 bd 00 00 4c 8b 5d f8 41 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 11 c9 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <c9> c3 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 e7 e8 13 ff ff ff 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa RSP: 002b:00007fff1fe14700 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007fa5627cbc5e RDX: 0000000000001f9c RSI: 00007fff1fe16984 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007fff1fe14710 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fff1fe16920 R13: 0000000000002000 R14: 0000000000001f9c R15: 0000000000001f9c The packet scheduler could attempt a reinjection after receiving an MP_FAIL and before the infinite map has been transmitted, causing a deadlock since MPTCP needs to do the reinjection atomically from WRT fallback. Address the issue explicitly avoiding the reinjection in the critical scenario. Note that this is the only fallback critical section that could potentially send packets and hit the double-lock. Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Closes: https://netdev-ctrl.bots.linux.dev/logs/vmksft/mptcp-dbg/results/412720/1-mptcp-join-sh/stderr Fixes: f8a1d9b ("mptcp: make fallback action and fallback decision atomic") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251205-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-19-rc1-v1-4-9e4781a6c1b8@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ca8b201 upstream. As Jiaming Zhang and syzbot reported, there is potential deadlock in f2fs as below: Chain exists of: &sbi->cp_rwsem --> fs_reclaim --> sb_internal#2 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rlock(sb_internal#2); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(sb_internal#2); rlock(&sbi->cp_rwsem); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kswapd0/73: #0: ffffffff8e247a40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:7015 [inline] #0: ffffffff8e247a40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: kswapd+0x951/0x2800 mm/vmscan.c:7389 #1: ffff8880118400e0 (&type->s_umount_key#50){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: super_trylock_shared fs/super.c:562 [inline] #1: ffff8880118400e0 (&type->s_umount_key#50){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: super_cache_scan+0x91/0x4b0 fs/super.c:197 #2: ffff888011840610 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: f2fs_evict_inode+0x8d9/0x1b60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:890 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 73 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x2ee/0x310 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043 check_noncircular+0x134/0x160 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain+0xb9b/0x2140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 __lock_acquire+0xab9/0xd20 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x120/0x360 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 down_read+0x46/0x2e0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1537 f2fs_down_read fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2278 [inline] f2fs_lock_op fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2357 [inline] f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x21c/0x10c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:791 f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x10a/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:867 f2fs_truncate+0x489/0x7c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:925 f2fs_evict_inode+0x9f2/0x1b60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:897 evict+0x504/0x9c0 fs/inode.c:810 f2fs_evict_inode+0x1dc/0x1b60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:853 evict+0x504/0x9c0 fs/inode.c:810 dispose_list fs/inode.c:852 [inline] prune_icache_sb+0x21b/0x2c0 fs/inode.c:1000 super_cache_scan+0x39b/0x4b0 fs/super.c:224 do_shrink_slab+0x6ef/0x1110 mm/shrinker.c:437 shrink_slab_memcg mm/shrinker.c:550 [inline] shrink_slab+0x7ef/0x10d0 mm/shrinker.c:628 shrink_one+0x28a/0x7c0 mm/vmscan.c:4955 shrink_many mm/vmscan.c:5016 [inline] lru_gen_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:5094 [inline] shrink_node+0x315d/0x3780 mm/vmscan.c:6081 kswapd_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:6941 [inline] balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:7124 [inline] kswapd+0x147c/0x2800 mm/vmscan.c:7389 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x4bc/0x870 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> The root cause is deadlock among four locks as below: kswapd - fs_reclaim --- Lock A - shrink_one - evict - f2fs_evict_inode - sb_start_intwrite --- Lock B - iput - evict - f2fs_evict_inode - sb_start_intwrite --- Lock B - f2fs_truncate - f2fs_truncate_blocks - f2fs_do_truncate_blocks - f2fs_lock_op --- Lock C ioctl - f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write - f2fs_lock_op --- Lock C - __f2fs_commit_atomic_write - __replace_atomic_write_block - f2fs_get_dnode_of_data - __get_node_folio - f2fs_check_nid_range - f2fs_handle_error - f2fs_record_errors - f2fs_down_write --- Lock D open - do_open - do_truncate - security_inode_need_killpriv - f2fs_getxattr - lookup_all_xattrs - f2fs_handle_error - f2fs_record_errors - f2fs_down_write --- Lock D - f2fs_commit_super - read_mapping_folio - filemap_alloc_folio_noprof - prepare_alloc_pages - fs_reclaim_acquire --- Lock A In order to avoid such deadlock, we need to avoid grabbing sb_lock in f2fs_handle_error(), so, let's use asynchronous method instead: - remove f2fs_handle_error() implementation - rename f2fs_handle_error_async() to f2fs_handle_error() - spread f2fs_handle_error() Fixes: 95fa90c ("f2fs: support recording errors into superblock") Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+14b90e1156b9f6fc1266@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/68eae49b.050a0220.ac43.0001.GAE@google.com Reported-by: Jiaming Zhang <r772577952@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CANypQFa-Gy9sD-N35o3PC+FystOWkNuN8pv6S75HLT0ga-Tzgw@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 44bf661 upstream. Commit 1d2da79 ("pinctrl: renesas: rzg2l: Avoid configuring ISEL in gpio_irq_{en,dis}able*()") dropped the configuration of ISEL from struct irq_chip::{irq_enable, irq_disable} APIs and moved it to struct gpio_chip::irq::{child_to_parent_hwirq, child_irq_domain_ops::free} APIs to fix spurious IRQs. After commit 1d2da79 ("pinctrl: renesas: rzg2l: Avoid configuring ISEL in gpio_irq_{en,dis}able*()"), ISEL was no longer configured properly on resume. This is because the pinctrl resume code used struct irq_chip::irq_enable (called from rzg2l_gpio_irq_restore()) to reconfigure the wakeup interrupts. Some drivers (e.g. Ethernet) may also reconfigure non-wakeup interrupts on resume through their own code, eventually calling struct irq_chip::irq_enable. Fix this by adding ISEL configuration back into the struct irq_chip::irq_enable API and on resume path for wakeup interrupts. As struct irq_chip::irq_enable needs now to lock to update the ISEL, convert the struct rzg2l_pinctrl::lock to a raw spinlock and replace the locking API calls with the raw variants. Otherwise the lockdep reports invalid wait context when probing the adv7511 module on RZ/G2L: [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.17.0-rc5-next-20250911-00001-gfcfac22533c9 #18 Not tainted ----------------------------- (udev-worker)/165 is trying to lock: ffff00000e3664a8 (&pctrl->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: rzg2l_gpio_irq_enable+0x38/0x78 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 3 locks held by (udev-worker)/165: #0: ffff00000e890108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __driver_attach+0x90/0x1ac #1: ffff000011c07240 (request_class){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0xb4/0x6dc #2: ffff000011c070c8 (lock_class){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq+0xdc/0x6dc stack backtrace: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 165 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-next-20250911-00001-gfcfac22533c9 #18 PREEMPT Hardware name: Renesas SMARC EVK based on r9a07g044l2 (DT) Call trace: show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 __lock_acquire+0xa14/0x20b4 lock_acquire+0x1c8/0x354 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x88 rzg2l_gpio_irq_enable+0x38/0x78 irq_enable+0x40/0x8c __irq_startup+0x78/0xa4 irq_startup+0x108/0x16c __setup_irq+0x3c0/0x6dc request_threaded_irq+0xec/0x1ac devm_request_threaded_irq+0x80/0x134 adv7511_probe+0x928/0x9a4 [adv7511] i2c_device_probe+0x22c/0x3dc really_probe+0xbc/0x2a0 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c driver_probe_device+0x40/0x164 __driver_attach+0x9c/0x1ac bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xd0 driver_attach+0x24/0x30 bus_add_driver+0xe4/0x208 driver_register+0x60/0x128 i2c_register_driver+0x48/0xd0 adv7511_init+0x5c/0x1000 [adv7511] do_one_initcall+0x64/0x30c do_init_module+0x58/0x23c load_module+0x1bcc/0x1d40 init_module_from_file+0x88/0xc4 idempotent_init_module+0x188/0x27c __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x68/0xac invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x4c/0x160 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c Having ISEL configuration back into the struct irq_chip::irq_enable API should be safe with respect to spurious IRQs, as in the probe case IRQs are enabled anyway in struct gpio_chip::irq::child_to_parent_hwirq. No spurious IRQs were detected on suspend/resume, boot, ethernet link insert/remove tests (executed on RZ/G3S). Boot, ethernet link insert/remove tests were also executed successfully on RZ/G2L. Fixes: 1d2da79 ("pinctrl: renesas: rzg2l: Avoid configuring ISEL in gpio_irq_{en,dis}able*(") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea.uj@bp.renesas.com> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250912095308.3603704-1-claudiu.beznea.uj@bp.renesas.com Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7838a4e upstream. When a page is freed it coalesces with a buddy into a higher order page while possible. When the buddy page migrate type differs, it is expected to be updated to match the one of the page being freed. However, only the first pageblock of the buddy page is updated, while the rest of the pageblocks are left unchanged. That causes warnings in later expand() and other code paths (like below), since an inconsistency between migration type of the list containing the page and the page-owned pageblocks migration types is introduced. [ 308.986589] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 308.987227] page type is 0, passed migratetype is 1 (nr=256) [ 308.987275] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5224 at mm/page_alloc.c:812 expand+0x23c/0x270 [ 308.987293] Modules linked in: algif_hash(E) af_alg(E) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) nft_chain_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) nf_tables(E) s390_trng(E) vfio_ccw(E) mdev(E) vfio_iommu_type1(E) vfio(E) sch_fq_codel(E) drm(E) i2c_core(E) drm_panel_orientation_quirks(E) loop(E) nfnetlink(E) vsock_loopback(E) vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common(E) vsock(E) ctcm(E) fsm(E) diag288_wdt(E) watchdog(E) zfcp(E) scsi_transport_fc(E) ghash_s390(E) prng(E) aes_s390(E) des_generic(E) des_s390(E) libdes(E) sha3_512_s390(E) sha3_256_s390(E) sha_common(E) paes_s390(E) crypto_engine(E) pkey_cca(E) pkey_ep11(E) zcrypt(E) rng_core(E) pkey_pckmo(E) pkey(E) autofs4(E) [ 308.987439] Unloaded tainted modules: hmac_s390(E):2 [ 308.987650] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5224 Comm: mempig_verify Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.18.0-gcc-bpf-debug #431 PREEMPT [ 308.987657] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 308.987661] Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 704 (z/VM 7.3.0) [ 308.987666] Krnl PSW : 0404f00180000000 00000349976fa600 (expand+0x240/0x270) [ 308.987676] R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:3 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 [ 308.987682] Krnl GPRS: 0000034980000004 0000000000000005 0000000000000030 000003499a0e6d88 [ 308.987688] 0000000000000005 0000034980000005 000002be803ac000 0000023efe6c8300 [ 308.987692] 0000000000000008 0000034998d57290 000002be00000100 0000023e00000008 [ 308.987696] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000349976fa5fc 000002c99b1eb6f0 [ 308.987708] Krnl Code: 00000349976fa5f0: c020008a02f2 larl %r2,000003499883abd4 00000349976fa5f6: c0e5ffe3f4b5 brasl %r14,0000034997378f60 #00000349976fa5fc: af000000 mc 0,0 >00000349976fa600: a7f4ff4c brc 15,00000349976fa498 00000349976fa604: b9040026 lgr %r2,%r6 00000349976fa608: c0300088317f larl %r3,0000034998800906 00000349976fa60e: c0e5fffdb6e1 brasl %r14,00000349976b13d0 00000349976fa614: af000000 mc 0,0 [ 308.987734] Call Trace: [ 308.987738] [<00000349976fa600>] expand+0x240/0x270 [ 308.987744] ([<00000349976fa5fc>] expand+0x23c/0x270) [ 308.987749] [<00000349976ff95e>] rmqueue_bulk+0x71e/0x940 [ 308.987754] [<00000349976ffd7e>] __rmqueue_pcplist+0x1fe/0x2a0 [ 308.987759] [<0000034997700966>] rmqueue.isra.0+0xb46/0xf40 [ 308.987763] [<0000034997703ec8>] get_page_from_freelist+0x198/0x8d0 [ 308.987768] [<0000034997706fa8>] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x198/0x400 [ 308.987774] [<00000349977536f8>] alloc_pages_mpol+0xb8/0x220 [ 308.987781] [<0000034997753bf6>] folio_alloc_mpol_noprof+0x26/0xc0 [ 308.987786] [<0000034997753e4c>] vma_alloc_folio_noprof+0x6c/0xa0 [ 308.987791] [<0000034997775b22>] vma_alloc_anon_folio_pmd+0x42/0x240 [ 308.987799] [<000003499777bfea>] __do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x3a/0x210 [ 308.987804] [<00000349976cb08e>] __handle_mm_fault+0x4de/0x500 [ 308.987809] [<00000349976cb14c>] handle_mm_fault+0x9c/0x3a0 [ 308.987813] [<000003499734d70e>] do_exception+0x1de/0x540 [ 308.987822] [<0000034998387390>] __do_pgm_check+0x130/0x220 [ 308.987830] [<000003499839a934>] pgm_check_handler+0x114/0x160 [ 308.987838] 3 locks held by mempig_verify/5224: [ 308.987842] #0: 0000023ea44c1e08 (vm_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: lock_vma_under_rcu+0xb2/0x2a0 [ 308.987859] #1: 0000023ee4d41b18 (&pcp->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue.isra.0+0xad6/0xf40 [ 308.987871] #2: 0000023efe6c8998 (&zone->lock){..-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0x5a/0x940 [ 308.987886] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [ 308.987890] [<0000034997379096>] __warn_printk+0x136/0x140 [ 308.987897] irq event stamp: 52330356 [ 308.987901] hardirqs last enabled at (52330355): [<000003499838742e>] __do_pgm_check+0x1ce/0x220 [ 308.987907] hardirqs last disabled at (52330356): [<000003499839932e>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x9e/0xe0 [ 308.987913] softirqs last enabled at (52329882): [<0000034997383786>] handle_softirqs+0x2c6/0x530 [ 308.987922] softirqs last disabled at (52329859): [<0000034997382f86>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x126/0x140 [ 308.987929] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 308.987936] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 308.987940] page type is 0, passed migratetype is 1 (nr=256) [ 308.987951] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5224 at mm/page_alloc.c:860 __del_page_from_free_list+0x1be/0x1e0 [ 308.987960] Modules linked in: algif_hash(E) af_alg(E) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) nft_chain_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) nf_tables(E) s390_trng(E) vfio_ccw(E) mdev(E) vfio_iommu_type1(E) vfio(E) sch_fq_codel(E) drm(E) i2c_core(E) drm_panel_orientation_quirks(E) loop(E) nfnetlink(E) vsock_loopback(E) vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common(E) vsock(E) ctcm(E) fsm(E) diag288_wdt(E) watchdog(E) zfcp(E) scsi_transport_fc(E) ghash_s390(E) prng(E) aes_s390(E) des_generic(E) des_s390(E) libdes(E) sha3_512_s390(E) sha3_256_s390(E) sha_common(E) paes_s390(E) crypto_engine(E) pkey_cca(E) pkey_ep11(E) zcrypt(E) rng_core(E) pkey_pckmo(E) pkey(E) autofs4(E) [ 308.988070] Unloaded tainted modules: hmac_s390(E):2 [ 308.988087] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5224 Comm: mempig_verify Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W E 6.18.0-gcc-bpf-debug #431 PREEMPT [ 308.988095] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 308.988100] Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 704 (z/VM 7.3.0) [ 308.988105] Krnl PSW : 0404f00180000000 00000349976f9e32 (__del_page_from_free_list+0x1c2/0x1e0) [ 308.988118] R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:3 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 [ 308.988127] Krnl GPRS: 0000034980000004 0000000000000005 0000000000000030 000003499a0e6d88 [ 308.988133] 0000000000000005 0000034980000005 0000034998d57290 0000023efe6c8300 [ 308.988139] 0000000000000001 0000000000000008 000002be00000100 000002be803ac000 [ 308.988144] 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 00000349976f9e2e 000002c99b1eb728 [ 308.988153] Krnl Code: 00000349976f9e22: c020008a06d9 larl %r2,000003499883abd4 00000349976f9e28: c0e5ffe3f89c brasl %r14,0000034997378f60 #00000349976f9e2e: af000000 mc 0,0 >00000349976f9e32: a7f4ff4e brc 15,00000349976f9cce 00000349976f9e36: b904002b lgr %r2,%r11 00000349976f9e3a: c030008a06e7 larl %r3,000003499883ac08 00000349976f9e40: c0e5fffdbac8 brasl %r14,00000349976b13d0 00000349976f9e46: af000000 mc 0,0 [ 308.988184] Call Trace: [ 308.988188] [<00000349976f9e32>] __del_page_from_free_list+0x1c2/0x1e0 [ 308.988195] ([<00000349976f9e2e>] __del_page_from_free_list+0x1be/0x1e0) [ 308.988202] [<00000349976ff946>] rmqueue_bulk+0x706/0x940 [ 308.988208] [<00000349976ffd7e>] __rmqueue_pcplist+0x1fe/0x2a0 [ 308.988214] [<0000034997700966>] rmqueue.isra.0+0xb46/0xf40 [ 308.988221] [<0000034997703ec8>] get_page_from_freelist+0x198/0x8d0 [ 308.988227] [<0000034997706fa8>] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x198/0x400 [ 308.988233] [<00000349977536f8>] alloc_pages_mpol+0xb8/0x220 [ 308.988240] [<0000034997753bf6>] folio_alloc_mpol_noprof+0x26/0xc0 [ 308.988247] [<0000034997753e4c>] vma_alloc_folio_noprof+0x6c/0xa0 [ 308.988253] [<0000034997775b22>] vma_alloc_anon_folio_pmd+0x42/0x240 [ 308.988260] [<000003499777bfea>] __do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x3a/0x210 [ 308.988267] [<00000349976cb08e>] __handle_mm_fault+0x4de/0x500 [ 308.988273] [<00000349976cb14c>] handle_mm_fault+0x9c/0x3a0 [ 308.988279] [<000003499734d70e>] do_exception+0x1de/0x540 [ 308.988286] [<0000034998387390>] __do_pgm_check+0x130/0x220 [ 308.988293] [<000003499839a934>] pgm_check_handler+0x114/0x160 [ 308.988300] 3 locks held by mempig_verify/5224: [ 308.988305] #0: 0000023ea44c1e08 (vm_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: lock_vma_under_rcu+0xb2/0x2a0 [ 308.988322] #1: 0000023ee4d41b18 (&pcp->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue.isra.0+0xad6/0xf40 [ 308.988334] #2: 0000023efe6c8998 (&zone->lock){..-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0x5a/0x940 [ 308.988346] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [ 308.988350] [<0000034997379096>] __warn_printk+0x136/0x140 [ 308.988356] irq event stamp: 52330356 [ 308.988360] hardirqs last enabled at (52330355): [<000003499838742e>] __do_pgm_check+0x1ce/0x220 [ 308.988366] hardirqs last disabled at (52330356): [<000003499839932e>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x9e/0xe0 [ 308.988373] softirqs last enabled at (52329882): [<0000034997383786>] handle_softirqs+0x2c6/0x530 [ 308.988380] softirqs last disabled at (52329859): [<0000034997382f86>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x126/0x140 [ 308.988388] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251215081002.3353900A9c-agordeev@linux.ibm.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251212151457.3898073Add-agordeev@linux.ibm.com Fixes: e6cf9e1 ("mm: page_alloc: fix up block types when merging compatible blocks") Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/87wmalyktd.fsf@linux.ibm.com/ Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Reviewed-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jeffallen
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Sep 8, 2026
commit 6558749 upstream. When running the Rust maple tree kunit tests with lockdep, you may trigger a warning that looks like this: lib/maple_tree.c:780 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 no locks held by kunit_try_catch/344. stack backtrace: CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 344 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G N 6.19.0-rc1+ #2 NONE Tainted: [N]=TEST Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x71/0x90 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x150/0x190 mas_start+0x104/0x150 mas_find+0x179/0x240 _RINvNtCs5QSdWC790r4_4core3ptr13drop_in_placeINtNtCs1cdwasc6FUb_6kernel10maple_tree9MapleTreeINtNtNtBL_5alloc4kbox3BoxlNtNtB1x_9allocator7KmallocEEECsgxAQYCfdR72_25doctests_kernel_generated+0xaf/0x130 rust_doctest_kernel_maple_tree_rs_0+0x600/0x6b0 ? lock_release+0xeb/0x2a0 ? kunit_try_catch_run+0x210/0x210 kunit_try_run_case+0x74/0x160 ? kunit_try_catch_run+0x210/0x210 kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x12/0x30 kthread+0x21c/0x230 ? __do_trace_sched_kthread_stop_ret+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x16c/0x270 ? __do_trace_sched_kthread_stop_ret+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> This is because the destructor of maple tree calls mas_find() without taking rcu_read_lock() or the spinlock. Doing that is actually ok in this case since the destructor has exclusive access to the entire maple tree, but it triggers a lockdep warning. To fix that, take the rcu read lock. In the future, it's possible that memory reclaim could gain a feature where it reallocates entries in maple trees even if no user-code is touching it. If that feature is added, then this use of rcu read lock would become load-bearing, so I did not make it conditional on lockdep. We have to repeatedly take and release rcu because the destructor of T might perform operations that sleep. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251217-maple-drop-rcu-v1-1-702af063573f@google.com Fixes: da939ef ("rust: maple_tree: add MapleTree") Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com> Reported-by: Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg@kernel.org> Closes: https://rust-for-linux.zulipchat.com/#narrow/channel/x/topic/x/near/564215108 Reviewed-by: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net> Reviewed-by: Daniel Almeida <daniel.almeida@collabora.com> Cc: Andrew Ballance <andrewjballance@gmail.com> Cc: Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org> Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Cc: Trevor Gross <tmgross@umich.edu> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jeffallen
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Sep 8, 2026
