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feat: release OAuth-protected hosted MCP access - #24
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Change
Add optional OAuth resource-server support for hosted Claude and ChatGPT MCP access; use an external IdP for login/code+PKCE/token issuance.
Validate RS256/ES256 access tokens against configured JWKS, exact issuer/resource audience, expiry, token type, subject bindings and tool scopes.
Serve protected-resource discovery metadata and proper authentication challenges. Native bearer clients and private publishing remain compatible; OAuth callers cannot publish or impersonate native receivers.
Bump the server/native package and signed Helm chart to
0.3.0-beta.13for immutable artifact publication. No native tool-wire changes or forced host upgrades.Document setup and security boundaries, with isolated signed-token/authorization coverage.
Keep authorization principal IDs private: public peer senders identify the bound native session or explicitly
unbound; require an exact launch/user-bound target instead of inferred parent sessions.Accept the real Authelia signed
scparray as well as standardscopestrings; reject ambiguous mixed formats.Verification
Local candidate gates are recorded in the task evidence. Normal exact-head PR CI must pass before merge; exact-main CI and signed release artifacts must qualify before deployment.
Deployment
User authorized deployment and explicitly accepted the existing singleton inspector's brief restart/readiness gap and loss of ephemeral discovery/pending-message records. Agent sessions, native credentials and private routing must remain intact. Homelab IdP/public activation is separately owned by INFRA-37 and cannot expose the old bearer-only image.
Refs INFRA-36, INFRA-37.