… to macb_open() commit 99537d5 upstream. In the non-RT kernel, local_bh_disable() merely disables preemption, whereas it maps to an actual spin lock in the RT kernel. Consequently, when attempting to refill RX buffers via netdev_alloc_skb() in macb_mac_link_up(), a deadlock scenario arises as follows: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.18.0-08691-g2061f18ad76e #39 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/0:0/8 is trying to acquire lock: ffff00080369bbe0 (&bp->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: macb_start_xmit+0x808/0xb7c but task is already holding lock: ffff000803698e58 (&queue->tx_ptr_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: macb_start_xmit +0x148/0xb7c which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&queue->tx_ptr_lock){+...}-{3:3}: rt_spin_lock+0x50/0x1f0 macb_start_xmit+0x148/0xb7c dev_hard_start_xmit+0x94/0x284 sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x37c __dev_queue_xmit+0x708/0x1120 neigh_resolve_output+0x148/0x28c ip6_finish_output2+0x2c0/0xb2c __ip6_finish_output+0x114/0x308 ip6_output+0xc4/0x4a4 mld_sendpack+0x220/0x68c mld_ifc_work+0x2a8/0x4f4 process_one_work+0x20c/0x5f8 worker_thread+0x1b0/0x35c kthread+0x144/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #2 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+...}-{3:3}: rt_spin_lock+0x50/0x1f0 sch_direct_xmit+0x11c/0x37c __dev_queue_xmit+0x708/0x1120 neigh_resolve_output+0x148/0x28c ip6_finish_output2+0x2c0/0xb2c __ip6_finish_output+0x114/0x308 ip6_output+0xc4/0x4a4 mld_sendpack+0x220/0x68c mld_ifc_work+0x2a8/0x4f4 process_one_work+0x20c/0x5f8 worker_thread+0x1b0/0x35c kthread+0x144/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #1 ((softirq_ctrl.lock)){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_release+0x250/0x348 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x7c/0x240 __netdev_alloc_skb+0x1b4/0x1d8 gem_rx_refill+0xdc/0x240 gem_init_rings+0xb4/0x108 macb_mac_link_up+0x9c/0x2b4 phylink_resolve+0x170/0x614 process_one_work+0x20c/0x5f8 worker_thread+0x1b0/0x35c kthread+0x144/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #0 (&bp->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x15a8/0x2084 lock_acquire+0x1cc/0x350 rt_spin_lock+0x50/0x1f0 macb_start_xmit+0x808/0xb7c dev_hard_start_xmit+0x94/0x284 sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x37c __dev_queue_xmit+0x708/0x1120 neigh_resolve_output+0x148/0x28c ip6_finish_output2+0x2c0/0xb2c __ip6_finish_output+0x114/0x308 ip6_output+0xc4/0x4a4 mld_sendpack+0x220/0x68c mld_ifc_work+0x2a8/0x4f4 process_one_work+0x20c/0x5f8 worker_thread+0x1b0/0x35c kthread+0x144/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &bp->lock --> _xmit_ETHER#2 --> &queue->tx_ptr_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&queue->tx_ptr_lock); lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); lock(&queue->tx_ptr_lock); lock(&bp->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** Call trace: show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0xa0/0xf0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_circular_bug+0x28c/0x370 check_noncircular+0x198/0x1ac __lock_acquire+0x15a8/0x2084 lock_acquire+0x1cc/0x350 rt_spin_lock+0x50/0x1f0 macb_start_xmit+0x808/0xb7c dev_hard_start_xmit+0x94/0x284 sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x37c __dev_queue_xmit+0x708/0x1120 neigh_resolve_output+0x148/0x28c ip6_finish_output2+0x2c0/0xb2c __ip6_finish_output+0x114/0x308 ip6_output+0xc4/0x4a4 mld_sendpack+0x220/0x68c mld_ifc_work+0x2a8/0x4f4 process_one_work+0x20c/0x5f8 worker_thread+0x1b0/0x35c kthread+0x144/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Notably, invoking the mog_init_rings() callback upon link establishment is unnecessary. Instead, we can exclusively call mog_init_rings() within the ndo_open() callback. This adjustment resolves the deadlock issue. Furthermore, since MACB_CAPS_MACB_IS_EMAC cases do not use mog_init_rings() when opening the network interface via at91ether_open(), moving mog_init_rings() to macb_open() also eliminates the MACB_CAPS_MACB_IS_EMAC check. Fixes: 633e98a ("net: macb: use resolved link config in mac_link_up()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Kevin Hao <kexin.hao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Xiaolei Wang <xiaolei.wang@windriver.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251222015624.1994551-1-xiaolei.wang@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jeffallen
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Sep 8, 2026
commit 7ba0b64 upstream. After rename exchanging (either with the rename exchange operation or regular renames in multiple non-atomic steps) two inodes and at least one of them is a directory, we can end up with a log tree that contains only of the inodes and after a power failure that can result in an attempt to delete the other inode when it should not because it was not deleted before the power failure. In some case that delete attempt fails when the target inode is a directory that contains a subvolume inside it, since the log replay code is not prepared to deal with directory entries that point to root items (only inode items). 1) We have directories "dir1" (inode A) and "dir2" (inode B) under the same parent directory; 2) We have a file (inode C) under directory "dir1" (inode A); 3) We have a subvolume inside directory "dir2" (inode B); 4) All these inodes were persisted in a past transaction and we are currently at transaction N; 5) We rename the file (inode C), so at btrfs_log_new_name() we update inode C's last_unlink_trans to N; 6) We get a rename exchange for "dir1" (inode A) and "dir2" (inode B), so after the exchange "dir1" is inode B and "dir2" is inode A. During the rename exchange we call btrfs_log_new_name() for inodes A and B, but because they are directories, we don't update their last_unlink_trans to N; 7) An fsync against the file (inode C) is done, and because its inode has a last_unlink_trans with a value of N we log its parent directory (inode A) (through btrfs_log_all_parents(), called from btrfs_log_inode_parent()). 8) So we end up with inode B not logged, which now has the old name of inode A. At copy_inode_items_to_log(), when logging inode A, we did not check if we had any conflicting inode to log because inode A has a generation lower than the current transaction (created in a past transaction); 9) After a power failure, when replaying the log tree, since we find that inode A has a new name that conflicts with the name of inode B in the fs tree, we attempt to delete inode B... this is wrong since that directory was never deleted before the power failure, and because there is a subvolume inside that directory, attempting to delete it will fail since replay_dir_deletes() and btrfs_unlink_inode() are not prepared to deal with dir items that point to roots instead of inodes. When that happens the mount fails and we get a stack trace like the following: [87.2314] BTRFS info (device dm-0): start tree-log replay [87.2318] BTRFS critical (device dm-0): failed to delete reference to subvol, root 5 inode 256 parent 259 [87.2332] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [87.2338] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -2) [87.2346] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 638968 at fs/btrfs/inode.c:4345 __btrfs_unlink_inode+0x416/0x440 [btrfs] [87.2368] Modules linked in: btrfs loop dm_thin_pool (...) [87.2470] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 638968 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 6.18.0-rc7-btrfs-next-218+ #2 PREEMPT(full) [87.2489] Tainted: [W]=WARN [87.2494] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [87.2514] RIP: 0010:__btrfs_unlink_inode+0x416/0x440 [btrfs] [87.2538] Code: c0 89 04 24 (...) [87.2568] RSP: 0018:ffffc0e741f4b9b8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [87.2574] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9d3ec8a6cf60 RCX: 0000000000000000 [87.2582] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff84ab45a1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [87.2591] RBP: ffff9d3ec8a6ef20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc0e741f4b840 [87.2599] R10: ffff9d45dc1fffa8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff9d3ee26d77e0 [87.2608] R13: ffffc0e741f4ba98 R14: ffff9d4458040800 R15: ffff9d44b6b7ca10 [87.2618] FS: 00007f7b9603a840(0000) GS:ffff9d4658982000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [87.2629] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [87.2637] CR2: 00007ffc9ec33b98 CR3: 000000011273e003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [87.2648] Call Trace: [87.2651] <TASK> [87.2654] btrfs_unlink_inode+0x15/0x40 [btrfs] [87.2661] unlink_inode_for_log_replay+0x27/0xf0 [btrfs] [87.2669] check_item_in_log+0x1ea/0x2c0 [btrfs] [87.2676] replay_dir_deletes+0x16b/0x380 [btrfs] [87.2684] fixup_inode_link_count+0x34b/0x370 [btrfs] [87.2696] fixup_inode_link_counts+0x41/0x160 [btrfs] [87.2703] btrfs_recover_log_trees+0x1ff/0x7c0 [btrfs] [87.2711] ? __pfx_replay_one_buffer+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] [87.2719] open_ctree+0x10bb/0x15f0 [btrfs] [87.2726] btrfs_get_tree.cold+0xb/0x16c [btrfs] [87.2734] ? fscontext_read+0x15c/0x180 [87.2740] ? rw_verify_area+0x50/0x180 [87.2746] vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xd0 [87.2750] vfs_cmd_create+0x59/0xe0 [87.2755] __do_sys_fsconfig+0x4f6/0x6b0 [87.2760] do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1220 [87.2764] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [87.2770] RIP: 0033:0x7f7b9625f4aa [87.2775] Code: 73 01 c3 48 (...) [87.2803] RSP: 002b:00007ffc9ec35b08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001af [87.2817] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000558bfa91ac20 RCX: 00007f7b9625f4aa [87.2829] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000003 [87.2842] RBP: 0000558bfa91b120 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [87.2854] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [87.2864] R13: 00007f7b963f1580 R14: 00007f7b963f326c R15: 00007f7b963d8a23 [87.2877] </TASK> [87.2882] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [87.2891] BTRFS: error (device dm-0 state A) in __btrfs_unlink_inode:4345: errno=-2 No such entry [87.2904] BTRFS: error (device dm-0 state EAO) in do_abort_log_replay:191: errno=-2 No such entry [87.2915] BTRFS critical (device dm-0 state EAO): log tree (for root 5) leaf currently being processed (slot 7 key (258 12 257)): [87.2929] BTRFS info (device dm-0 state EAO): leaf 30736384 gen 10 total ptrs 7 free space 15712 owner 18446744073709551610 [87.2929] BTRFS info (device dm-0 state EAO): refs 3 lock_owner 0 current 638968 [87.2929] item 0 key (257 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160 [87.2929] inode generation 9 transid 10 size 0 nbytes 0 [87.2929] block group 0 mode 40755 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 [87.2929] rdev 0 sequence 7 flags 0x0 [87.2929] atime 1765464494.678070921 [87.2929] ctime 1765464494.686606513 [87.2929] mtime 1765464494.686606513 [87.2929] otime 1765464494.678070921 [87.2929] item 1 key (257 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16109 itemsize 14 [87.2929] index 4 name_len 4 [87.2929] item 2 key (257 DIR_LOG_INDEX 2) itemoff 16101 itemsize 8 [87.2929] dir log end 2 [87.2929] item 3 key (257 DIR_LOG_INDEX 3) itemoff 16093 itemsize 8 [87.2929] dir log end 18446744073709551615 [87.2930] item 4 key (257 DIR_INDEX 3) itemoff 16060 itemsize 33 [87.2930] location key (258 1 0) type 1 [87.2930] transid 10 data_len 0 name_len 3 [87.2930] item 5 key (258 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 15900 itemsize 160 [87.2930] inode generation 9 transid 10 size 0 nbytes 0 [87.2930] block group 0 mode 100644 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 [87.2930] rdev 0 sequence 2 flags 0x0 [87.2930] atime 1765464494.678456467 [87.2930] ctime 1765464494.686606513 [87.2930] mtime 1765464494.678456467 [87.2930] otime 1765464494.678456467 [87.2930] item 6 key (258 INODE_REF 257) itemoff 15887 itemsize 13 [87.2930] index 3 name_len 3 [87.2930] BTRFS critical (device dm-0 state EAO): log replay failed in unlink_inode_for_log_replay:1045 for root 5, stage 3, with error -2: failed to unlink inode 256 parent dir 259 name subvol root 5 [87.2963] BTRFS: error (device dm-0 state EAO) in btrfs_recover_log_trees:7743: errno=-2 No such entry [87.2981] BTRFS: error (device dm-0 state EAO) in btrfs_replay_log:2083: errno=-2 No such entry (Failed to recover log tr So fix this by changing copy_inode_items_to_log() to always detect if there are conflicting inodes for the ref/extref of the inode being logged even if the inode was created in a past transaction. A test case for fstests will follow soon. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 361e0ff upstream. When forward-porting Rust Binder to 6.18, I neglected to take commit fb56fdf ("mm/list_lru: split the lock to per-cgroup scope") into account, and apparently I did not end up running the shrinker callback when I sanity tested the driver before submission. This leads to crashes like the following: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.18.0-mainline-maybe-dirty #1 Tainted: G IO -------------------------------------------- kswapd0/68 is trying to acquire lock: ffff956000fa18b0 (&l->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: lock_list_lru_of_memcg+0x128/0x230 but task is already holding lock: ffff956000fa18b0 (&l->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: rust_helper_spin_lock+0xd/0x20 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&l->lock); lock(&l->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by kswapd0/68: #0: ffffffff90d2e260 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: kswapd+0x597/0x1160 #1: ffff956000fa18b0 (&l->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: rust_helper_spin_lock+0xd/0x20 #2: ffffffff90cf3680 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: lock_list_lru_of_memcg+0x2d/0x230 To fix this, remove the spin_lock() call from rust_shrink_free_page(). Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Fixes: eafedbc ("rust_binder: add Rust Binder driver") Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251202-binder-shrink-unspin-v1-1-263efb9ad625@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 20cf2ae upstream. The GPIO controller is configured as non-sleeping but it uses generic pinctrl helpers which use a mutex for synchronization. This can cause the following lockdep splat with shared GPIOs enabled on boards which have multiple devices using the same GPIO: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:591 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 12, name: kworker/u16:0 preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 6 locks held by kworker/u16:0/12: #0: ffff0001f0018d48 ((wq_completion)events_unbound#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x18c/0x604 #1: ffff8000842dbdf0 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b4/0x604 #2: ffff0001f18498f8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach+0x38/0x1b0 #3: ffff0001f75f1e90 (&gdev->srcu){.+.?}-{0:0}, at: gpiod_direction_output_raw_commit+0x0/0x360 #4: ffff0001f46e3db8 (&shared_desc->spinlock){....}-{3:3}, at: gpio_shared_proxy_direction_output+0xd0/0x144 [gpio_shared_proxy] #5: ffff0001f180ee90 (&gdev->srcu){.+.?}-{0:0}, at: gpiod_direction_output_raw_commit+0x0/0x360 irq event stamp: 81450 hardirqs last enabled at (81449): [<ffff8000813acba4>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x74/0x78 hardirqs last disabled at (81450): [<ffff8000813abfb8>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x84/0x88 softirqs last enabled at (79616): [<ffff8000811455fc>] __alloc_skb+0x17c/0x1e8 softirqs last disabled at (79614): [<ffff8000811455fc>] __alloc_skb+0x17c/0x1e8 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc4-next-20260105+ #11975 PREEMPT Hardware name: Hardkernel ODROID-M1 (DT) Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 __might_resched+0x144/0x248 __might_sleep+0x48/0x98 __mutex_lock+0x5c/0x894 mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 pinctrl_get_device_gpio_range+0x44/0x128 pinctrl_gpio_direction+0x3c/0xe0 pinctrl_gpio_direction_output+0x14/0x20 rockchip_gpio_direction_output+0xb8/0x19c gpiochip_direction_output+0x38/0x94 gpiod_direction_output_raw_commit+0x1d8/0x360 gpiod_direction_output_nonotify+0x7c/0x230 gpiod_direction_output+0x34/0xf8 gpio_shared_proxy_direction_output+0xec/0x144 [gpio_shared_proxy] gpiochip_direction_output+0x38/0x94 gpiod_direction_output_raw_commit+0x1d8/0x360 gpiod_direction_output_nonotify+0x7c/0x230 gpiod_configure_flags+0xbc/0x480 gpiod_find_and_request+0x1a0/0x574 gpiod_get_index+0x58/0x84 devm_gpiod_get_index+0x20/0xb4 devm_gpiod_get_optional+0x18/0x30 rockchip_pcie_probe+0x98/0x380 platform_probe+0x5c/0xac really_probe+0xbc/0x298 Fixes: 936ee26 ("gpio/rockchip: add driver for rockchip gpio") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/d035fc29-3b03-4cd6-b8ec-001f93540bc6@samsung.com/ Acked-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260106090011.21603-1-bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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…ked_inode() [ Upstream commit 8731f2c ] In btrfs_read_locked_inode() we are calling btrfs_init_file_extent_tree() while holding a path with a read locked leaf from a subvolume tree, and btrfs_init_file_extent_tree() may do a GFP_KERNEL allocation, which can trigger reclaim. This can create a circular lock dependency which lockdep warns about with the following splat: [6.1433] ====================================================== [6.1574] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [6.1583] 6.18.0+ #4 Tainted: G U [6.1591] ------------------------------------------------------ [6.1599] kswapd0/117 is trying to acquire lock: [6.1606] ffff8d9b6333c5b8 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x39/0x2f0 [6.1625] but task is already holding lock: [6.1633] ffffffffa4ab8ce0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x195/0xc60 [6.1646] which lock already depends on the new lock. [6.1657] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [6.1667] -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: [6.1677] fs_reclaim_acquire+0x9d/0xd0 [6.1685] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x59/0x750 [6.1694] btrfs_init_file_extent_tree+0x90/0x100 [6.1702] btrfs_read_locked_inode+0xc3/0x6b0 [6.1710] btrfs_iget+0xbb/0xf0 [6.1716] btrfs_lookup_dentry+0x3c5/0x8e0 [6.1724] btrfs_lookup+0x12/0x30 [6.1731] lookup_open.isra.0+0x1aa/0x6a0 [6.1739] path_openat+0x5f7/0xc60 [6.1746] do_filp_open+0xd6/0x180 [6.1753] do_sys_openat2+0x8b/0xe0 [6.1760] __x64_sys_openat+0x54/0xa0 [6.1768] do_syscall_64+0x97/0x3e0 [6.1776] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [6.1784] -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}: [6.1794] lock_release+0x127/0x2a0 [6.1801] up_read+0x1b/0x30 [6.1808] btrfs_search_slot+0x8e0/0xff0 [6.1817] btrfs_lookup_inode+0x52/0xd0 [6.1825] __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x73/0x520 [6.1833] btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x11a/0x120 [6.1842] btrfs_log_inode+0x608/0x1aa0 [6.1849] btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x249/0xf80 [6.1857] btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x3e/0x60 [6.1865] btrfs_sync_file+0x431/0x690 [6.1872] do_fsync+0x39/0x80 [6.1879] __x64_sys_fsync+0x13/0x20 [6.1887] do_syscall_64+0x97/0x3e0 [6.1894] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [6.1903] -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [6.1913] __lock_acquire+0x15e9/0x2820 [6.1920] lock_acquire+0xc9/0x2d0 [6.1927] __mutex_lock+0xcc/0x10a0 [6.1934] __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x39/0x2f0 [6.1944] btrfs_evict_inode+0x20b/0x4b0 [6.1952] evict+0x15a/0x2f0 [6.1958] prune_icache_sb+0x91/0xd0 [6.1966] super_cache_scan+0x150/0x1d0 [6.1974] do_shrink_slab+0x155/0x6f0 [6.1981] shrink_slab+0x48e/0x890 [6.1988] shrink_one+0x11a/0x1f0 [6.1995] shrink_node+0xbfd/0x1320 [6.1002] balance_pgdat+0x67f/0xc60 [6.1321] kswapd+0x1dc/0x3e0 [6.1643] kthread+0xff/0x240 [6.1965] ret_from_fork+0x223/0x280 [6.1287] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [6.1616] other info that might help us debug this: [6.1561] Chain exists of: &delayed_node->mutex --> btrfs-tree-00 --> fs_reclaim [6.1503] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [6.1110] CPU0 CPU1 [6.1411] ---- ---- [6.1707] lock(fs_reclaim); [6.1998] lock(btrfs-tree-00); [6.1291] lock(fs_reclaim); [6.1581] lock(&delayed_node->mutex); [6.1874] *** DEADLOCK *** [6.1716] 2 locks held by kswapd0/117: [6.1999] #0: ffffffffa4ab8ce0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x195/0xc60 [6.1294] #1: ffff8d998344b0e0 (&type->s_umount_key#40){++++}- {3:3}, at: super_cache_scan+0x37/0x1d0 [6.1596] stack backtrace: [6.1183] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 117 Comm: kswapd0 Tainted: G U 6.18.0+ #4 PREEMPT(lazy) [6.1185] Tainted: [U]=USER [6.1186] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME B560M-A AC, BIOS 2001 02/01/2023 [6.1187] Call Trace: [6.1187] <TASK> [6.1189] dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 [6.1192] print_circular_bug.cold+0x17a/0x1c0 [6.1194] check_noncircular+0x175/0x190 [6.1197] __lock_acquire+0x15e9/0x2820 [6.1200] lock_acquire+0xc9/0x2d0 [6.1201] ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x39/0x2f0 [6.1204] __mutex_lock+0xcc/0x10a0 [6.1206] ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x39/0x2f0 [6.1208] ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x39/0x2f0 [6.1211] ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x39/0x2f0 [6.1213] __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x39/0x2f0 [6.1215] btrfs_evict_inode+0x20b/0x4b0 [6.1217] ? lock_acquire+0xc9/0x2d0 [6.1220] evict+0x15a/0x2f0 [6.1222] prune_icache_sb+0x91/0xd0 [6.1224] super_cache_scan+0x150/0x1d0 [6.1226] do_shrink_slab+0x155/0x6f0 [6.1228] shrink_slab+0x48e/0x890 [6.1229] ? shrink_slab+0x2d2/0x890 [6.1231] shrink_one+0x11a/0x1f0 [6.1234] shrink_node+0xbfd/0x1320 [6.1236] ? shrink_node+0xa2d/0x1320 [6.1236] ? shrink_node+0xbd3/0x1320 [6.1239] ? balance_pgdat+0x67f/0xc60 [6.1239] balance_pgdat+0x67f/0xc60 [6.1241] ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xc4/0x2a0 [6.1246] kswapd+0x1dc/0x3e0 [6.1247] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 [6.1249] ? __pfx_kswapd+0x10/0x10 [6.1250] kthread+0xff/0x240 [6.1251] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [6.1253] ret_from_fork+0x223/0x280 [6.1255] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [6.1257] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [6.1260] </TASK> This is because: 1) The fsync task is holding an inode's delayed node mutex (for a directory) while calling __btrfs_update_delayed_inode() and that needs to do a search on the subvolume's btree (therefore read lock some extent buffers); 2) The lookup task, at btrfs_lookup(), triggered reclaim with the GFP_KERNEL allocation done by btrfs_init_file_extent_tree() while holding a read lock on a subvolume leaf; 3) The reclaim triggered kswapd which is doing inode eviction for the directory inode the fsync task is using as an argument to btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode() - but in that call chain we are trying to read lock the same leaf that the lookup task is holding while calling btrfs_init_file_extent_tree() and doing the GFP_KERNEL allocation. Fix this by calling btrfs_init_file_extent_tree() after we don't need the path anymore and release it in btrfs_read_locked_inode(). Reported-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/6e55113a22347c3925458a5d840a18401a38b276.camel@linux.intel.com/ Fixes: 8679d26 ("btrfs: initialize inode::file_extent_tree after i_mode has been set") Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Sep 8, 2026
…te in qfq_reset [ Upstream commit c1d73b1 ] `qfq_class->leaf_qdisc->q.qlen > 0` does not imply that the class itself is active. Two qfq_class objects may point to the same leaf_qdisc. This happens when: 1. one QFQ qdisc is attached to the dev as the root qdisc, and 2. another QFQ qdisc is temporarily referenced (e.g., via qdisc_get() / qdisc_put()) and is pending to be destroyed, as in function tc_new_tfilter. When packets are enqueued through the root QFQ qdisc, the shared leaf_qdisc->q.qlen increases. At the same time, the second QFQ qdisc triggers qdisc_put and qdisc_destroy: the qdisc enters qfq_reset() with its own q->q.qlen == 0, but its class's leaf qdisc->q.qlen > 0. Therefore, the qfq_reset would wrongly deactivate an inactive aggregate and trigger a null-deref in qfq_deactivate_agg: [ 0.903172] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 0.903571] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 0.903860] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 0.904177] PGD 10299b067 P4D 10299b067 PUD 10299c067 PMD 0 [ 0.904502] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 0.904737] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 135 Comm: exploit Not tainted 6.19.0-rc3+ #2 NONE [ 0.905157] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 0.905754] RIP: 0010:qfq_deactivate_agg (include/linux/list.h:992 (discriminator 2) include/linux/list.h:1006 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1367 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1393 (discriminator 2)) [ 0.906046] Code: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 48 89 70 18 8b 4b 10 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 48 8b 78 08 48 d3 e2 48 21 f2 48 2b 13 48 8b 30 48 d3 ea 8b 4b 18 0 Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 je 0x153 6: 48 89 70 18 mov %rsi,0x18(%rax) a: 8b 4b 10 mov 0x10(%rbx),%ecx d: 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff mov $0xffffffffffffffff,%rdx 14: 48 8b 78 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%rdi 18: 48 d3 e2 shl %cl,%rdx 1b: 48 21 f2 and %rsi,%rdx 1e: 48 2b 13 sub (%rbx),%rdx 21: 48 8b 30 mov (%rax),%rsi 24: 48 d3 ea shr %cl,%rdx 27: 8b 4b 18 mov 0x18(%rbx),%ecx ... [ 0.907095] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004a39a0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 0.907368] RAX: ffff8881043a0880 RBX: ffff888102953340 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 0.907723] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 0.908100] RBP: ffff888102952180 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 0.908451] R10: ffff8881043a0000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888102952000 [ 0.908804] R13: ffff888102952180 R14: ffff8881043a0ad8 R15: ffff8881043a0880 [ 0.909179] FS: 000000002a1a0380(0000) GS:ffff888196d8d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 0.909572] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 0.909857] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000102993002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [ 0.910247] PKRU: 55555554 [ 0.910391] Call Trace: [ 0.910527] <TASK> [ 0.910638] qfq_reset_qdisc (net/sched/sch_qfq.c:357 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1485) [ 0.910826] qdisc_reset (include/linux/skbuff.h:2195 include/linux/skbuff.h:2501 include/linux/skbuff.h:3424 include/linux/skbuff.h:3430 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1036) [ 0.911040] __qdisc_destroy (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1076) [ 0.911236] tc_new_tfilter (net/sched/cls_api.c:2447) [ 0.911447] rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958) [ 0.911663] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6861) [ 0.911894] netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550) [ 0.912100] netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344) [ 0.912296] ? __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:706) [ 0.912484] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894) [ 0.912682] sock_write_iter (net/socket.c:727 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:742 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1195 (discriminator 1)) [ 0.912880] vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:593 fs/read_write.c:686) [ 0.913077] ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:738) [ 0.913252] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1)) [ 0.913438] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:131) [ 0.913687] RIP: 0033:0x424c34 [ 0.913844] Code: 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bd 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 2d 44 09 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 9 Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 89 02 mov %eax,(%rdx) 2: 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff mov $0xffffffffffffffff,%rax 9: eb bd jmp 0xffffffffffffffc8 b: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 cs nopw 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 12: 00 00 00 15: 90 nop 16: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64 1a: 80 3d 2d 44 09 00 00 cmpb $0x0,0x9442d(%rip) # 0x9444e 21: 74 13 je 0x36 23: b8 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%eax 28: 0f 05 syscall 2a: 09 .byte 0x9 [ 0.914807] RSP: 002b:00007ffea1938b78 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 0.915197] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000424c34 [ 0.915556] RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 000000002af378c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 0.915912] RBP: 00007ffea1938bc0 R08: 00000000004b8820 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 0.916297] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffea1938d28 [ 0.916652] R13: 00007ffea1938d38 R14: 00000000004b3828 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 0.917039] </TASK> [ 0.917158] Modules linked in: [ 0.917316] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 0.917484] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 0.917717] RIP: 0010:qfq_deactivate_agg (include/linux/list.h:992 (discriminator 2) include/linux/list.h:1006 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1367 (discriminator 2) net/sched/sch_qfq.c:1393 (discriminator 2)) [ 0.917978] Code: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 48 89 70 18 8b 4b 10 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 48 8b 78 08 48 d3 e2 48 21 f2 48 2b 13 48 8b 30 48 d3 ea 8b 4b 18 0 Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 0f 84 4d 01 00 00 je 0x153 6: 48 89 70 18 mov %rsi,0x18(%rax) a: 8b 4b 10 mov 0x10(%rbx),%ecx d: 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff mov $0xffffffffffffffff,%rdx 14: 48 8b 78 08 mov 0x8(%rax),%rdi 18: 48 d3 e2 shl %cl,%rdx 1b: 48 21 f2 and %rsi,%rdx 1e: 48 2b 13 sub (%rbx),%rdx 21: 48 8b 30 mov (%rax),%rsi 24: 48 d3 ea shr %cl,%rdx 27: 8b 4b 18 mov 0x18(%rbx),%ecx ... [ 0.918902] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004a39a0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 0.919198] RAX: ffff8881043a0880 RBX: ffff888102953340 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 0.919559] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 0.919908] RBP: ffff888102952180 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 0.920289] R10: ffff8881043a0000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888102952000 [ 0.920648] R13: ffff888102952180 R14: ffff8881043a0ad8 R15: ffff8881043a0880 [ 0.921014] FS: 000000002a1a0380(0000) GS:ffff888196d8d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 0.921424] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 0.921710] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000102993002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [ 0.922097] PKRU: 55555554 [ 0.922240] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 0.922590] Kernel Offset: disabled Fixes: 0545a30 ("pkt_sched: QFQ - quick fair queue scheduler") Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260106034100.1780779-1-xmei5@asu.edu Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0e16776 ] A race condition was found in sg_proc_debug_helper(). It was observed on a system using an IBM LTO-9 SAS Tape Drive (ULTRIUM-TD9) and monitoring /proc/scsi/sg/debug every second. A very large elapsed time would sometimes appear. This is caused by two race conditions. We reproduced the issue with an IBM ULTRIUM-HH9 tape drive on an x86_64 architecture. A patched kernel was built, and the race condition could not be observed anymore after the application of this patch. A reproducer C program utilising the scsi_debug module was also built by Changhui Zhong and can be viewed here: https://github.com/MichaelRabek/linux-tests/blob/master/drivers/scsi/sg/sg_race_trigger.c The first race happens between the reading of hp->duration in sg_proc_debug_helper() and request completion in sg_rq_end_io(). The hp->duration member variable may hold either of two types of information: #1 - The start time of the request. This value is present while the request is not yet finished. #2 - The total execution time of the request (end_time - start_time). If sg_proc_debug_helper() executes *after* the value of hp->duration was changed from #1 to #2, but *before* srp->done is set to 1 in sg_rq_end_io(), a fresh timestamp is taken in the else branch, and the elapsed time (value type #2) is subtracted from a timestamp, which cannot yield a valid elapsed time (which is a type #2 value as well). To fix this issue, the value of hp->duration must change under the protection of the sfp->rq_list_lock in sg_rq_end_io(). Since sg_proc_debug_helper() takes this read lock, the change to srp->done and srp->header.duration will happen atomically from the perspective of sg_proc_debug_helper() and the race condition is thus eliminated. The second race condition happens between sg_proc_debug_helper() and sg_new_write(). Even though hp->duration is set to the current time stamp in sg_add_request() under the write lock's protection, it gets overwritten by a call to get_sg_io_hdr(), which calls copy_from_user() to copy struct sg_io_hdr from userspace into kernel space. hp->duration is set to the start time again in sg_common_write(). If sg_proc_debug_helper() is called between these two calls, an arbitrary value set by userspace (usually zero) is used to compute the elapsed time. To fix this issue, hp->duration must be set to the current timestamp again after get_sg_io_hdr() returns successfully. A small race window still exists between get_sg_io_hdr() and setting hp->duration, but this window is only a few instructions wide and does not result in observable issues in practice, as confirmed by testing. Additionally, we fix the format specifier from %d to %u for printing unsigned int values in sg_proc_debug_helper(). Signed-off-by: Michal Rábek <mrabek@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com> Tested-by: Changhui Zhong <czhong@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: John Meneghini <jmeneghi@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251212160900.64924-1-mrabek@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 4f8543b upstream. With latest llvm22, I hit the verif_scale_strobemeta selftest failure below: $ ./test_progs -n 618 libbpf: prog 'on_event': BPF program load failed: -E2BIG libbpf: prog 'on_event': -- BEGIN PROG LOAD LOG -- BPF program is too large. Processed 1000001 insn verification time 7019091 usec stack depth 488 processed 1000001 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 28 total_states 33927 peak_states 12813 mark_read 0 -- END PROG LOAD LOG -- libbpf: prog 'on_event': failed to load: -E2BIG libbpf: failed to load object 'strobemeta.bpf.o' scale_test:FAIL:expect_success unexpected error: -7 (errno 7) #618 verif_scale_strobemeta:FAIL But if I increase the verificaiton insn limit from 1M to 10M, the above test_progs run actually will succeed. The below is the result from veristat: $ ./veristat strobemeta.bpf.o Processing 'strobemeta.bpf.o'... File Program Verdict Duration (us) Insns States Program size Jited size ---------------- -------- ------- ------------- ------- ------ ------------ ---------- strobemeta.bpf.o on_event success 90250893 9777685 358230 15954 80794 ---------------- -------- ------- ------------- ------- ------ ------------ ---------- Done. Processed 1 files, 0 programs. Skipped 1 files, 0 programs. Further debugging shows the llvm commit [1] is responsible for the verificaiton failure as it tries to convert certain switch statement to if-condition. Such change may cause different transformation compared to original switch statement. In bpf program strobemeta.c case, the initial llvm ir for read_int_var() function is define internal void @read_int_var(ptr noundef %0, i64 noundef %1, ptr noundef %2, ptr noundef %3, ptr noundef %4) #2 !dbg !535 { %6 = alloca ptr, align 8 %7 = alloca i64, align 8 %8 = alloca ptr, align 8 %9 = alloca ptr, align 8 %10 = alloca ptr, align 8 %11 = alloca ptr, align 8 %12 = alloca i32, align 4 ... %20 = icmp ne ptr %19, null, !dbg !561 br i1 %20, label %22, label %21, !dbg !562 21: ; preds = %5 store i32 1, ptr %12, align 4 br label %48, !dbg !563 22: %23 = load ptr, ptr %9, align 8, !dbg !564 ... 47: ; preds = %38, %22 store i32 0, ptr %12, align 4, !dbg !588 br label %48, !dbg !588 48: ; preds = %47, %21 call void @llvm.lifetime.end.p0(ptr %11) #4, !dbg !588 %49 = load i32, ptr %12, align 4 switch i32 %49, label %51 [ i32 0, label %50 i32 1, label %50 ] 50: ; preds = %48, %48 ret void, !dbg !589 51: ; preds = %48 unreachable } Note that the above 'switch' statement is added by clang frontend. Without [1], the switch statement will survive until SelectionDag, so the switch statement acts like a 'barrier' and prevents some transformation involved with both 'before' and 'after' the switch statement. But with [1], the switch statement will be removed during middle end optimization and later middle end passes (esp. after inlining) have more freedom to reorder the code. The following is the related source code: static void *calc_location(struct strobe_value_loc *loc, void *tls_base): bpf_probe_read_user(&tls_ptr, sizeof(void *), dtv); /* if pointer has (void *)-1 value, then TLS wasn't initialized yet */ return tls_ptr && tls_ptr != (void *)-1 ? tls_ptr + tls_index.offset : NULL; In read_int_var() func, we have: void *location = calc_location(&cfg->int_locs[idx], tls_base); if (!location) return; bpf_probe_read_user(value, sizeof(struct strobe_value_generic), location); ... The static func calc_location() is called inside read_int_var(). The asm code without [1]: 77: .123....89 (85) call bpf_probe_read_user#112 78: ........89 (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -368) 79: .1......89 (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) 80: .12.....89 (bf) r3 = r2 81: .123....89 (0f) r3 += r1 82: ..23....89 (07) r2 += 1 83: ..23....89 (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -464) 84: ..234...89 (a5) if r2 < 0x2 goto pc+13 85: ...34...89 (15) if r3 == 0x0 goto pc+12 86: ...3....89 (bf) r1 = r10 87: .1.3....89 (07) r1 += -400 88: .1.3....89 (b4) w2 = 16 In this case, 'r2 < 0x2' and 'r3 == 0x0' go to null 'locaiton' place, so the verifier actually prefers to do verification first at 'r1 = r10' etc. The asm code with [1]: 119: .123....89 (85) call bpf_probe_read_user#112 120: ........89 (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -368) 121: .1......89 (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) 122: .12.....89 (bf) r3 = r2 123: .123....89 (0f) r3 += r1 124: ..23....89 (07) r2 += -1 125: ..23....89 (a5) if r2 < 0xfffffffe goto pc+6 126: ........89 (05) goto pc+17 ... 144: ........89 (b4) w1 = 0 145: .1......89 (6b) *(u16 *)(r8 +80) = r1 In this case, if 'r2 < 0xfffffffe' is true, the control will go to non-null 'location' branch, so 'goto pc+17' will actually go to null 'location' branch. This seems causing tremendous amount of verificaiton state. To fix the issue, rewrite the following code return tls_ptr && tls_ptr != (void *)-1 ? tls_ptr + tls_index.offset : NULL; to if/then statement and hopefully these explicit if/then statements are sticky during middle-end optimizations. Test with llvm20 and llvm21 as well and all strobemeta related selftests are passed. [1] llvm/llvm-project#161000 Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251014051639.1996331-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a80c9d9 ] A null-ptr-deref was reported in the SCTP transmit path when SCTP-AUTH key initialization fails: ================================================================== KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f] CPU: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G W 6.6.0 #2 RIP: 0010:sctp_packet_bundle_auth net/sctp/output.c:264 [inline] RIP: 0010:sctp_packet_append_chunk+0xb36/0x1260 net/sctp/output.c:401 Call Trace: sctp_packet_transmit_chunk+0x31/0x250 net/sctp/output.c:189 sctp_outq_flush_data+0xa29/0x26d0 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1111 sctp_outq_flush+0xc80/0x1240 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1217 sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.0+0x19a5/0x62c0 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1787 sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1198 [inline] sctp_do_sm+0x1a3/0x670 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1169 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x33e/0x640 net/sctp/associola.c:1052 sctp_inq_push+0x1dd/0x280 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88 sctp_rcv+0x11ae/0x3100 net/sctp/input.c:243 sctp6_rcv+0x3d/0x60 net/sctp/ipv6.c:1127 The issue is triggered when sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() fails in sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack() while processing an INIT_ACK. In this case, the command sequence is currently: - SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT - SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP (T1_INIT) - SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START (T1_COOKIE) - SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE (COOKIE_ECHOED) - SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY - SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO If SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY fails, asoc->shkey remains NULL, while asoc->peer.auth_capable and asoc->peer.peer_chunks have already been set by SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT. This allows a DATA chunk with auth = 1 and shkey = NULL to be queued by sctp_datamsg_from_user(). Since command interpretation stops on failure, no COOKIE_ECHO should been sent via SCTP_CMD_GEN_COOKIE_ECHO. However, the T1_COOKIE timer has already been started, and it may enqueue a COOKIE_ECHO into the outqueue later. As a result, the DATA chunk can be transmitted together with the COOKIE_ECHO in sctp_outq_flush_data(), leading to the observed issue. Similar to the other places where it calls sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() right after sctp_process_init(), this patch moves the SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY immediately after SCTP_CMD_PEER_INIT, before stopping T1_INIT and starting T1_COOKIE. This ensures that if shared key generation fails, authenticated DATA cannot be sent. It also allows the T1_INIT timer to retransmit INIT, giving the client another chance to process INIT_ACK and retry key setup. Fixes: 730fc3d ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing") Reported-by: Zhen Chen <chenzhen126@huawei.com> Tested-by: Zhen Chen <chenzhen126@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/44881224b375aa8853f5e19b4055a1a56d895813.1768324226.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit ca1a47c upstream. Patch series "mm/hugetlb: fixes for PMD table sharing (incl. using mmu_gather)", v3. One functional fix, one performance regression fix, and two related comment fixes. I cleaned up my prototype I recently shared [1] for the performance fix, deferring most of the cleanups I had in the prototype to a later point. While doing that I identified the other things. The goal of this patch set is to be backported to stable trees "fairly" easily. At least patch #1 and #4. Patch #1 fixes hugetlb_pmd_shared() not detecting any sharing Patch #2 + #3 are simple comment fixes that patch #4 interacts with. Patch #4 is a fix for the reported performance regression due to excessive IPI broadcasts during fork()+exit(). The last patch is all about TLB flushes, IPIs and mmu_gather. Read: complicated There are plenty of cleanups in the future to be had + one reasonable optimization on x86. But that's all out of scope for this series. Runtime tested, with a focus on fixing the performance regression using the original reproducer [2] on x86. This patch (of 4): We switched from (wrongly) using the page count to an independent shared count. Now, shared page tables have a refcount of 1 (excluding speculative references) and instead use ptdesc->pt_share_count to identify sharing. We didn't convert hugetlb_pmd_shared(), so right now, we would never detect a shared PMD table as such, because sharing/unsharing no longer touches the refcount of a PMD table. Page migration, like mbind() or migrate_pages() would allow for migrating folios mapped into such shared PMD tables, even though the folios are not exclusive. In smaps we would account them as "private" although they are "shared", and we would be wrongly setting the PM_MMAP_EXCLUSIVE in the pagemap interface. Fix it by properly using ptdesc_pmd_is_shared() in hugetlb_pmd_shared(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251223214037.580860-1-david@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251223214037.580860-2-david@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8cab934d-4a56-44aa-b641-bfd7e23bd673@kernel.org/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8cab934d-4a56-44aa-b641-bfd7e23bd673@kernel.org/ [2] Fixes: 59d9094 ("mm: hugetlb: independent PMD page table shared count") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand (Red Hat) <david@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Reviewed-by: Lance Yang <lance.yang@linux.dev> Tested-by: Lance Yang <lance.yang@linux.dev> Reviewed-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com> Tested-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> Acked-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com> Cc: Uschakow, Stanislav" <suschako@amazon.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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…itives [ Upstream commit c06343b ] The "valid" readout delay between the two reads of the watchdog is larger than the valid delta between the resulting watchdog and clocksource intervals, which results in false positive watchdog results. Assume TSC is the clocksource and HPET is the watchdog and both have a uncertainty margin of 250us (default). The watchdog readout does: 1) wdnow = read(HPET); 2) csnow = read(TSC); 3) wdend = read(HPET); The valid window for the delta between #1 and #3 is calculated by the uncertainty margins of the watchdog and the clocksource: m = 2 * watchdog.uncertainty_margin + cs.uncertainty margin; which results in 750us for the TSC/HPET case. The actual interval comparison uses a smaller margin: m = watchdog.uncertainty_margin + cs.uncertainty margin; which results in 500us for the TSC/HPET case. That means the following scenario will trigger the watchdog: Watchdog cycle N: 1) wdnow[N] = read(HPET); 2) csnow[N] = read(TSC); 3) wdend[N] = read(HPET); Assume the delay between #1 and #2 is 100us and the delay between #1 and Watchdog cycle N + 1: 4) wdnow[N + 1] = read(HPET); 5) csnow[N + 1] = read(TSC); 6) wdend[N + 1] = read(HPET); If the delay between #4 and #6 is within the 750us margin then any delay between #4 and #5 which is larger than 600us will fail the interval check and mark the TSC unstable because the intervals are calculated against the previous value: wd_int = wdnow[N + 1] - wdnow[N]; cs_int = csnow[N + 1] - csnow[N]; Putting the above delays in place this results in: cs_int = (wdnow[N + 1] + 610us) - (wdnow[N] + 100us); -> cs_int = wd_int + 510us; which is obviously larger than the allowed 500us margin and results in marking TSC unstable. Fix this by using the same margin as the interval comparison. If the delay between two watchdog reads is larger than that, then the readout was either disturbed by interconnect congestion, NMIs or SMIs. Fixes: 4ac1dd3 ("clocksource: Set cs_watchdog_read() checks based on .uncertainty_margin") Reported-by: Daniel J Blueman <daniel@quora.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250602223251.496591-1-daniel@quora.org/ Link: https://patch.msgid.link/87bjjxc9dq.ffs@tglx Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9910159 ] When one iio device is a consumer of another, it is possible that the ->info_exist_lock of both ends up being taken when reading the value of the consumer device. Since they currently belong to the same lockdep class (being initialized in a single location with mutex_init()), that results in a lockdep warning CPU0 ---- lock(&iio_dev_opaque->info_exist_lock); lock(&iio_dev_opaque->info_exist_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by sensors/414: #0: c31fd6dc (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: seq_read_iter+0x44/0x4e4 #1: c4f5a1c4 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x1c/0xac #2: c2827548 (kn->active#34){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x30/0xac #3: c1dd2b6 (&iio_dev_opaque->info_exist_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iio_read_channel_processed_scale+0x24/0xd8 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 414 Comm: sensors Not tainted 6.17.11 #5 NONE Hardware name: Generic AM33XX (Flattened Device Tree) Call trace: unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x60 dump_stack_lvl from print_deadlock_bug+0x2b8/0x334 print_deadlock_bug from __lock_acquire+0x13a4/0x2ab0 __lock_acquire from lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2c0 lock_acquire from __mutex_lock+0xa0/0xe8c __mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24 mutex_lock_nested from iio_read_channel_raw+0x20/0x6c iio_read_channel_raw from rescale_read_raw+0x128/0x1c4 rescale_read_raw from iio_channel_read+0xe4/0xf4 iio_channel_read from iio_read_channel_processed_scale+0x6c/0xd8 iio_read_channel_processed_scale from iio_hwmon_read_val+0x68/0xbc iio_hwmon_read_val from dev_attr_show+0x18/0x48 dev_attr_show from sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x80/0x110 sysfs_kf_seq_show from seq_read_iter+0xdc/0x4e4 seq_read_iter from vfs_read+0x238/0x2e4 vfs_read from ksys_read+0x6c/0xec ksys_read from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c Just as the mlock_key already has its own lockdep class, add a lock_class_key for the info_exist mutex. Note that this has in theory been a problem since before IIO first left staging, but it only occurs when a chain of consumers is in use and that is not often done. Fixes: ac917a8 ("staging:iio:core set the iio_dev.info pointer to null on unregister under lock.") Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <ravi@prevas.dk> Reviewed-by: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2aa1545 ] Since the commit 25c6a5a ("net: phy: micrel: Dynamically control external clock of KSZ PHY"), the clock of Micrel PHY has been enabled by phy_driver::resume() and disabled by phy_driver::suspend(). However, devm_clk_get_optional_enabled() is used in kszphy_probe(), so the clock will automatically be disabled when the device is unbound from the bus. Therefore, this could cause the clock to be disabled twice, resulting in clk driver warnings. For example, this issue can be reproduced on i.MX6ULL platform, and we can see the following logs when removing the FEC MAC drivers. $ echo 2188000.ethernet > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/fec/unbind $ echo 20b4000.ethernet > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/fec/unbind [ 109.758207] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 109.758240] WARNING: drivers/clk/clk.c:1188 at clk_core_disable+0xb4/0xd0, CPU#0: sh/639 [ 109.771011] enet2_ref already disabled [ 109.793359] Call trace: [ 109.822006] clk_core_disable from clk_disable+0x28/0x34 [ 109.827340] clk_disable from clk_disable_unprepare+0xc/0x18 [ 109.833029] clk_disable_unprepare from devm_clk_release+0x1c/0x28 [ 109.839241] devm_clk_release from devres_release_all+0x98/0x100 [ 109.845278] devres_release_all from device_unbind_cleanup+0xc/0x70 [ 109.851571] device_unbind_cleanup from device_release_driver_internal+0x1a4/0x1f4 [ 109.859170] device_release_driver_internal from bus_remove_device+0xbc/0xe4 [ 109.866243] bus_remove_device from device_del+0x140/0x458 [ 109.871757] device_del from phy_mdio_device_remove+0xc/0x24 [ 109.877452] phy_mdio_device_remove from mdiobus_unregister+0x40/0xac [ 109.883918] mdiobus_unregister from fec_enet_mii_remove+0x40/0x78 [ 109.890125] fec_enet_mii_remove from fec_drv_remove+0x4c/0x158 [ 109.896076] fec_drv_remove from device_release_driver_internal+0x17c/0x1f4 [ 109.962748] WARNING: drivers/clk/clk.c:1047 at clk_core_unprepare+0xfc/0x13c, CPU#0: sh/639 [ 109.975805] enet2_ref already unprepared [ 110.002866] Call trace: [ 110.031758] clk_core_unprepare from clk_unprepare+0x24/0x2c [ 110.037440] clk_unprepare from devm_clk_release+0x1c/0x28 [ 110.042957] devm_clk_release from devres_release_all+0x98/0x100 [ 110.048989] devres_release_all from device_unbind_cleanup+0xc/0x70 [ 110.055280] device_unbind_cleanup from device_release_driver_internal+0x1a4/0x1f4 [ 110.062877] device_release_driver_internal from bus_remove_device+0xbc/0xe4 [ 110.069950] bus_remove_device from device_del+0x140/0x458 [ 110.075469] device_del from phy_mdio_device_remove+0xc/0x24 [ 110.081165] phy_mdio_device_remove from mdiobus_unregister+0x40/0xac [ 110.087632] mdiobus_unregister from fec_enet_mii_remove+0x40/0x78 [ 110.093836] fec_enet_mii_remove from fec_drv_remove+0x4c/0x158 [ 110.099782] fec_drv_remove from device_release_driver_internal+0x17c/0x1f4 After analyzing the process of removing the FEC driver, as shown below, it can be seen that the clock was disabled twice by the PHY driver. fec_drv_remove() --> fec_enet_close() --> phy_stop() --> phy_suspend() --> kszphy_suspend() #1 The clock is disabled --> fec_enet_mii_remove() --> mdiobus_unregister() --> phy_mdio_device_remove() --> device_del() --> devm_clk_release() #2 The clock is disabled again Therefore, devm_clk_get_optional() is used to fix the above issue. And to avoid the issue mentioned by the commit 9853294 ("net: phy: micrel: use devm_clk_get_optional_enabled for the rmii-ref clock"), the clock is enabled by clk_prepare_enable() to get the correct clock rate. Fixes: 25c6a5a ("net: phy: micrel: Dynamically control external clock of KSZ PHY") Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <wei.fang@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Maxime Chevallier <maxime.chevallier@bootlin.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260126081544.983517-1-wei.fang@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 96313fc ] There was a lockdep warning in sprd_gpio: [ 6.258269][T329@C6] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 6.258270][T329@C6] 6.18.0-android17-0-g30527ad7aaae-ab00009-4k #1 Tainted: G W OE [ 6.258272][T329@C6] ----------------------------- [ 6.258273][T329@C6] modprobe/329 is trying to lock: [ 6.258275][T329@C6] ffffff8081c91690 (&sprd_gpio->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: sprd_gpio_irq_unmask+0x4c/0xa4 [gpio_sprd] [ 6.258282][T329@C6] other info that might help us debug this: [ 6.258283][T329@C6] context-{5:5} [ 6.258285][T329@C6] 3 locks held by modprobe/329: [ 6.258286][T329@C6] #0: ffffff808baca108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __driver_attach+0xc4/0x204 [ 6.258295][T329@C6] #1: ffffff80965e7240 (request_class#4){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0x1cc/0x82c [ 6.258304][T329@C6] #2: ffffff80965e70c8 (lock_class#4){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq+0x21c/0x82c [ 6.258313][T329@C6] stack backtrace: [ 6.258314][T329@C6] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 329 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W OE 6.18.0-android17-0-g30527ad7aaae-ab00009-4k #1 PREEMPT 3ad5b0f45741a16e5838da790706e16ceb6717df [ 6.258316][T329@C6] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 6.258317][T329@C6] Hardware name: Unisoc UMS9632-base Board (DT) [ 6.258318][T329@C6] Call trace: [ 6.258318][T329@C6] show_stack+0x20/0x30 (C) [ 6.258321][T329@C6] __dump_stack+0x28/0x3c [ 6.258324][T329@C6] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0xf0 [ 6.258326][T329@C6] dump_stack+0x18/0x3c [ 6.258329][T329@C6] __lock_acquire+0x824/0x2c28 [ 6.258331][T329@C6] lock_acquire+0x148/0x2cc [ 6.258333][T329@C6] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x6c/0xb4 [ 6.258334][T329@C6] sprd_gpio_irq_unmask+0x4c/0xa4 [gpio_sprd 814535e93c6d8e0853c45c02eab0fa88a9da6487] [ 6.258337][T329@C6] irq_startup+0x238/0x350 [ 6.258340][T329@C6] __setup_irq+0x504/0x82c [ 6.258342][T329@C6] request_threaded_irq+0x118/0x184 [ 6.258344][T329@C6] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x94/0x120 [ 6.258347][T329@C6] sc8546_init_irq+0x114/0x170 [sc8546_charger 223586ccafc27439f7db4f95b0c8e6e882349a99] [ 6.258352][T329@C6] sc8546_charger_probe+0x53c/0x5a0 [sc8546_charger 223586ccafc27439f7db4f95b0c8e6e882349a99] [ 6.258358][T329@C6] i2c_device_probe+0x2c8/0x350 [ 6.258361][T329@C6] really_probe+0x1a8/0x46c [ 6.258363][T329@C6] __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x10c [ 6.258366][T329@C6] driver_probe_device+0x44/0x1b4 [ 6.258369][T329@C6] __driver_attach+0xd0/0x204 [ 6.258371][T329@C6] bus_for_each_dev+0x10c/0x168 [ 6.258373][T329@C6] driver_attach+0x2c/0x3c [ 6.258376][T329@C6] bus_add_driver+0x154/0x29c [ 6.258378][T329@C6] driver_register+0x70/0x10c [ 6.258381][T329@C6] i2c_register_driver+0x48/0xc8 [ 6.258384][T329@C6] init_module+0x28/0xfd8 [sc8546_charger 223586ccafc27439f7db4f95b0c8e6e882349a99] [ 6.258389][T329@C6] do_one_initcall+0x128/0x42c [ 6.258392][T329@C6] do_init_module+0x60/0x254 [ 6.258395][T329@C6] load_module+0x1054/0x1220 [ 6.258397][T329@C6] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x240/0x35c [ 6.258400][T329@C6] invoke_syscall+0x60/0xec [ 6.258402][T329@C6] el0_svc_common+0xb0/0xe4 [ 6.258405][T329@C6] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x30 [ 6.258407][T329@C6] el0_svc+0x54/0x1c4 [ 6.258409][T329@C6] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xdc [ 6.258411][T329@C6] el0t_64_sync+0x1c4/0x1c8 This is because the spin_lock would change to rt_mutex in PREEMPT_RT, however the sprd_gpio->lock would use in hard-irq, this is unsafe. So change the spin_lock_t to raw_spin_lock_t to use the spinlock in hard-irq. Signed-off-by: Xuewen Yan <xuewen.yan@unisoc.com> Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260126094209.9855-1-xuewen.yan@unisoc.com [Bartosz: tweaked the commit message] Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f8b4cd2 ] kvfree_call_rcu() can be called while holding a raw_spinlock_t. Since __kfree_rcu_sheaf() may acquire a spinlock_t (which becomes a sleeping lock on PREEMPT_RT) and violate lock nesting rules, kvfree_call_rcu() bypasses the sheaves layer entirely on PREEMPT_RT. However, lockdep still complains about acquiring spinlock_t while holding raw_spinlock_t, even on !PREEMPT_RT where spinlock_t is a spinning lock. This causes a false lockdep warning [1]: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.19.0-rc6-next-20260120 #21508 Not tainted ----------------------------- migration/1/23 is trying to lock: ffff8afd01054e98 (&barn->lock){..-.}-{3:3}, at: barn_get_empty_sheaf+0x1d/0xb0 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 3 locks held by migration/1/23: #0: ffff8afd01fd89a8 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __balance_push_cpu_stop+0x3f/0x200 #1: ffffffff9f15c5c8 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: cpuset_cpus_allowed_fallback+0x27/0x250 #2: ffff8afd1f470be0 ((local_lock_t *)&pcs->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __kfree_rcu_sheaf+0x52/0x3d0 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 23 Comm: migration/1 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc6-next-20260120 #21508 PREEMPTLAZY Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Stopper: __balance_push_cpu_stop+0x0/0x200 <- balance_push+0x118/0x170 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack+0x22/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80 dump_stack+0x19/0x24 __lock_acquire+0xd3a/0x28e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x5a9/0x28e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x5a9/0x28e0 ? barn_get_empty_sheaf+0x1d/0xb0 lock_acquire+0xc3/0x270 ? barn_get_empty_sheaf+0x1d/0xb0 ? __kfree_rcu_sheaf+0x52/0x3d0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x47/0x70 ? barn_get_empty_sheaf+0x1d/0xb0 barn_get_empty_sheaf+0x1d/0xb0 ? __kfree_rcu_sheaf+0x52/0x3d0 __kfree_rcu_sheaf+0x19f/0x3d0 kvfree_call_rcu+0xaf/0x390 set_cpus_allowed_force+0xc8/0xf0 [...] </TASK> This wasn't triggered until sheaves were enabled for all slab caches, since kfree_rcu() wasn't being called with a raw spinlock held for caches with sheaves (vma, maple node). As suggested by Vlastimil Babka, fix this by using a lockdep map with LD_WAIT_CONFIG wait type to tell lockdep that acquiring spinlock_t is valid in this case, as those spinlocks won't be used on PREEMPT_RT. Note that kfree_rcu_sheaf_map should be acquired using _try() variant, otherwise the acquisition of the lockdep map itself will trigger an invalid wait context warning. Reported-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/c858b9af-2510-448b-9ab3-058f7b80dd42@paulmck-laptop [1] Fixes: ec66e0d ("slab: add sheaf support for batching kfree_rcu() operations") Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit cd7ef20 ] On the THUNDEROBOT ZERO laptop, the second NVMe slot and the discrete NVIDIA GPU are both controlled by power-resource PXP. Due to the SSDT table bug (lack of reference), PXP will be shut dow as an "unused" power resource during initialization, making the NVMe slot #2 + NVIDIA both inaccessible. This issue was introduced by commit a1224f3 ("ACPI: PM: Check states of power resources during initialization"). Here are test results on the three consecutive commits: (bad again!) a1224f3 ACPI: PM: Check states of power resources during initialization (good) bc28368 ACPI: PM: Do not turn off power resources in unknown state (bad) 519d819 Linux 5.15-rc6 On commit bc28368 ("ACPI: PM: Do not turn off power resources in unknown state") this was not an issue because the power resource state left UNKNOWN thus being ignored. See also commit 9b04d99 ("ACPI: PM: Do not turn of unused power resources on the Toshiba Click Mini") which is another almost identical case to this one. Fixes: a1224f3 ("ACPI: PM: Check states of power resources during initialization") Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221087 Signed-off-by: Zhai Can <bczhc0@126.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260214161452.2849346-1-bczhc0@126.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e6834a4 ] The ALB RX path may access rx_hashtbl concurrently with bond teardown. During rapid bond up/down cycles, rlb_deinitialize() frees rx_hashtbl while RX handlers are still running, leading to a null pointer dereference detected by KASAN. However, the root cause is that rlb_arp_recv() can still be accessed after setting recv_probe to NULL, which is actually a use-after-free (UAF) issue. That is the reason for using the referenced commit in the Fixes tag. [ 214.174138] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000001d: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 214.186478] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef] [ 214.194933] CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 2375 Comm: ping Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.19.0-rc8+ #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 214.205907] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0WCJNT, BIOS 2.14.0 01/14/2022 [ 214.214357] RIP: 0010:rlb_arp_recv+0x505/0xab0 [bonding] [ 214.220320] Code: 0f 85 2b 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 40 0f b6 ed 48 c1 e5 06 49 03 ad 78 01 00 00 48 8d 7d 28 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 06 0f 8e 12 05 00 00 80 7d 28 00 0f 84 8c 00 [ 214.241280] RSP: 0018:ffffc900073d8870 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 214.247116] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888168556822 RCX: ffff88816855681e [ 214.255082] RDX: 000000000000001d RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 00000000000000e8 [ 214.263048] RBP: 00000000000000c0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: ffffed11192021c8 [ 214.271013] R10: ffff8888c9010e43 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 1ffff92000e7b119 [ 214.278978] R13: ffff8888c9010e00 R14: ffff888168556822 R15: ffff888168556810 [ 214.286943] FS: 00007f85d2d9cb80(0000) GS:ffff88886ccb3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 214.295966] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 214.302380] CR2: 00007f0d047b5e34 CR3: 00000008a1c2e002 CR4: 00000000001726f0 [ 214.310347] Call Trace: [ 214.313070] <IRQ> [ 214.315318] ? __pfx_rlb_arp_recv+0x10/0x10 [bonding] [ 214.320975] bond_handle_frame+0x166/0xb60 [bonding] [ 214.326537] ? __pfx_bond_handle_frame+0x10/0x10 [bonding] [ 214.332680] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x576/0x2710 [ 214.339199] ? __pfx_arp_process+0x10/0x10 [ 214.343775] ? sched_balance_find_src_group+0x98/0x630 [ 214.349513] ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 [ 214.356513] ? arp_rcv+0x307/0x690 [ 214.360311] ? __pfx_arp_rcv+0x10/0x10 [ 214.364499] ? __lock_acquire+0x58c/0xbd0 [ 214.368975] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xae/0x1b0 [ 214.374518] ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 [ 214.380743] ? lock_acquire+0x10b/0x140 [ 214.385026] process_backlog+0x3f1/0x13a0 [ 214.389502] ? process_backlog+0x3aa/0x13a0 [ 214.394174] __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x9f/0x370 [ 214.399233] net_rx_action+0x8c1/0xe60 [ 214.403423] ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 [ 214.408193] ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xbd/0x260 [ 214.413058] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x6c/0x540 [ 214.417540] ? mark_held_locks+0x40/0x70 [ 214.421920] handle_softirqs+0x1fd/0x860 [ 214.426302] ? __pfx_handle_softirqs+0x10/0x10 [ 214.431264] ? __neigh_event_send+0x2d6/0xf50 [ 214.436131] do_softirq+0xb1/0xf0 [ 214.439830] </IRQ> The issue is reproducible by repeatedly running ip link set bond0 up/down while receiving ARP messages, where rlb_arp_recv() can race with rlb_deinitialize() and dereference a freed rx_hashtbl entry. Fix this by setting recv_probe to NULL and then calling synchronize_net() to wait for any concurrent RX processing to finish. This ensures that no RX handler can access rx_hashtbl after it is freed in bond_alb_deinitialize(). Reported-by: Liang Li <liali@redhat.com> Fixes: 3aba891 ("bonding: move processing of recv handlers into handle_frame()") Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <jv@jvosburgh.net> Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260218060919.101574-1-liuhangbin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a70493e ] The ETM decoder incorrectly assumed that auxtrace queue indices were equivalent to CPU number. This assumption is used for inserting records into the queue, and for fetching queues when given a CPU number. This assumption held when Perf always opened a dummy event on every CPU, even if the user provided a subset of CPUs on the commandline, resulting in the indices aligning. For example: # event : name = cs_etm//u, , id = { 2451, 2452 }, type = 11 (cs_etm), size = 136, config = 0x4010, { sample_period, samp> # event : name = dummy:u, , id = { 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456 }, type = 1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE), size = 136, config = 0x9 (PER> 0 0 0x200 [0xd0]: PERF_RECORD_ID_INDEX nr: 6 ... id: 2451 idx: 2 cpu: 2 tid: -1 ... id: 2452 idx: 3 cpu: 3 tid: -1 ... id: 2453 idx: 0 cpu: 0 tid: -1 ... id: 2454 idx: 1 cpu: 1 tid: -1 ... id: 2455 idx: 2 cpu: 2 tid: -1 ... id: 2456 idx: 3 cpu: 3 tid: -1 Since commit 811082e ("perf parse-events: Support user CPUs mixed with threads/processes") the dummy event no longer behaves in this way, making the ETM event indices start from 0 on the first CPU recorded regardless of its ID: # event : name = cs_etm//u, , id = { 771, 772 }, type = 11 (cs_etm), size = 144, config = 0x4010, { sample_period, sample> # event : name = dummy:u, , id = { 773, 774 }, type = 1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE), size = 144, config = 0x9 (PERF_COUNT_SW_DUM> 0 0 0x200 [0x90]: PERF_RECORD_ID_INDEX nr: 4 ... id: 771 idx: 0 cpu: 2 tid: -1 ... id: 772 idx: 1 cpu: 3 tid: -1 ... id: 773 idx: 0 cpu: 2 tid: -1 ... id: 774 idx: 1 cpu: 3 tid: -1 This causes the following segfault when decoding: $ perf record -e cs_etm//u -C 2,3 -- true $ perf report perf: Segmentation fault -------- backtrace -------- #0 0xaaaabf9fd020 in ui__signal_backtrace setup.c:110 #1 0xffffab5c7930 in __kernel_rt_sigreturn [vdso][930] #2 0xaaaabfb68d30 in cs_etm_decoder__reset cs-etm-decoder.c:85 #3 0xaaaabfb65930 in cs_etm__get_data_block cs-etm.c:2032 #4 0xaaaabfb666fc in cs_etm__run_per_cpu_timeless_decoder cs-etm.c:2551 #5 0xaaaabfb6692c in (cs_etm__process_timeless_queues cs-etm.c:2612 #6 0xaaaabfb63390 in cs_etm__flush_events cs-etm.c:921 #7 0xaaaabfb324c0 in auxtrace__flush_events auxtrace.c:2915 #8 0xaaaabfaac378 in __perf_session__process_events session.c:2285 #9 0xaaaabfaacc9c in perf_session__process_events session.c:2442 #10 0xaaaabf8d3d90 in __cmd_report builtin-report.c:1085 #11 0xaaaabf8d6944 in cmd_report builtin-report.c:1866 #12 0xaaaabf95ebfc in run_builtin perf.c:351 #13 0xaaaabf95eeb0 in handle_internal_command perf.c:404 #14 0xaaaabf95f068 in run_argv perf.c:451 #15 0xaaaabf95f390 in main perf.c:558 #16 0xffffaab97400 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74 #17 0xffffaab974d8 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128 #18 0xaaaabf8aa8f0 in _start perf[7a8f0] Fix it by inserting into the queues based on CPU number, rather than using the index. Fixes: 811082e ("perf parse-events: Support user CPUs mixed with threads/processes") Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org> Tested-by: Leo Yan <leo.yan@arm.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: coresight@lists.linaro.org Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: John Garry <john.g.garry@oracle.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Suzuki Poulouse <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Cc: Thomas Falcon <thomas.falcon@intel.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d935187 ] A potential circular locking dependency (ABBA deadlock) exists between `ec_dev->lock` and the clock framework's `prepare_lock`. The first order (A -> B) occurs when scp_ipi_send() is called while `ec_dev->lock` is held (e.g., within cros_ec_cmd_xfer()): 1. cros_ec_cmd_xfer() acquires `ec_dev->lock` and calls scp_ipi_send(). 2. scp_ipi_send() calls clk_prepare_enable(), which acquires `prepare_lock`. See #0 in the following example calling trace. (Lock Order: `ec_dev->lock` -> `prepare_lock`) The reverse order (B -> A) is more complex and has been observed (learned) by lockdep. It involves the clock prepare operation triggering power domain changes, which then propagates through sysfs and power supply uevents, eventually calling back into the ChromeOS EC driver and attempting to acquire `ec_dev->lock`: 1. Something calls clk_prepare(), which acquires `prepare_lock`. It then triggers genpd operations like genpd_runtime_resume(), which takes `&genpd->mlock`. 2. Power domain changes can trigger regulator changes; regulator changes can then trigger device link changes; device link changes can then trigger sysfs changes. Eventually, power_supply_uevent() is called. 3. This leads to calls like cros_usbpd_charger_get_prop(), which calls cros_ec_cmd_xfer_status(), which then attempts to acquire `ec_dev->lock`. See #1 ~ #6 in the following example calling trace. (Lock Order: `prepare_lock` -> `&genpd->mlock` -> ... -> `&ec_dev->lock`) Move the clk_prepare()/clk_unprepare() operations for `scp->clk` to the remoteproc prepare()/unprepare() callbacks. This ensures `prepare_lock` is only acquired in prepare()/unprepare() callbacks. Since `ec_dev->lock` is not involved in the callbacks, the dependency loop is broken. This means the clock is always "prepared" when the SCP is running. The prolonged "prepared time" for the clock should be acceptable as SCP is designed to be a very power efficient processor. The power consumption impact can be negligible. A simplified calling trace reported by lockdep: > -> #6 (&ec_dev->lock) > cros_ec_cmd_xfer > cros_ec_cmd_xfer_status > cros_usbpd_charger_get_port_status > cros_usbpd_charger_get_prop > power_supply_get_property > power_supply_show_property > power_supply_uevent > dev_uevent > uevent_show > dev_attr_show > sysfs_kf_seq_show > kernfs_seq_show > -> #5 (kn->active#2) > kernfs_drain > __kernfs_remove > kernfs_remove_by_name_ns > sysfs_remove_file_ns > device_del > __device_link_del > device_links_driver_bound > -> #4 (device_links_lock) > device_link_remove > _regulator_put > regulator_put > -> #3 (regulator_list_mutex) > regulator_lock_dependent > regulator_disable > scpsys_power_off > _genpd_power_off > genpd_power_off > -> #2 (&genpd->mlock/1) > genpd_add_subdomain > pm_genpd_add_subdomain > scpsys_add_subdomain > scpsys_probe > -> #1 (&genpd->mlock) > genpd_runtime_resume > __rpm_callback > rpm_callback > rpm_resume > __pm_runtime_resume > clk_core_prepare > clk_prepare > -> #0 (prepare_lock) > clk_prepare > scp_ipi_send > scp_send_ipi > mtk_rpmsg_send > rpmsg_send > cros_ec_pkt_xfer_rpmsg Signed-off-by: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <wenst@chromium.org> Tested-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <wenst@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260112110755.2435899-1-tzungbi@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2700b7e ] Fix a circular locking dependency between dbg_mutex and the domain rx/tx mutexes that could lead to a deadlock. The dump path in dr_dump_domain_all() was acquiring locks in the order: dbg_mutex -> rx.mutex -> tx.mutex While the table/matcher creation paths acquire locks in the order: rx.mutex -> tx.mutex -> dbg_mutex This inverted lock ordering creates a circular dependency. Fix this by changing dr_dump_domain_all() to acquire the domain lock before dbg_mutex, matching the order used in mlx5dr_table_create() and mlx5dr_matcher_create(). Lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.19.0-rc6net_next_e817c4e #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ sos/30721 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888102df5900 (&dmn->info.rx.mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dr_dump_start+0x131/0x450 [mlx5_core] but task is already holding lock: ffff888102df5bc0 (&dmn->dump_info.dbg_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dr_dump_start+0x10b/0x450 [mlx5_core] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&dmn->dump_info.dbg_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x91/0x1060 mlx5dr_matcher_create+0x377/0x5e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_cmd_dr_create_flow_group+0x62/0xd0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_create_flow_group+0x113/0x1c0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_chains_create_prio+0x453/0x2290 [mlx5_core] mlx5_chains_get_table+0x2e2/0x980 [mlx5_core] esw_chains_create+0x1e6/0x3b0 [mlx5_core] esw_create_offloads_fdb_tables.cold+0x62/0x63f [mlx5_core] esw_offloads_enable+0x76f/0xd20 [mlx5_core] mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x35a/0x500 [mlx5_core] mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x561/0x950 [mlx5_core] devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x67/0xe0 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe0/0x130 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x290 netlink_rcv_skb+0x4b/0xf0 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1ed/0x2c0 netlink_sendmsg+0x210/0x450 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x119/0x180 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x70/0xd00 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 -> #1 (&dmn->info.tx.mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x91/0x1060 mlx5dr_table_create+0x11d/0x530 [mlx5_core] mlx5_cmd_dr_create_flow_table+0x62/0x140 [mlx5_core] __mlx5_create_flow_table+0x46f/0x960 [mlx5_core] mlx5_create_flow_table+0x16/0x20 [mlx5_core] esw_create_offloads_fdb_tables+0x136/0x240 [mlx5_core] esw_offloads_enable+0x76f/0xd20 [mlx5_core] mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x35a/0x500 [mlx5_core] mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x561/0x950 [mlx5_core] devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x67/0xe0 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe0/0x130 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x290 netlink_rcv_skb+0x4b/0xf0 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1ed/0x2c0 netlink_sendmsg+0x210/0x450 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x119/0x180 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x70/0xd00 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 -> #0 (&dmn->info.rx.mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x18b6/0x2eb0 lock_acquire+0xd3/0x2c0 __mutex_lock+0x91/0x1060 dr_dump_start+0x131/0x450 [mlx5_core] seq_read_iter+0xe3/0x410 seq_read+0xfb/0x130 full_proxy_read+0x53/0x80 vfs_read+0xba/0x330 ksys_read+0x65/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x70/0xd00 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&dmn->dump_info.dbg_mutex); lock(&dmn->info.tx.mutex); lock(&dmn->dump_info.dbg_mutex); lock(&dmn->info.rx.mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** Fixes: 9222f0b ("net/mlx5: DR, Add support for dumping steering info") Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <shayd@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Yevgeny Kliteynik <kliteyn@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Vesker <valex@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260224114652.1787431-2-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 51520e0 upstream. When the mci->pvt_info allocation in edac_mc_alloc() fails, the error path will call put_device() which will end up calling the device's release function. However, the init ordering is wrong such that device_initialize() happens *after* the failed allocation and thus the device itself and the release function pointer are not initialized yet when they're called: MCE: In-kernel MCE decoding enabled. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kobject: '(null)': is not initialized, yet kobject_put() is being called. WARNING: lib/kobject.c:734 at kobject_put, CPU#22: systemd-udevd CPU: 22 UID: 0 PID: 538 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #2 PREEMPT(full) RIP: 0010:kobject_put Call Trace: <TASK> edac_mc_alloc+0xbe/0xe0 [edac_core] amd64_edac_init+0x7a4/0xff0 [amd64_edac] ? __pfx_amd64_edac_init+0x10/0x10 [amd64_edac] do_one_initcall ... Reorder the calling sequence so that the device is initialized and thus the release function pointer is properly set before it can be used. This was found by Claude while reviewing another EDAC patch. Fixes: 0bbb265 ("EDAC/mc: Get rid of silly one-shot struct allocation in edac_mc_alloc()") Reported-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-4.5 Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260331121623.4871-1-bp@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5914781 upstream. Switch from using the completion's raw spinlock to a local lock in the idpf_vc_xn struct. The conversion is safe because complete/_all() are called outside the lock and there is no reason to share the completion lock in the current logic. This avoids invalid wait context reported by the kernel due to the async handler taking BH spinlock: [ 805.726977] ============================= [ 805.726991] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 805.727006] 7.0.0-rc2-net-devq-031026+ #28 Tainted: G S OE [ 805.727026] ----------------------------- [ 805.727038] kworker/u261:0/572 is trying to lock: [ 805.727051] ff190da6a8dbb6a0 (&vport_config->mac_filter_list_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: idpf_mac_filter_async_handler+0xe9/0x260 [idpf] [ 805.727099] other info that might help us debug this: [ 805.727111] context-{5:5} [ 805.727119] 3 locks held by kworker/u261:0/572: [ 805.727132] #0: ff190da6db3e6148 ((wq_completion)idpf-0000:83:00.0-mbx){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4b5/0x730 [ 805.727163] #1: ff3c6f0a6131fe50 ((work_completion)(&(&adapter->mbx_task)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e5/0x730 [ 805.727191] #2: ff190da765190020 (&x->wait#34){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: idpf_recv_mb_msg+0xc8/0x710 [idpf] [ 805.727218] stack backtrace: ... [ 805.727238] Workqueue: idpf-0000:83:00.0-mbx idpf_mbx_task [idpf] [ 805.727247] Call Trace: [ 805.727249] <TASK> [ 805.727251] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0 [ 805.727259] __lock_acquire+0xb3b/0x2290 [ 805.727268] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x59/0x130 [ 805.727275] lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2f0 [ 805.727277] ? idpf_mac_filter_async_handler+0xe9/0x260 [idpf] [ 805.727284] ? _printk+0x5b/0x80 [ 805.727290] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x38/0x50 [ 805.727298] ? idpf_mac_filter_async_handler+0xe9/0x260 [idpf] [ 805.727303] idpf_mac_filter_async_handler+0xe9/0x260 [idpf] [ 805.727310] idpf_recv_mb_msg+0x1c8/0x710 [idpf] [ 805.727317] process_one_work+0x226/0x730 [ 805.727322] worker_thread+0x19e/0x340 [ 805.727325] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 805.727328] kthread+0xf4/0x130 [ 805.727333] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 805.727336] ret_from_fork+0x32c/0x410 [ 805.727345] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 805.727347] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 805.727354] </TASK> Fixes: 34c21fa ("idpf: implement virtchnl transaction manager") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Reported-by: Ray Zhang <sgzhang@google.com> Signed-off-by: Emil Tantilov <emil.s.tantilov@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com> Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Samuel Salin <Samuel.salin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3700f07 upstream. MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR and LBR MSRs are currently not enumerated by KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST, and LBR MSRs cannot be set with KVM_SET_MSRS. So save/restore is completely broken. Fix it by adding the MSRs to msrs_to_save_base, and allowing writes to LBR MSRs from userspace only (as they are read-only MSRs) if LBR virtualization is enabled. Additionally, to correctly restore L1's LBRs while L2 is running, make sure the LBRs are copied from the captured VMCB01 save area in svm_copy_vmrun_state(). Note, for VMX, this also fixes a flaw where MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR isn't reported as an MSR to save/restore. Note #2, over-reporting MSR_IA32_LASTxxx on Intel is ok, as KVM already handles unsupported reads and writes thanks to commit b5e2fec ("KVM: Ignore DEBUGCTL MSRs with no effect") (kvm_do_msr_access() will morph the unsupported userspace write into a nop). Fixes: 24e09cb ("KVM: SVM: enable LBR virtualization") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303003421.2185681-4-yosry@kernel.org [sean: guard with lbrv checks, massage changelog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 96bd3e7 upstream. According to the APM Volume #2, 15.5, Canonicalization and Consistency Checks (24593—Rev. 3.42—March 2024), the following condition (among others) results in a #VMEXIT with VMEXIT_INVALID (aka SVM_EXIT_ERR): EFER.LME, CR0.PG, CR4.PAE, CS.L, and CS.D are all non-zero. In the list of consistency checks done when EFER.LME and CR0.PG are set, add a check that CS.L and CS.D are not both set, after the existing check that CR4.PAE is set. This is functionally a nop because the nested VMRUN results in SVM_EXIT_ERR in HW, which is forwarded to L1, but KVM makes all consistency checks before a VMRUN is actually attempted. Fixes: 3d6368e ("KVM: SVM: Add VMRUN handler") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303003421.2185681-17-yosry@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b71138f upstream. From the APM Volume #2, 15.25.4 (24593—Rev. 3.42—March 2024): When VMRUN is executed with nested paging enabled (NP_ENABLE = 1), the following conditions are considered illegal state combinations, in addition to those mentioned in “Canonicalization and Consistency Checks”: • Any MBZ bit of nCR3 is set. • Any G_PAT.PA field has an unsupported type encoding or any reserved field in G_PAT has a nonzero value. Add the consistency check for nCR3 being a legal GPA with no MBZ bits set. Note, the G_PAT.PA check is being handled separately[*]. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20260205214326.1029278-3-jmattson@google.com [*] Fixes: 4b16184 ("KVM: SVM: Initialize Nested Nested MMU context on VMRUN") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303003421.2185681-16-yosry@kernel.org [sean: capture everything in CC(), massage changelog formatting] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a355eef ] Currently, the initialization of loongarch_jump_ops does not contain an assignment to its .free field. This causes disasm_line__free() to fall through to ins_ops__delete() for LoongArch jump instructions. ins_ops__delete() will free ins_operands.source.raw and ins_operands.source.name, and these fields overlaps with ins_operands.jump.raw_comment and ins_operands.jump.raw_func_start. Since in loongarch_jump__parse(), these two fields are populated by strchr()-ing the same buffer, trying to free them will lead to undefined behavior. This invalid free usually leads to crashes: Process 1712902 (perf) of user 1000 dumped core. Stack trace of thread 1712902: #0 0x00007fffef155c58 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0x95c58) #1 0x00007fffef0f7a94 raise (libc.so.6 + 0x37a94) #2 0x00007fffef0dd6a8 abort (libc.so.6 + 0x1d6a8) #3 0x00007fffef145490 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0x85490) #4 0x00007fffef1646f4 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0xa46f4) #5 0x00007fffef164718 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0xa4718) #6 0x00005555583a6764 __zfree (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x106764) #7 0x000055555854fb70 disasm_line__free (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x2afb70) #8 0x000055555853d618 annotated_source__purge (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x29d618) #9 0x000055555852300c __hist_entry__tui_annotate (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x28300c) #10 0x0000555558526718 do_annotate (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x286718) #11 0x000055555852ed94 evsel__hists_browse (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x28ed94) #12 0x000055555831fdd0 cmd_report (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x7fdd0) #13 0x000055555839b644 handle_internal_command (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0xfb644) #14 0x00005555582fe6ac main (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x5e6ac) #15 0x00007fffef0ddd90 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0x1dd90) #16 0x00007fffef0ddf0c __libc_start_main (libc.so.6 + 0x1df0c) #17 0x00005555582fed10 _start (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x5ed10) ELF object binary architecture: LoongArch ... and it can be confirmed with Valgrind: ==1721834== Invalid free() / delete / delete[] / realloc() ==1721834== at 0x4EA9014: free (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-loongarch64-linux.so) ==1721834== by 0x4106287: __zfree (zalloc.c:13) ==1721834== by 0x42ADC8F: disasm_line__free (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x429B737: annotated_source__purge (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x42811EB: __hist_entry__tui_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x42848D7: do_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x428CF33: evsel__hists_browse (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== Address 0x7d34303 is 35 bytes inside a block of size 62 alloc'd ==1721834== at 0x4EA59B8: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-loongarch64-linux.so) ==1721834== by 0x6B80B6F: strdup (strdup.c:42) ==1721834== by 0x42AD917: disasm_line__new (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x42AE5A3: symbol__disassemble_objdump (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x42AF0A7: symbol__disassemble (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x429B3CF: symbol__annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x429C233: symbol__annotate2 (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x42804D3: __hist_entry__tui_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x42848D7: do_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) ==1721834== by 0x428CF33: evsel__hists_browse (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf) This patch adds the missing free() specialization in loongarch_jump_ops, which prevents disasm_line__free() from invoking the default cleanup function. Fixes: fb7fd2a ("perf annotate: Move raw_comment and raw_func_start fields out of 'struct ins_operands'") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: WANG Rui <wangrui@loongson.cn> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name> Cc: loongarch@lists.linux.dev Signed-off-by: Rong Bao <rong.bao@csmantle.top> Tested-by: WANG Rui <wangrui@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 9997572 upstream. When removing a directory we are not updating its last_unlink_trans field, which can result in incorrect fsync behaviour in case some one fsyncs the directory after it was removed because it's holding a file descriptor on it. Example scenario: mkdir /mnt/dir1 mkdir /mnt/dir1/dir2 mkdir /mnt/dir3 sync -f /mnt # Do some change to the directory and fsync it. chmod 700 /mnt/dir1 xfs_io -c fsync /mnt/dir1 # Move dir2 out of dir1 so that dir1 becomes empty. mv /mnt/dir1/dir2 /mnt/dir3/ open fd on /mnt/dir1 call rmdir(2) on path "/mnt/dir1" fsync fd <trigger power failure> When attempting to mount the filesystem, the log replay will fail with an -EIO error and dmesg/syslog has the following: [445771.626482] BTRFS info (device dm-0): first mount of filesystem 0368bbea-6c5e-44b5-b409-09abe496e650 [445771.626486] BTRFS info (device dm-0): using crc32c checksum algorithm [445771.627912] BTRFS info (device dm-0): start tree-log replay [445771.628335] page: refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000061443ddc index:0x1d00 pfn:0x7072a5 [445771.629453] memcg:ffff89f400351b00 [445771.629892] aops:btree_aops [btrfs] ino:1 [445771.630737] flags: 0x17fffc00000402a(uptodate|lru|private|writeback|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [445771.632359] raw: 017fffc00000402a fffff47284d950c8 fffff472907b7c08 ffff89f458e412b8 [445771.633713] raw: 0000000000001d00 ffff89f6c51d1a90 00000002ffffffff ffff89f400351b00 [445771.635029] page dumped because: eb page dump [445771.635825] BTRFS critical (device dm-0): corrupt leaf: root=5 block=30408704 slot=10 ino=258, invalid nlink: has 2 expect no more than 1 for dir [445771.638088] BTRFS info (device dm-0): leaf 30408704 gen 10 total ptrs 17 free space 14878 owner 5 [445771.638091] BTRFS info (device dm-0): refs 4 lock_owner 0 current 3581087 [445771.638094] item 0 key (256 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160 [445771.638097] inode generation 3 transid 9 size 16 nbytes 16384 [445771.638098] block group 0 mode 40755 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 [445771.638100] rdev 0 sequence 2 flags 0x0 [445771.638102] atime 1775744884.0 [445771.660056] ctime 1775744885.645502983 [445771.660058] mtime 1775744885.645502983 [445771.660060] otime 1775744884.0 [445771.660062] item 1 key (256 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16111 itemsize 12 [445771.660064] index 0 name_len 2 [445771.660066] item 2 key (256 DIR_ITEM 1843588421) itemoff 16077 itemsize 34 [445771.660068] location key (259 1 0) type 2 [445771.660070] transid 9 data_len 0 name_len 4 [445771.660075] item 3 key (256 DIR_ITEM 2363071922) itemoff 16043 itemsize 34 [445771.660076] location key (257 1 0) type 2 [445771.660077] transid 9 data_len 0 name_len 4 [445771.660078] item 4 key (256 DIR_INDEX 2) itemoff 16009 itemsize 34 [445771.660079] location key (257 1 0) type 2 [445771.660080] transid 9 data_len 0 name_len 4 [445771.660081] item 5 key (256 DIR_INDEX 3) itemoff 15975 itemsize 34 [445771.660082] location key (259 1 0) type 2 [445771.660083] transid 9 data_len 0 name_len 4 [445771.660084] item 6 key (257 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 15815 itemsize 160 [445771.660086] inode generation 9 transid 9 size 8 nbytes 0 [445771.660087] block group 0 mode 40777 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 [445771.660088] rdev 0 sequence 2 flags 0x0 [445771.660089] atime 1775744885.641174097 [445771.660090] ctime 1775744885.645502983 [445771.660091] mtime 1775744885.645502983 [445771.660105] otime 1775744885.641174097 [445771.660106] item 7 key (257 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 15801 itemsize 14 [445771.660107] index 2 name_len 4 [445771.660108] item 8 key (257 DIR_ITEM 2676584006) itemoff 15767 itemsize 34 [445771.660109] location key (258 1 0) type 2 [445771.660110] transid 9 data_len 0 name_len 4 [445771.660111] item 9 key (257 DIR_INDEX 2) itemoff 15733 itemsize 34 [445771.660112] location key (258 1 0) type 2 [445771.660113] transid 9 data_len 0 name_len 4 [445771.660114] item 10 key (258 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 15573 itemsize 160 [445771.660115] inode generation 9 transid 10 size 0 nbytes 0 [445771.660116] block group 0 mode 40755 links 2 uid 0 gid 0 [445771.660117] rdev 0 sequence 0 flags 0x0 [445771.660118] atime 1775744885.645502983 [445771.660119] ctime 1775744885.645502983 [445771.660120] mtime 1775744885.645502983 [445771.660121] otime 1775744885.645502983 [445771.660122] item 11 key (258 INODE_REF 257) itemoff 15559 itemsize 14 [445771.660123] index 2 name_len 4 [445771.660124] item 12 key (258 INODE_REF 259) itemoff 15545 itemsize 14 [445771.660125] index 2 name_len 4 [445771.660126] item 13 key (259 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 15385 itemsize 160 [445771.660127] inode generation 9 transid 10 size 8 nbytes 0 [445771.660128] block group 0 mode 40755 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 [445771.660129] rdev 0 sequence 1 flags 0x0 [445771.660130] atime 1775744885.645502983 [445771.660130] ctime 1775744885.645502983 [445771.660131] mtime 1775744885.645502983 [445771.660132] otime 1775744885.645502983 [445771.660133] item 14 key (259 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 15371 itemsize 14 [445771.660134] index 3 name_len 4 [445771.660135] item 15 key (259 DIR_ITEM 2676584006) itemoff 15337 itemsize 34 [445771.660136] location key (258 1 0) type 2 [445771.660137] transid 10 data_len 0 name_len 4 [445771.660138] item 16 key (259 DIR_INDEX 2) itemoff 15303 itemsize 34 [445771.660139] location key (258 1 0) type 2 [445771.660140] transid 10 data_len 0 name_len 4 [445771.660144] BTRFS error (device dm-0): block=30408704 write time tree block corruption detected [445771.661650] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [445771.662358] WARNING: fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:326 at btree_csum_one_bio+0x217/0x230 [btrfs], CPU#8: mount/3581087 [445771.663588] Modules linked in: btrfs f2fs xfs (...) [445771.671229] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 3581087 Comm: mount Tainted: G W 7.0.0-rc6-btrfs-next-230+ #2 PREEMPT(full) [445771.672575] Tainted: [W]=WARN [445771.672987] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [445771.674460] RIP: 0010:btree_csum_one_bio+0x217/0x230 [btrfs] [445771.675222] Code: 89 44 24 (...) [445771.677364] RSP: 0018:ffffd23882247660 EFLAGS: 00010246 [445771.678029] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff89f6c51d1a90 RCX: 0000000000000000 [445771.678975] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff89f406020000 [445771.679983] RBP: ffff89f821204000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffefffff [445771.680905] R10: ffffd23882247448 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffffd23882247668 [445771.681978] R13: ffff89f458e40fc0 R14: ffff89f737f4f500 R15: ffff89f737f4f500 [445771.682912] FS: 00007f0447a98840(0000) GS:ffff89fb9771d000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [445771.684393] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [445771.685230] CR2: 00007f0447bf1330 CR3: 000000017cb02002 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [445771.686273] Call Trace: [445771.686646] <TASK> [445771.686969] btrfs_submit_bbio+0x83f/0x860 [btrfs] [445771.687750] ? write_one_eb+0x28f/0x340 [btrfs] [445771.688428] btree_writepages+0x2e3/0x550 [btrfs] [445771.689180] ? kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x12a/0x490 [445771.689963] ? alloc_extent_state+0x19/0x120 [btrfs] [445771.690801] ? kmem_cache_free+0x135/0x380 [445771.691328] ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 [445771.691831] ? set_extent_bit+0x252/0x8e0 [btrfs] [445771.692468] ? xas_load+0x9/0xc0 [445771.692873] ? xas_find+0x14d/0x1a0 [445771.693304] do_writepages+0xc6/0x160 [445771.693756] filemap_writeback+0xb8/0xe0 [445771.694274] btrfs_write_marked_extents+0x61/0x170 [btrfs] [445771.694999] btrfs_write_and_wait_transaction+0x4e/0xc0 [btrfs] [445771.695818] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x5c8/0xd10 [btrfs] [445771.696530] ? kmem_cache_free+0x135/0x380 [445771.697120] ? release_extent_buffer+0x34/0x160 [btrfs] [445771.697786] btrfs_recover_log_trees+0x7be/0x7e0 [btrfs] [445771.698525] ? __pfx_replay_one_buffer+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] [445771.699206] open_ctree+0x11e5/0x1810 [btrfs] [445771.699776] btrfs_get_tree.cold+0xb/0x162 [btrfs] [445771.700463] ? fscontext_read+0x165/0x180 [445771.701146] ? rw_verify_area+0x50/0x180 [445771.701866] vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xd0 [445771.702491] vfs_cmd_create+0x59/0xe0 [445771.703125] __do_sys_fsconfig+0x303/0x610 [445771.703603] do_syscall_64+0xe9/0xf20 [445771.703974] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [445771.704700] RIP: 0033:0x7f0447cbd4aa [445771.705108] Code: 73 01 c3 (...) [445771.707263] RSP: 002b:00007ffc4e528318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001af [445771.708107] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005561585d8c20 RCX: 00007f0447cbd4aa [445771.708931] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000003 [445771.709744] RBP: 00005561585d9120 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [445771.710674] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [445771.711477] R13: 00007f0447e4f580 R14: 00007f0447e5126c R15: 00007f0447e36a23 [445771.712277] </TASK> [445771.712541] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [445771.713382] BTRFS error (device dm-0): error while writing out transaction: -5 [445771.714679] BTRFS warning (device dm-0): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. [445771.715562] BTRFS error (device dm-0 state A): Transaction aborted (error -5) [445771.716459] BTRFS: error (device dm-0 state A) in cleanup_transaction:2068: errno=-5 IO failure [445771.717936] BTRFS error (device dm-0 state EA): failed to recover log trees with error: -5 [445771.719681] BTRFS error (device dm-0 state EA): open_ctree failed: -5 The problem is that such a fsync should have result in a fallback to a transaction commit, but that did not happen because through the btrfs_rmdir() we never update the directory's last_unlink_trans field. Any inode that had a link removed must have its last_unlink_trans updated to the ID of transaction used for the operation, otherwise fsync and log replay will not work correctly. btrfs_rmdir() calls btrfs_unlink_inode() and through that call chain we never call btrfs_record_unlink_dir() in order to update last_unlink_trans. However btrfs_unlink(), which is used for unlinking regular files, calls btrfs_record_unlink_dir() and then calls btrfs_unlink_inode(). So fix this by moving the call to btrfs_record_unlink_dir() from btrfs_unlink() to btrfs_unlink_inode(). A test case for fstests will follow soon. Reported-by: Slava0135 <slava.kovalevskiy.2014@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAAJYhww5ov62Hm+n+tmhcL-e_4cBobg+OWogKjOJxVUXivC=MQ@mail.gmail.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ba9d308 upstream. Commit 03b3bcd ("nvme: fix admin request_queue lifetime") moved the admin queue reference ->put call into nvme_free_ctrl() - a controller device release callback performed for every nvme driver doing nvme_init_ctrl(). nvme-apple sets refcount of the admin queue to 1 at allocation during the probe function and then puts it twice now: nvme_free_ctrl() blk_put_queue(ctrl->admin_q) // #1 ->free_ctrl() apple_nvme_free_ctrl() blk_put_queue(anv->ctrl.admin_q) // #2 Note that there is a commit 941f729 ("nvme-apple: remove an extra queue reference") which intended to drop taking an extra admin queue reference. Looks like at that moment it accidentally fixed a refcount leak, which existed since the driver's introduction. There were two ->get calls at driver's probe function and a single ->put inside apple_nvme_free_ctrl(). However now after commit 03b3bcd ("nvme: fix admin request_queue lifetime") the refcount is imbalanced again. Fix it by removing extra ->put call from apple_nvme_free_ctrl(). anv->dev and ctrl->dev point to the same device, so use ctrl->dev directly for simplification. Compile tested only. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 03b3bcd ("nvme: fix admin request_queue lifetime") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit aade8ab upstream. nvmet_tcp_release_queue_work() runs on nvmet-wq and can drop the final controller reference through nvmet_cq_put(). If that triggers nvmet_ctrl_free(), the teardown path flushes ctrl->async_event_work on the same nvmet-wq. Call chain: nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() kref_put(&queue->kref, nvmet_tcp_release_queue) nvmet_tcp_release_queue() queue_work(nvmet_wq, &queue->release_work) <--- nvmet_wq process_one_work() nvmet_tcp_release_queue_work() nvmet_cq_put(&queue->nvme_cq) nvmet_cq_destroy() nvmet_ctrl_put(cq->ctrl) nvmet_ctrl_free() flush_work(&ctrl->async_event_work) <--- nvmet_wq Previously Scheduled by :- nvmet_add_async_event queue_work(nvmet_wq, &ctrl->async_event_work); This trips lockdep with a possible recursive locking warning. [ 5223.015876] run blktests nvme/003 at 2026-04-07 20:53:55 [ 5223.061801] loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 2097152 [ 5223.072206] nvmet: adding nsid 1 to subsystem blktests-subsystem-1 [ 5223.088368] nvmet_tcp: enabling port 0 (127.0.0.1:4420) [ 5223.126086] nvmet: Created discovery controller 1 for subsystem nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress.discovery for NQN nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress:uuid:0f01fb42-9f7f-4856-b0b3-51e60b8de349. [ 5223.128453] nvme nvme1: new ctrl: NQN "nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress.discovery", addr 127.0.0.1:4420, hostnqn: nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress:uuid:0f01fb42-9f7f-4856-b0b3-51e60b8de349 [ 5233.199447] nvme nvme1: Removing ctrl: NQN "nqn.2014-08.org.nvmexpress.discovery" [ 5233.227718] ============================================ [ 5233.231283] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 5233.234696] 7.0.0-rc3nvme+ #20 Tainted: G O N [ 5233.238434] -------------------------------------------- [ 5233.241852] kworker/u192:6/2413 is trying to acquire lock: [ 5233.245429] ffff888111632548 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x26/0x90 [ 5233.251438] but task is already holding lock: [ 5233.255254] ffff888111632548 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x5cc/0x6e0 [ 5233.261125] other info that might help us debug this: [ 5233.265333] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 5233.269217] CPU0 [ 5233.270795] ---- [ 5233.272436] lock((wq_completion)nvmet-wq); [ 5233.275241] lock((wq_completion)nvmet-wq); [ 5233.278020] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 5233.281793] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 5233.286195] 3 locks held by kworker/u192:6/2413: [ 5233.289192] #0: ffff888111632548 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x5cc/0x6e0 [ 5233.294569] #1: ffffc9000e2a7e40 ((work_completion)(&queue->release_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c5/0x6e0 [ 5233.300128] #2: ffffffff82d7dc40 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __flush_work+0x62/0x530 [ 5233.304290] stack backtrace: [ 5233.306520] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 2413 Comm: kworker/u192:6 Tainted: G O N 7.0.0-rc3nvme+ #20 PREEMPT(full) [ 5233.306524] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [N]=TEST [ 5233.306525] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 5233.306527] Workqueue: nvmet-wq nvmet_tcp_release_queue_work [nvmet_tcp] [ 5233.306532] Call Trace: [ 5233.306534] <TASK> [ 5233.306536] dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xb0 [ 5233.306552] print_deadlock_bug+0x225/0x2f0 [ 5233.306556] __lock_acquire+0x13f0/0x2290 [ 5233.306563] lock_acquire+0xd0/0x300 [ 5233.306565] ? touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x26/0x90 [ 5233.306571] ? __flush_work+0x20b/0x530 [ 5233.306573] ? touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x26/0x90 [ 5233.306577] touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x3b/0x90 [ 5233.306580] ? touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x26/0x90 [ 5233.306583] ? __flush_work+0x20b/0x530 [ 5233.306585] __flush_work+0x268/0x530 [ 5233.306588] ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 [ 5233.306594] ? xen_error_entry+0x30/0x60 [ 5233.306600] nvmet_ctrl_free+0x140/0x310 [nvmet] [ 5233.306617] nvmet_cq_put+0x74/0x90 [nvmet] [ 5233.306629] nvmet_tcp_release_queue_work+0x19f/0x360 [nvmet_tcp] [ 5233.306634] process_one_work+0x206/0x6e0 [ 5233.306640] worker_thread+0x184/0x320 [ 5233.306643] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 5233.306646] kthread+0xf1/0x130 [ 5233.306648] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 5233.306651] ret_from_fork+0x355/0x450 [ 5233.306653] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 5233.306656] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 5233.306664] </TASK> There is also no need to flush async_event_work from controller teardown. The admin queue teardown already fails outstanding AER requests before the final controller put :- nvmet_sq_destroy(admin sq) nvmet_async_events_failall(ctrl) The controller has already been removed from the subsystem list before nvmet_ctrl_free() quiesces outstanding work. Replace flush_work() with cancel_work_sync() so a pending async_event_work item is canceled and a running instance is waited on without recursing into the same workqueue. Fixes: 06406d8 ("nvmet: cancel fatal error and flush async work before free controller") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4406942 ] Add a missing cond_resched() in bpf_fd_array_map_clear() loop. For PROG_ARRAY maps with many entries this loop calls prog_array_map_poke_run() per entry which can be expensive, and without yielding this can cause RCU stalls under load: rcu: Stack dump where RCU GP kthread last ran: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 30932 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.14.0-13195-g967e8def1100 #2 PREEMPT(undef) Workqueue: events prog_array_map_clear_deferred RIP: 0010:write_comp_data+0x38/0x90 kernel/kcov.c:246 Call Trace: <TASK> prog_array_map_poke_run+0x77/0x380 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1096 __fd_array_map_delete_elem+0x197/0x310 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:925 bpf_fd_array_map_clear kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1000 [inline] prog_array_map_clear_deferred+0x119/0x1b0 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1141 process_one_work+0x898/0x19d0 kernel/workqueue.c:3238 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3319 [inline] worker_thread+0x770/0x10b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3400 kthread+0x465/0x880 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153 ret_from_fork_asm+0x19/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Reviewed-by: Sun Jian <sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com> Fixes: da765a2 ("bpf: Add poke dependency tracking for prog array maps") Signed-off-by: Sechang Lim <rhkrqnwk98@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260407103823.3942156-1-rhkrqnwk98@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4d328dd ] bpf_iter_unix_seq_show() may deadlock when lock_sock_fast() takes the fast path and the iter prog attempts to update a sockmap. Which ends up spinning at sock_map_update_elem()'s bh_lock_sock(): WARNING: possible recursive locking detected test_progs/1393 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88811ec25f58 (slock-AF_UNIX){+...}-{3:3}, at: sock_map_update_elem+0xdb/0x1f0 but task is already holding lock: ffff88811ec25f58 (slock-AF_UNIX){+...}-{3:3}, at: __lock_sock_fast+0x37/0xe0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(slock-AF_UNIX); lock(slock-AF_UNIX); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by test_progs/1393: #0: ffff88814b59c790 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bpf_seq_read+0x59/0x10d0 #1: ffff88811ec25fd8 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: bpf_seq_read+0x42c/0x10d0 #2: ffff88811ec25f58 (slock-AF_UNIX){+...}-{3:3}, at: __lock_sock_fast+0x37/0xe0 #3: ffffffff85a6a7c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_iter_run_prog+0x51d/0xb00 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xc0/0xce __lock_acquire+0x130f/0x2590 lock_acquire+0x14e/0x2b0 _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x40 sock_map_update_elem+0xdb/0x1f0 bpf_prog_2d0075e5d9b721cd_dump_unix+0x55/0x4f4 bpf_iter_run_prog+0x5b9/0xb00 bpf_iter_unix_seq_show+0x1f7/0x2e0 bpf_seq_read+0x42c/0x10d0 vfs_read+0x171/0xb20 ksys_read+0xff/0x200 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x3a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: 2c860a4 ("bpf: af_unix: Implement BPF iterator for UNIX domain socket.") Suggested-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com> Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260414-unix-proto-update-null-ptr-deref-v4-2-2af6fe97918e@rbox.co Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3811338 ] When trying to unbind a device in order to bind to it vfio-platform as: echo bc0000.geniqup > /sys/bus/platform/devices/bc0000.geniqup/driver/unbind I get the following Oops: [ 436.478639] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020 [ 436.487762] Mem abort info: [ 436.490716] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 436.494595] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 436.500071] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 436.503250] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 436.506505] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 436.511533] Data abort info: [ 436.514558] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 436.520215] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 436.525436] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 436.530918] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000008861a9000 [ 436.537554] [0000000000000020] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 436.544548] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP [ 436.550374] Modules linked in: [ 436.553542] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 671 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 7.0.0-rc3-g56fcdd0911a5-dirty #2 PREEMPT [ 436.564440] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 436.567515] Hardware name: LENOVO 91B6CTO1WW/3796, BIOS O6NKT3BA 05/02/2025 [ 436.574675] pstate: 21400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 436.581841] pc : ps883x_retimer_remove+0x14/0x94 [ 436.586605] lr : i2c_device_remove+0x28/0x84 [ 436.591017] sp : ffff8000847137c0 That's because the ps883x_retimer_remove() retrieves the driver data from i2c_get_clientdata() which was never set at probe. So, add i2c_set_clientdata() at the end of the probe. Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio@oss.qualcomm.com> Fixes: 257a087 ("usb: typec: Add support for Parade PS8830 Type-C Retimer") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260313155534.1916773-1-smostafa@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 54ef024 ] ice_reset_all_vfs() ignores the return value of ice_vf_rebuild_vsi(). When the VSI rebuild fails (e.g. during NVM firmware update via nvmupdate64e), ice_vsi_rebuild() tears down the VSI on its error path, leaving txq_map and rxq_map as NULL. The subsequent unconditional call to ice_vf_post_vsi_rebuild() leads to a NULL pointer dereference in ice_ena_vf_q_mappings() when it accesses vsi->txq_map[0]. The single-VF reset path in ice_reset_vf() already handles this correctly by checking the return value of ice_vf_reconfig_vsi() and skipping ice_vf_post_vsi_rebuild() on failure. Apply the same pattern to ice_reset_all_vfs(): check the return value of ice_vf_rebuild_vsi() and skip ice_vf_post_vsi_rebuild() and ice_eswitch_attach_vf() on failure. The VF is left safely disabled (ICE_VF_STATE_INIT not set, VFGEN_RSTAT not set to VFACTIVE) and can be recovered via a VFLR triggered by a PCI reset of the VF (sysfs reset or driver rebind). Note that this patch does not prevent the VF VSI rebuild from failing during NVM update — the underlying cause is firmware being in a transitional state while the EMP reset is processed, which can cause Admin Queue commands (ice_add_vsi, ice_cfg_vsi_lan) to fail. This patch only prevents the subsequent NULL pointer dereference that crashes the kernel when the rebuild does fail. crash> bt PID: 50795 TASK: ff34c9ee708dc680 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/u512:5" #0 [ff72159bcfe5bb50] machine_kexec at ffffffffaa8850ee #1 [ff72159bcfe5bba8] __crash_kexec at ffffffffaaa15fba #2 [ff72159bcfe5bc68] crash_kexec at ffffffffaaa16540 #3 [ff72159bcfe5bc70] oops_end at ffffffffaa837eda #4 [ff72159bcfe5bc90] page_fault_oops at ffffffffaa893997 #5 [ff72159bcfe5bce8] exc_page_fault at ffffffffab528595 #6 [ff72159bcfe5bd10] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffffab600bb2 [exception RIP: ice_ena_vf_q_mappings+0x79] RIP: ffffffffc0a85b29 RSP: ff72159bcfe5bdc8 RFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 00000000000f0000 RBX: ff34c9efc9c00000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000010 RDI: ff34c9efc9c00000 RBP: ff34c9efc27d4828 R8: 0000000000000093 R9: 0000000000000040 R10: ff34c9efc27d4828 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: 0000000000100000 R13: 0000000000000010 R14: R15: ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ff72159bcfe5bdf8] ice_sriov_post_vsi_rebuild at ffffffffc0a85e2e [ice] #8 [ff72159bcfe5be08] ice_reset_all_vfs at ffffffffc0a920b4 [ice] #9 [ff72159bcfe5be48] ice_service_task at ffffffffc0a31519 [ice] #10 [ff72159bcfe5be88] process_one_work at ffffffffaa93dca4 #11 [ff72159bcfe5bec8] worker_thread at ffffffffaa93e9de #12 [ff72159bcfe5bf18] kthread at ffffffffaa946663 #13 [ff72159bcfe5bf50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffaa8086b9 The panic occurs attempting to dereference the NULL pointer in RDX at ice_sriov.c:294, which loads vsi->txq_map (offset 0x4b8 in ice_vsi). The faulting VSI is an allocated slab object but not fully initialized after a failed ice_vsi_rebuild(): crash> struct ice_vsi 0xff34c9efc27d4828 netdev = 0x0, rx_rings = 0x0, tx_rings = 0x0, q_vectors = 0x0, txq_map = 0x0, rxq_map = 0x0, alloc_txq = 0x10, num_txq = 0x10, alloc_rxq = 0x10, num_rxq = 0x10, The nvmupdate64e process was performing NVM firmware update: crash> bt 0xff34c9edd1a30000 PID: 49858 TASK: ff34c9edd1a30000 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "nvmupdate64e" #0 [ff72159bcd617618] __schedule at ffffffffab5333f8 #4 [ff72159bcd617750] ice_sq_send_cmd at ffffffffc0a35347 [ice] #5 [ff72159bcd6177a8] ice_sq_send_cmd_retry at ffffffffc0a35b47 [ice] #6 [ff72159bcd617810] ice_aq_send_cmd at ffffffffc0a38018 [ice] #7 [ff72159bcd617848] ice_aq_read_nvm at ffffffffc0a40254 [ice] #8 [ff72159bcd6178b8] ice_read_flat_nvm at ffffffffc0a4034c [ice] #9 [ff72159bcd617918] ice_devlink_nvm_snapshot at ffffffffc0a6ffa5 [ice] dmesg: ice 0000:13:00.0: firmware recommends not updating fw.mgmt, as it may result in a downgrade. continuing anyways ice 0000:13:00.1: ice_init_nvm failed -5 ice 0000:13:00.1: Rebuild failed, unload and reload driver Fixes: 12bb018 ("ice: Refactor VF reset") Signed-off-by: Petr Oros <poros@redhat.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260427-jk-iwl-net-petr-oros-fixes-v1-5-cdcb48303fd8@intel.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 3392291 upstream. With PROVE_LOCKING on an Snapdragon X1 and VM reclaim pressure, we see: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 7.0.0-debug+ #43 Tainted: G W ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/82 is trying to acquire lock: ffff800080ec3870 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: msm_gem_shrinker_scan+0x17c/0x400 [msm] but task is already holding lock: ffffc31709b263b8 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x88/0x988 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x4d0/0xad0 lock_acquire.part.0+0xc4/0x248 lock_acquire+0x8c/0x248 fs_reclaim_acquire+0xd0/0xf0 dma_resv_lockdep+0x224/0x348 do_one_initcall+0x84/0x5d0 do_initcalls+0x194/0x1d8 kernel_init_freeable+0x128/0x180 kernel_init+0x2c/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #1 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x4d0/0xad0 lock_acquire.part.0+0xc4/0x248 lock_acquire+0x8c/0x248 dma_resv_lockdep+0x1a8/0x348 do_one_initcall+0x84/0x5d0 do_initcalls+0x194/0x1d8 kernel_init_freeable+0x128/0x180 kernel_init+0x2c/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: check_prev_add+0x114/0x790 validate_chain+0x594/0x6f0 __lock_acquire+0x4d0/0xad0 lock_acquire.part.0+0xc4/0x248 lock_acquire+0x8c/0x248 drm_gem_lru_scan+0x1ac/0x440 msm_gem_shrinker_scan+0x17c/0x400 [msm] do_shrink_slab+0x150/0x4a0 shrink_slab+0x144/0x460 shrink_one+0x9c/0x1b0 shrink_many+0x27c/0x5c0 shrink_node+0x344/0x550 balance_pgdat+0x2c0/0x988 kswapd+0x11c/0x318 kthread+0x10c/0x128 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex --> fs_reclaim Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by kswapd0/82: #0: ffffc31709b263b8 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x88/0x988 stack backtrace: CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kswapd0 Tainted: G W 7.0.0-debug+ #43 PREEMPT(full) Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: LENOVO 21BX0016US/21BX0016US, BIOS N3HET94W (1.66 ) 09/15/2025 Call trace: show_stack+0x20/0x40 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xd0 dump_stack+0x18/0x30 print_circular_bug+0x114/0x120 check_noncircular+0x178/0x198 check_prev_add+0x114/0x790 validate_chain+0x594/0x6f0 __lock_acquire+0x4d0/0xad0 lock_acquire.part.0+0xc4/0x248 lock_acquire+0x8c/0x248 drm_gem_lru_scan+0x1ac/0x440 msm_gem_shrinker_scan+0x17c/0x400 [msm] do_shrink_slab+0x150/0x4a0 shrink_slab+0x144/0x460 shrink_one+0x9c/0x1b0 shrink_many+0x27c/0x5c0 shrink_node+0x344/0x550 balance_pgdat+0x2c0/0x988 kswapd+0x11c/0x318 kthread+0x10c/0x128 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 kswapd0 holding fs_reclaim calls the MSM shrinker, which calls dma_resv_lock. This in turn acquires fs_reclaim. Fix this deadlock by using dma_resv_trylock() instead, dropping the subsequently unused passed wait-wound lock 'ticket'. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel J Blueman <daniel@quora.org> Fixes: fe4952b ("drm/msm: Convert vm locking") Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/723564/ Message-ID: <20260508065722.18785-1-daniel@quora.org> [rob: fixup compile errors, replace lockdep splat with something legible] Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robin.clark@oss.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6d34594 ] Since the start of the git history, brport_store() always acquired the bridge lock. Back then this decision made sense: The bridge lock protects the STP state of the bridge and its ports and at that time the function was only used by two STP related attributes (cost and priority). Nowadays, brport_store() processes a lot more attributes and most of them do not need the bridge lock: * Bridge flags: Only require RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path. Annotations can be added in net-next. * FDB port flushing: Only requires the FDB lock. * Multicast attributes: Only require the multicast lock. * Group forward mask: Only requires RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path. Annotations can be added in net-next. * Backup port: Only requires RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path. This is a problem as the bridge calls dev_set_promiscuity() when certain bridge port flags change and this function can sleep since the commit cited below, resulting in a splat such as [1]. Fix this by reducing the scope of the bridge lock and only take it when processing the two STP related attributes that require it. Remove the now stale comment from br_switchdev_set_port_flag(). The SWITCHDEV_F_DEFER flag can be removed in net-next. [1] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1262 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 372, name: bash preempt_count: 201, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 5 locks held by bash/372: #0: ffff88810c51c3f0 (sb_writers#7){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) #1: ffff888115ce9480 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:343) #2: ffff88810b9fd330 (kn->active#37){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:80 fs/kernfs/file.c:344) #3: ffffffffa59473a0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: brport_store (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:326) #4: ffff8881099d2d58 (&br->lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: brport_store (./include/linux/spinlock.h:348 net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:345) Preemption disabled at: 0x0 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) __might_resched.cold (kernel/sched/core.c:9163) netif_rx_mode_run (net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1262) netif_rx_mode_sync (net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1428) dev_set_promiscuity (net/core/dev_api.c:289) br_manage_promisc (net/bridge/br_if.c:135 net/bridge/br_if.c:172) br_port_flags_change (net/bridge/br_if.c:242 net/bridge/br_if.c:747) store_learning (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:79 net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:235) brport_store (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:346) kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:352) new_sync_write (fs/read_write.c:595) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Fixes: 78cd408 ("net: add missing instance lock to dev_set_promiscuity") Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260526064818.272516-3-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 68938cc upstream. The xe driver keeps track of whether to probe display, and whether display hardware is there, using xe->info.probe_display. It gets set to false if there's no display after intel_display_device_probe(). However, the display may also be disabled via fuses, detected at a later time in intel_display_device_info_runtime_init(). In this case, the xe driver does for_each_intel_crtc() on uninitialized mode config in xe_display_flush_cleanup_work(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference, and generally calls display code with display info cleared. Check for intel_display_device_present() after intel_display_device_info_runtime_init(), and reset xe->info.probe_display as necessary. Also do unset_display_features() for completeness, although display runtime init has already done that. This will need to be unified across all cases later. Move intel_display_device_info_runtime_init() call slightly earlier, similar to i915, to avoid a bunch of unnecessary setup for no display cases. Note #1: The xe driver has no business doing low level display plumbing like for_each_intel_crtc() to begin with. It all needs to happen in display code. Note #2: The actual bug is present already in commit 44e6949 ("drm/xe/display: Implement display support"), but the oops was likely introduced later at commit ddf6492 ("drm/xe/display: Make display suspend/resume work on discrete"). Fixes: 44e6949 ("drm/xe/display: Implement display support") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/work_items/7904 Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/work_items/6150 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.8+ Reviewed-by: Suraj Kandpal <suraj.kandpal@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515160920.1082842-1-jani.nikula@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 7c3eb9f) Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cb481e5 upstream. The length for the internal output buffer is calculated incorrectly, which can result overflow when a too small buffer is provided. Fix the bug by allocating internal output with the size of the maximum length of the cryptographic primitive instead of caller provided size. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/20260531024914.3712130-1-jarkko@kernel.org/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+ Fixes: 00d60fd ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]") Reported-by: Alessandro Groppo <ale.grpp@gmail.com> Tested-by: Alessandro Groppo <ale.grpp@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 40ef3ed upstream. The current implementation uses pci_num_vf() while holding the memory_lock to prevent changing the power state of a PF when VFs are enabled. This creates a lockdep circular dependency warning because memory_lock is held during device probing. [ 286.997167] ====================================================== [ 287.003363] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 287.009562] 7.0.0-dbg-DEV #3 Tainted: G S [ 287.015074] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 287.021270] vfio_pci_sriov_/18636 is trying to acquire lock: [ 287.026942] ff45bea2294d4968 (&vdev->memory_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfio_pci_core_runtime_resume+0x1f/0xa0 [ 287.036530] [ 287.036530] but task is already holding lock: [ 287.042383] ff45bea3a96b8230 (&new_dev_set->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x44d/0x7b0 [ 287.051879] [ 287.051879] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 287.051879] [ 287.060070] [ 287.060070] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 287.067568] [ 287.067568] -> #2 (&new_dev_set->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 287.073941] __mutex_lock+0x92/0xb80 [ 287.078058] vfio_assign_device_set+0x66/0x1b0 [ 287.083042] vfio_pci_core_register_device+0xd1/0x2a0 [ 287.088638] vfio_pci_probe+0xd2/0x100 [ 287.092933] local_pci_probe_callback+0x4d/0xa0 [ 287.098001] process_scheduled_works+0x2ca/0x680 [ 287.103158] worker_thread+0x1e8/0x2f0 [ 287.107452] kthread+0x10c/0x140 [ 287.111230] ret_from_fork+0x18e/0x360 [ 287.115519] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 287.119983] [ 287.119983] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&arg.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 287.127219] __flush_work+0x345/0x490 [ 287.131429] pci_device_probe+0x2e3/0x490 [ 287.135979] really_probe+0x1f9/0x4e0 [ 287.140180] __driver_probe_device+0x77/0x100 [ 287.145079] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x110 [ 287.149803] __device_attach_driver+0xe3/0x170 [ 287.154789] bus_for_each_drv+0x125/0x150 [ 287.159346] __device_attach+0xca/0x1a0 [ 287.163720] device_initial_probe+0x34/0x50 [ 287.168445] pci_bus_add_device+0x6e/0x90 [ 287.172995] pci_iov_add_virtfn+0x3c9/0x3e0 [ 287.177719] sriov_add_vfs+0x2c/0x60 [ 287.181838] sriov_enable+0x306/0x4a0 [ 287.186038] vfio_pci_core_sriov_configure+0x184/0x220 [ 287.191715] sriov_numvfs_store+0xd9/0x1c0 [ 287.196351] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x13f/0x1d0 [ 287.201338] vfs_write+0x2be/0x3b0 [ 287.205286] ksys_write+0x73/0x100 [ 287.209233] do_syscall_64+0x14d/0x750 [ 287.213529] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 287.219120] [ 287.219120] -> #0 (&vdev->memory_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 287.225491] __lock_acquire+0x14c6/0x2800 [ 287.230048] lock_acquire+0xd3/0x2f0 [ 287.234168] down_write+0x3a/0xc0 [ 287.238019] vfio_pci_core_runtime_resume+0x1f/0xa0 [ 287.243436] __rpm_callback+0x8c/0x310 [ 287.247730] rpm_resume+0x529/0x6f0 [ 287.251765] __pm_runtime_resume+0x68/0x90 [ 287.256402] vfio_pci_core_enable+0x44/0x310 [ 287.261216] vfio_pci_open_device+0x1c/0x80 [ 287.265947] vfio_df_open+0x10f/0x150 [ 287.270148] vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x4a4/0x7b0 [ 287.275476] __se_sys_ioctl+0x71/0xc0 [ 287.279679] do_syscall_64+0x14d/0x750 [ 287.283975] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 287.289559] [ 287.289559] other info that might help us debug this: [ 287.289559] [ 287.297582] Chain exists of: [ 287.297582] &vdev->memory_lock --> (work_completion)(&arg.work) --> &new_dev_set->lock [ 287.297582] [ 287.310023] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 287.310023] [ 287.315961] CPU0 CPU1 [ 287.320510] ---- ---- [ 287.325059] lock(&new_dev_set->lock); [ 287.328917] lock((work_completion)(&arg.work)); [ 287.336153] lock(&new_dev_set->lock); [ 287.342523] lock(&vdev->memory_lock); [ 287.346382] [ 287.346382] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 287.346382] [ 287.352315] 2 locks held by vfio_pci_sriov_/18636: [ 287.357125] #0: ff45bea208ed3e18 (&group->group_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x3e3/0x7b0 [ 287.367048] #1: ff45bea3a96b8230 (&new_dev_set->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x44d/0x7b0 [ 287.376976] [ 287.376976] stack backtrace: [ 287.381353] CPU: 191 UID: 0 PID: 18636 Comm: vfio_pci_sriov_ Tainted: G S 7.0.0-dbg-DEV #3 PREEMPTLAZY [ 287.381355] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC [ 287.381356] Call Trace: [ 287.381357] <TASK> [ 287.381358] dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70 [ 287.381361] print_circular_bug+0x2e1/0x300 [ 287.381363] check_noncircular+0xf9/0x120 [ 287.381364] ? __lock_acquire+0x5b4/0x2800 [ 287.381366] __lock_acquire+0x14c6/0x2800 [ 287.381368] ? pci_mmcfg_read+0x4f/0x220 [ 287.381370] ? pci_mmcfg_write+0x57/0x220 [ 287.381371] ? lock_acquire+0xd3/0x2f0 [ 287.381373] ? pci_mmcfg_write+0x57/0x220 [ 287.381374] ? lock_release+0xef/0x360 [ 287.381376] ? vfio_pci_core_runtime_resume+0x1f/0xa0 [ 287.381377] lock_acquire+0xd3/0x2f0 [ 287.381378] ? vfio_pci_core_runtime_resume+0x1f/0xa0 [ 287.381379] ? lock_is_held_type+0x76/0x100 [ 287.381382] down_write+0x3a/0xc0 [ 287.381382] ? vfio_pci_core_runtime_resume+0x1f/0xa0 [ 287.381383] vfio_pci_core_runtime_resume+0x1f/0xa0 [ 287.381384] ? __pfx_pci_pm_runtime_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 287.381385] __rpm_callback+0x8c/0x310 [ 287.381386] ? ktime_get_mono_fast_ns+0x3d/0xb0 [ 287.381389] ? __pfx_pci_pm_runtime_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 287.381390] rpm_resume+0x529/0x6f0 [ 287.381392] ? lock_is_held_type+0x76/0x100 [ 287.381394] __pm_runtime_resume+0x68/0x90 [ 287.381396] vfio_pci_core_enable+0x44/0x310 [ 287.381398] vfio_pci_open_device+0x1c/0x80 [ 287.381399] vfio_df_open+0x10f/0x150 [ 287.381401] vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x4a4/0x7b0 [ 287.381402] __se_sys_ioctl+0x71/0xc0 [ 287.381404] do_syscall_64+0x14d/0x750 [ 287.381405] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 287.381406] ? trace_irq_disable+0x25/0xd0 [ 287.381409] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Introduce a private flag 'sriov_active' in the vfio_pci_core_device struct. This allows the driver to track the SR-IOV power state requirement without relying on pci_num_vf() while holding the memory_lock. The lock is now only held to set the flag and ensure the device is in D0, after which pci_enable_sriov() can be called without the lock. Fixes: f4162eb ("vfio/pci: Change the PF power state to D0 before enabling VFs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Suggested-by: Alex Williamson <alex@shazbot.org> Signed-off-by: Raghavendra Rao Ananta <rananta@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260514173449.3282188-1-rananta@google.com [promote bitfield to plain bool to avoid storage-unit races] Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex@shazbot.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fa09f08 upstream. The etb10 miscdevice uses drvdata->reading as a shared exclusivity gate for userspace buffer access. etb_open() claims that gate with local_cmpxchg(), and etb_release() clears it with local_set(). That gate is shared per-device state rather than CPU-local state. A running system can reach it whenever /dev/<etb> is opened, closed, and reopened by different tasks while the device remains registered, so the same drvdata->reading variable may be claimed on one CPU and later cleared on another. This code used to use atomic_t for the same gate, but commit 27b10da ("coresight: etb10: moving to local atomic operations") changed it to local_t even though the access pattern remained cross-task and cross-CPU. Restore atomic_t together with atomic_cmpxchg() and atomic_set() so the exclusivity gate again uses a primitive intended for shared state. The issue was found on Linux v6.18.21 by our static analysis tool while scanning surviving local_t-on-shared-state sites, and then manually reviewed against the live etb10 file-op path. It was runtime-validated with a reproducible QEMU no-device KCSAN PoC that kept the same report-local contract: 1. use one shared struct etb_drvdata carrier and its drvdata->reading gate; 2. call etb_open() and etb_release() sequentially on that gate to confirm the original claim/clear path; 3. bind the open side to CPU0 and the release side to CPU1 for the same gate to show cross-CPU ownership; 4. run bound workers that repeatedly race etb_open() and etb_release() on the same gate until KCSAN reports a target hit. The harness recorded: L1 passed open=1 release=1 reading_after_open=1 reading_after_release=0 L2 passed open_cpu=0 release_cpu=1 cross_cpu_release=1 reading_after=0 open_ret=0 Representative KCSAN excerpt from the no-device validation run: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in etb_open.constprop.0.isra.0 [vuln_msv] write to 0xffffffffc0003810 of 4 bytes by task 216 on cpu 1: etb_open.constprop.0.isra.0+0x38/0x80 [vuln_msv] l3_worker_thread_fn+0x4f/0xf0 [vuln_msv] kthread+0x17e/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 read to 0xffffffffc0003810 of 4 bytes by task 215 on cpu 0: etb_open.constprop.0.isra.0+0x18/0x80 [vuln_msv] l3_worker_thread_fn+0x4f/0xf0 [vuln_msv] kthread+0x17e/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 215 Comm: etb10_l3_a Tainted: G O 6.1.66 #2 This no-device harness is not a real ETB10 hardware end-to-end run, but it preserves the same shared drvdata->reading gate and the same etb_open()/etb_release() claim/clear contract. No real ETB10 hardware was available for runtime testing. Build-tested with: make olddefconfig make -j"$(nproc)" drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.o Fixes: 27b10da ("coresight: etb10: moving to local atomic operations") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Runyu Xiao <runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260528165201.319452-1-runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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…softlockup commit 66366d2 upstream. We hit a real softlockup in an internal stress test environment. The workload was LTP memory/swap stress on a large arm64 machine, with 320 CPUs, about 1TB memory and an 8.6GB swap device. The system was under heavy load and the swap device had a large number of full clusters. The softlockup was triggered during a stress test after about 3 days. So, add periodic cond_resched() calls during large full_clusters reclaim operations to prevent softlockup issues. Detailed call trace as follow: PID: 3817773 TASK: ffff0883bb28b780 CPU: 48 COMMAND: "kworker/48:7" #0 [ffff800080183d10] __crash_kexec at ffffa4c1361e5de4 #1 [ffff800080183d90] panic at ffffa4c1360d5e9c #2 [ffff800080183e20] watchdog_timer_fn at ffffa4c136231fa8 ... #16 [ffff8000c4ad3cb0] swap_cache_del_folio at ffffa4c1363e1614 #17 [ffff8000c4ad3ce0] __try_to_reclaim_swap at ffffa4c1363e4bfc #18 [ffff8000c4ad3d40] swap_reclaim_full_clusters at ffffa4c1363e5474 #19 [ffff8000c4ad3da0] swap_reclaim_work at ffffa4c1363e550c #20 [ffff8000c4ad3dc0] process_one_work at ffffa4c136102edc #21 [ffff8000c4ad3e10] worker_thread at ffffa4c136103398 #22 [ffff8000c4ad3e70] kthread at ffffa4c13610d95c Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260506130919.2298807-1-kerayhuang@tencent.com Fixes: 5168a68 ("mm, swap: avoid over reclaim of full clusters") Signed-off-by: Zijiang Huang <kerayhuang@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Kairui Song <kasong@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Hao Peng <flyingpeng@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: albinwyang <albinwyang@tencent.com> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <baoquan.he@linux.dev> Acked-by: Chris Li <chrisl@kernel.org> Cc: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org> Cc: Kairui Song <kasong@tencent.com> Cc: Kemeng Shi <shikemeng@huaweicloud.com> Cc: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com> Cc: Youngjun Park <youngjun.park@lge.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b9399d2 upstream. EHCI and FOTG210 isochronous submits build an ehci_iso_sched before linking the URB to the endpoint queue, and keep the staged schedule in urb->hcpriv until iso_stream_schedule() and the link helpers consume it. If the controller is no longer accessible, or usb_hcd_link_urb_to_ep() fails, submit jumps to done_not_linked before that handoff happens and leaks the staged schedule still attached to urb->hcpriv. Free the staged schedule from done_not_linked when submit fails before the URB is linked and clear urb->hcpriv after the free. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1.1. An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. As we do not have an EHCI host controller with a USB isochronous device to test with, no runtime testing was able to be performed. Fixes: 8de9840 ("[PATCH] USB: Fix USB suspend/resume crasher (#2)") Fixes: e9df41c ("USB: make HCDs responsible for managing endpoint queues") Fixes: 7d50195 ("usb: host: Faraday fotg210-hcd driver") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260630071419.349161-1-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b23705e ] strset_add_str_mem() might reallocate the strset data buffer in order to accommodate the provided string 's'. However, if 's' points to a string already present in the buffer, it becomes dangling after the realloc. This leads to a use-after-free when attempting to memcpy() the string into the new buffer. One scenario that triggers this problematic path is when resolve_btfids attempts to patch kfunc prototypes using existing BTF parameter names: | resolve_btfids: function bpf_list_push_back_impl already exists in BTF | Segmentation fault (core dumped) Compiling resolve_btfids with fsanitize=address generates a detailed report of the UAF: | ================================================================= | ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x7f4c4a500bd4 | ==1507892==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x7f4c4a500bd4 at pc 0x55d25155a2a8 bp 0x7ffcef879060 sp 0x7ffcef878818 | READ of size 5 at 0x7f4c4a500bd4 thread T0 | #0 0x55d25155a2a7 in memcpy (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xcf2a7) | #1 0x55d2515d708e in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:162:2 | #2 0x55d2515c730b in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2109:8 | #3 0x55d2515c9020 in btf__add_func_param tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:3108:14 | #4 0x55d25159f0b5 in process_kfunc_with_implicit_args tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1196:9 | #5 0x55d25159e004 in btf2btf tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1229:9 | #6 0x55d25159cee7 in main tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1535:6 | #7 0x7f4c78e29f76 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16 | #8 0x7f4c78e2a026 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3 | #9 0x55d2514bb860 in _start (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0x30860) | | 0x7f4c4a500bd4 is located 13268 bytes inside of 2829000-byte region [0x7f4c4a4fd800,0x7f4c4a7b02c8) | freed by thread T0 here: | #0 0x55d25155b700 in realloc (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xd0700) | #1 0x55d2515c426c in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/./libbpf_internal.h:220:9 | #2 0x55d2515c426c in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:224:13 | | previously allocated by thread T0 here: | #0 0x55d25155b2e3 in malloc (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xd02e3) | #1 0x55d2515d6e7d in strset__new tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:58:20 While resolve_btfids could be refactored to avoid this call path, let's instead fix this issue at the source in strset__add_str() and avoid similar scenarios. Let's check if set->strs_data was reallocated and whether 's' points to an internal string within the old strset buffer. In such case, 's' is reconstructed to point to the new buffer. While already here, also fix strset__find_str() which suffers from the same problem by factoring out the common operations into a new helper function strset_str_append(). Fixes: 90d76d3 ("libbpf: Extract internal set-of-strings datastructure APIs") Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Suggested-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com> Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260523162722.2718940-1-cmllamas@google.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ff6f26c ] A circular locking dependency involves INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE, EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE, and ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE. 1. ocfs2_mknod() acquires INODE_ALLOC then EXTENT_ALLOC. 2. ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() acquires EXTENT_ALLOC for unwritten extents, then ORPHAN_DIR via ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan() while still holding EXTENT_ALLOC. 3. ocfs2_wipe_inode() acquires ORPHAN_DIR then INODE_ALLOC via ocfs2_remove_inode. Break the cycle in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() by freeing the allocation contexts (releasing EXTENT_ALLOC) before acquiring ORPHAN_DIR. WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected ------------------------------------------------------ is trying to acquire lock: ffff8881e78b33a0 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_evict_inode+0x1539/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299 but task is already holding lock: ffff8881e78b4fa0 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_evict_inode+0xe97/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline] ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan+0x12e/0x7a0 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:2728 ocfs2_dio_end_io+0xf9c/0x1370 fs/ocfs2/aops.c:2418 dio_complete+0x25b/0x790 fs/direct-io.c:281 -> #1 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline] ocfs2_reserve_suballoc_bits+0x16d/0x4840 fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:882 ocfs2_reserve_new_metadata_blocks+0x415/0x9a0 fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1078 ocfs2_mknod+0x10f3/0x2260 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:351 -> #0 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x15a5/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 down_write+0x96/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625 inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline] ocfs2_remove_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:733 [inline] ocfs2_wipe_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:896 [inline] ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1157 [inline] ocfs2_evict_inode+0x1539/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299 Chain exists of: &ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE] --> &ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE] --> &ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE] Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]); lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]); lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]); lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]); *** DEADLOCK *** Link: https://lore.kernel.org/97c902a6-3bcf-43ea-9b70-f1f136a6c3f2@mail.kernel.org Fixes: d647c5b ("ocfs2: split transactions in dio completion to avoid credit exhaustion") Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Gemini:gemini-3-flash-preview syzbot Reported-by: syzbot+b225d4dfce6219600c42@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b225d4dfce6219600c42 Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/ai_job?id=0b53ce1e-2972-4192-aa85-8097a702762c Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0f36469 ] The AFS filesystem client uses an rxrpc server to listen for callback notifications. Each callback call type handler has a delivery function that parses the incoming request stream, and this should return -EAGAIN the last packet hasn't yet been seen, but all currently queued received data is consumed. afs_extract_data() does this, but the -EAGAIN return is switched to 0 inadvertantly Fix callback service message parsers to pass through -EAGAIN Fixes: d001648 ("rxrpc: Don't expose skbs to in-kernel users [ver #2]") Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260609081738.770127-1-dhowells%40redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260622090856.2746629-14-dhowells@redhat.com cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 9a79524 upstream. The KCOV selftest enables coverage by setting current->kcov_mode to KCOV_MODE_TRACE_PC without installing a coverage area. If an interrupt records coverage in that window, the access should fault and expose the bug. When building for QEMU raspi0 (Raspberry Pi Zero, ARMv6, CONFIG_CPU_V6K=y, CONFIG_CURRENT_POINTER_IN_TPIDRURO=y) with GCC 13.3.0, the store that enables the mode is removed. The generated kcov_init() code only stores zero after the wait loop: mrc 15, 0, r3, cr13, cr0, {3} str r4, [r3, #2028] where r4 is zero. There is no store of KCOV_MODE_TRACE_PC before the loop, so the selftest reports success without exercising coverage. Use WRITE_ONCE() for the temporary mode stores. With the same compiler and config, kcov_init() contains the intended mode store: mov r3, #2 mrc 15, 0, r2, cr13, cr0, {3} str r3, [r2, #2028] Now that the KCOV selftest is actually executed, it may expose KCOV instrumentation issues depending on the kernel config. That is expected for a selftest that was intended to catch coverage from interrupt paths. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260526114715.38280-1-kmehltretter@gmail.com Fixes: 6cd0dd9 ("kcov: Add interrupt handling self test") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter <kmehltretter@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 920f893 upstream. Wongi and Jungwoo decoded and reported a non-leader exec() related race which can result in an UAF: sys_timer_delete() exec() posix_cpu_timer_del() // Observes old leader p = pid_task(pid, pid_type); de_thread() switch_leader(); release_task(old_leader) __exit_signal(old_leader) sighand = lock(old_leader, sighand); posix_cpu_timers*_exit(); sighand = lock_task_sighand(p) unhash_task(old_leader); sh = lock(p, sighand) old_leader->sighand = NULL; unlock(sighand); (p->sighand == NULL) unlock(sh) return NULL; // Returns without action if(!sighand) return 0; free_posix_timer(); This is "harmless" unless the deleted timer was armed and enqueued in p->signal because on exec() a TGID targeted timer is inherited. As sys_timer_delete() freed the underlying posix timer object run_posix_cpu_timers() or any timerqueue related add/delete operations on other timers will access the freed object's timerqueue node, which results in an UAF. There is a similar problem vs. posix_cpu_timer_set(). For regular posix timers it just transiently returns -ESRCH to user space, but for the use case in do_cpu_nanosleep() it's the same UAF just that the k_itimer is allocated on the stack. Also posix_cpu_timer_rearm() fails to rearm the timer, which means it stops to expire. While debating solutions Frederic pointed out another problem: posix_cpu_timer_del(tmr) __exit_signal(p) posix_cpu_timers*_exit(p); unhash_task(p); p->sighand = NULL; sh = lock_task_sighand(p) sighand = p->sighand; if (!sighand) return NULL; lock(sighand); if (!sh) WARN_ON_ONCE(timer_queued(tmr)); On weakly ordered architectures it is not guaranteed that posix_cpu_timer_del() will observe the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() when p->sighand is observed as NULL, which means the WARN() can be a false positive. Solve these issues by: 1) Changing the store in __exit_signal() to smp_store_release(). 2) Adding a smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep() into the !sighand path of lock_task_sighand(). 3) Creating a helper function for looking up the task and locking sighand which does not return when sighand == NULL. Instead it retries the task lookup and only if that fails it gives up. 4) Using that helper in the three affected functions. observes all preceeding stores, i.e. the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() and the ones in unhash_task(). gracefully. When the task lookup returns the old leader, but sighand == NULL then it retries. In the non-leader exec() case the subsequent task lookup will observe the new leader due to #1/#2. In normal exit() scenarios the subsequent lookup fails. When the task lookup fails, the function also checks whether the timer is still enqueued and issues a warning if that's the case. Unfortunately there is nothing which can be done about it, but as the task is already not longer visible the timer should not be accessed anymore. This check also requires memory ordering, which is not provided when the first lookup fails. To achieve that the check is preceeded by a smp_rmb() which pairs with the smp_wmb() in write_seqlock() in __exit_signal(). That ensures that the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() are visible. The history of the non-leader exec() issue goes back to the early days of posix CPU timers, which stored a pointer to the group leader task in the timer. That obviously fails when a non-leader exec() switches the leader. commit e0a7021 ("posix-cpu-timers: workaround to suppress the problems with mt exec") added a temporary workaround for that in 2010 which survived about 10 years. The fix for the workaround changed the task pointer to a pid pointer, but failed to see the subtle race described above. So the Fixes tag picks that commit, which seems to be halfways accurate. Thanks to Frederic Weissbecker, Oleg Nesterov and Peter Zijlstra for review, feedback and suggestions and to Wongi and Jungwoo for the excellent bug report and analysis! Fixes: 55e8c8e ("posix-cpu-timers: Store a reference to a pid not a task") Reported-by: Wongi Lee <qw3rtyp0@gmail.com> Reported-by: Jungwoo Lee <jwlee2217@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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…ailable commit 2abd528 upstream. Check for a "stale" page fault, i.e. for an invalid and/or obsolete root, after making MMU pages available for the shadow MMU. If reclaiming shadow pages zaps an in-use root, i.e. marks it invalid, then KVM will attempt to map memory into an invalid root. On its own, populating an invalid root is "fine", but because child shadow pages inherit their parent's role, any children created during the map/fetch will be created as invalid pages, thus violating KVM's invariant that invalid pages are never on the list of active MMU pages. Note, the underlying flaw has existed since KVM first started tracking invalid roots in 2008 (commit 2e53d63, "KVM: MMU: ignore zapped root pagetables"), but the true badness only came along in 2020 (Linux 5.9) with the invariant that invalid shadow pages can't be on the list of active pages. Note #2, inheriting role.invalid when creating child shadow pages is also far from ideal; that flaw will be addressed separately. Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com> Fixes: f95eec9 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Don't put invalid SPs back on the list of active pages") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 81905b5 ] A deadlock occurs in the audit subsystem when duplicating executable-related rules. When a file is moved (e.g., via do_renameat2()), the VFS layer locks the parent directory (I_MUTEX_PARENT), which synchronously triggers an fsnotify_move event. If an existing executable audit rule matches the file being moved, the audit subsystem catches this event and calls audit_dupe_exe() to duplicate the watch and update the rule. Then, audit_alloc_mark() would call kern_path_parent() to resolve the path, leading to a blind attempt to acquire the exact same I_MUTEX_PARENT lock already held by the task, resulting in the following recursive locking deadlock: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.12.0-55.27.1.el10_0.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- mv/5099 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0 but task is already holding lock: ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1); lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by mv/5099: #0: ffff888112a9c440 (sb_writers#13) at: do_renameat2+0x34c/0xbc0 #1: ffff888112a9c790 (&type->s_vfs_rename_key#3) at: do_renameat2+0x415/0xbc0 #2: ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1) at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0 #3: ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/5) at: lock_two_directories+0x175/0x2b0 #4: ffffffffb3a1fb10 (&fsnotify_mark_srcu) at: fsnotify+0x454/0x28a0 #5: ffffffffaf886230 (audit_filter_mutex) at: audit_update_watch+0x36/0x11e0 stack backtrace: Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0 print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xbd/0xca validate_chain+0x83a/0xf00 __lock_acquire+0xcac/0x1d20 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x360 down_write_nested+0x9f/0x230 __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0 kern_path_locked+0x26/0x40 audit_alloc_mark+0xfb/0x4f0 audit_dupe_exe+0x6c/0xe0 audit_dupe_rule+0x6c2/0xc00 audit_update_watch+0x4cc/0x11e0 audit_watch_handle_event+0x12c/0x1b0 send_to_group+0x5d0/0x8b0 fsnotify+0x615/0x28a0 fsnotify_move+0x1d8/0x630 vfs_rename+0xdcd/0x1df0 do_renameat2+0x9d4/0xbc0 __x64_sys_renameat+0x192/0x260 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f0491fe8c4e Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 c1 e1 16 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 08 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffc7210bf38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0491fe8c4e RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc7210e6c8 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00005575eb2dae2a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005575eb2dae2a R13: 00007ffc7210e6c8 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00000000ffffff9c </TASK> The aforementioned deadlock can be consistently reproduced by running the script below: audit-dupe-exe-deadlock.sh -------------------------- #!/bin/bash auditctl -D mkdir -p /tmp/foo touch /tmp/file auditctl -a always,exit -F exe=/tmp/file -F path=/tmp/file -S all -k dr mv /tmp/file /tmp/foo/file rm -Rf /tmp/foo This patch fixes the issue by introducing struct audit_watch_ctx to pass the fsnotify event context down to audit_alloc_mark(). By utilizing the already-resolved directory inode provided by the event, we bypass the kern_path_parent() path resolution entirely, safely avoiding the recursive lock. Furthermore, it explicitly allows duplicate fsnotify marks (allow_dups = 1) during the rename update, allowing the new rule's mark to safely coexist with the old rule's mark until the old rule is freed. P.S.: This issue was identified and reproduced during a comprehensive code coverage analysis of the audit subsystem. The full report is available at the link below: https://people.redhat.com/rrobaina/audit-code-coverage-analysis.pdf P.P.S: With the permission of both Ricardo and Nathan, I've squashed a fixup patch from Nathan that addresses a compile time error when CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=n. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 34d99af ("audit: implement audit by executable") Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Robaina <rrobaina@redhat.com> [PM: move link metadata into the msg, apply fix from NC] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c5f0bc9 upstream. The check for private futexes whether the waiter's mm, which is stored in the futex_key and copied into the pi_state, is the same as the owner's mm is not sufficient for exec(). exec() has a gap where the mm check fails to give the correct answer: exec() ... exec_release_mm() futex_exec_release() tsk::futex::exit_state = EXITING; cleanup_robust_list(); 1) tsk::futex::exit_state = OK; ... old_mm = tsk::mm; 2) tsk::mm = ->mm; Between #1 and #2 the check for the mm is wrong as that mm is about to be swapped out and eventually freed. Plug this gap by: 1) Setting tsk::futex::exit_state to FUTEX_STATE_DEAD in futex_exec_release() 2) Setting tsk::futex::exit_state to FUTEX_STATE_OK after the mm has been switched. >>From a futex point of view the task is dead after it finished the robust list cleanup up to the point where it sets the state to OK again. Fixes: 80367ad ("futex: Add basic infrastructure for local task local hash") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Sep 8, 2026
commit d5dc1e6 upstream. A virtio_net_hdr (tun/tap, or AF_PACKET with PACKET_VNET_HDR) can mark an IPv4 or IPv6 fragment as GSO; nothing relates gso_type to frag_off. inet_frag_reasm_prepare()/inet_frag_reasm_finish() keep the first fragment's skb as the head of the reassembled datagram, including its shinfo->gso_size/gso_type/gso_segs, and chain the remaining fragments on frag_list with whatever linear/paged layout they arrived with. After ip_defrag() (ip_local_deliver(), nf_defrag_ipv4, ...) the reassembled skb therefore still claims to be GSO (SKB_GSO_DODGY), and the next software segmentation point - udp_rcv_segment() on local delivery, validate_xmit_skb(), or the ip_finish_output_gso() slow path - hands it to skb_segment(). skb_segment()'s frag_list walk assumes GRO-shaped input and hits one of its BUG_ON()s. Two writes to a tap by an unprivileged user in its own userns are enough: kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4899! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 82 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.2.0-pentest+ #2 RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x20ca/0x48b0 Call Trace: <TASK> __udp_gso_segment+0x29a/0x27d0 udp4_ufo_fragment+0x458/0x6c0 inet_gso_segment+0x429/0x1340 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x233/0x4f0 __skb_gso_segment+0x308/0x660 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x440/0xad0 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0xc7/0x2c0 udp_rcv+0x16ce/0x2260 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x197/0x2d0 ip_local_deliver+0x430/0x690 ip_rcv+0x16f/0x1f0 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x15e/0x1c0 __netif_receive_skb+0x1e/0x110 netif_receive_skb+0xf6/0x5c0 tun_rx_batched.isra.0+0x3ab/0x790 tun_get_user+0x17c3/0x3550 tun_chr_write_iter+0xba/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x646/0x1130 </TASK> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt This runs with BH disabled, so it is a panic rather than an oops. The same is reachable with CAP_NET_RAW in a netns where a defrag point precedes a GSO point, and from a guest whose VMM forwards virtio_net_hdr to a tap. The SKB_GSO_DODGY frag_list checks added by commit 3dcbdb1 ("net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting gso_size mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list") and by commit 9e4b7a9 ("net: gso: fix panic on frag_list with mixed head alloc types") do not cover it: page-backed heads skip them, and kmalloc heads skip them when gso_size == skb_headlen(head), which the sender controls. An skb entering a frag queue is an IP fragment by definition and cannot legitimately carry GSO state: GRO does not merge fragments and the stack segments before it fragments, so only untrusted sources are affected. This has been reachable since commit f43798c ("tun: Allow GSO using virtio_net_hdr"), the first path that let userspace attach GSO metadata to an IP fragment. Reset the GSO fields of every fragment as it is queued, in inet_frag_queue_insert(), which IPv4, IPv6, nf_conntrack_reasm and 6lowpan reassembly share; then neither the head nor the frag_list members of the reassembled skb carry them (the members matter too: the ip_do_fragment()/ip6_fragment() fast paths send them out as they are). The head may remain CHECKSUM_PARTIAL; that is already accepted on receive and resolved by skb_checksum_help() in ip_do_fragment()/ip6_fragment() on forward. Tested on top of net.git (dc4b95b), x86_64: the tap reproducer above, two further IPv4 frag_list geometries that reach BUG_ON(i >= nfrags) and BUG_ON(!list_skb->head_frag), and an IPv6 fragment-header variant (udp6_ufo_fragment()) each panic the unpatched kernel; with this patch all four datagrams are delivered intact and nothing is logged. Fixes: f43798c ("tun: Allow GSO using virtio_net_hdr") Cc: stable@kernel.org Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Xinyang Ge <xinyang@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/937926e509f2acd8e0e66520dc2b30fd6b4d1687.1787839506.git.pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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tcp_v6_connect() resolves the route before the ephemeral source port is bound: fl6->fl6_sport is still 0 and, since commit 65e9024 ("ip: load balance tcp connections to single dst addr and port"), FLOWI_FLAG_ANY_SPORT makes rt6_multipath_hash() substitute a random source port so that connections to a single destination still spread over the available next hops. The resulting dst is cached on the socket by ip6_dst_store() and, unlike tcp_v4_connect() which re-resolves via ip_route_newports(), it is never refreshed with the port that inet6_hash_connect() goes on to bind.
Every later route rebuild for the socket goes through inet6_csk_route_socket(), which starts from a zeroed fl6 and fills in the real inet->inet_sport. So under a port-based multipath hash policy (fib_multipath_hash_policy 1 or 3) the connect-time next hop and the steady-state next hop are hashed from different source ports, and in general are not the same next hop.
The difference stays hidden while the cached dst is valid. IPv6 socket dst entries are revalidated against the FIB node cookie, so when something invalidates the cached dst -- unrelated route churn in the same table, or, since commit 658eb69 ("tcp: rehash onto different local ECMP path on retransmit timeout"), a retransmission timeout -- the socket re-resolves and the established flow silently moves to a different next hop mid-connection.
This is harmless for ordinary unicast multipath, where every next hop reaches the same destination. It breaks configurations where per-next-hop state matters, e.g. an anycast destination whose next hops each NAT to a different backend and keep per-path connection state: the flow arrives at a next hop that holds no state for it and is reset.
Commit 658eb69 ("tcp: rehash onto different local ECMP path on retransmit timeout") addressed the equivalent problem for fib_multipath_hash_policy 0, by keying fl6->mp_hash on sk_txhash and selecting the initial path with it so that the connect-time and steady-state lookups agree. Policies 1 and 3 hash the source port and are still exposed.
Fix those the same way IPv4 does: once inet6_hash_connect() has bound the ephemeral port, install it in fl6, clear FLOWI_FLAG_ANY_SPORT and resolve again, so the next hop cached on the socket is the one every subsequent lookup will select. The source address is already final at this point -- the first lookup selected it and wrote it back into fl6->saddr. The second lookup only runs when the port was not already bound before connect(), and it is a no-op for policy 0, where fl6->mp_hash carries the first lookup's decision.
Fixes: 51ebd31 ("ipv6: add support of equal cost multipath (ECMP)")