Security fixes are provided for the latest released line of this library.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.3.x | ✅ Yes |
| 0.2.x | ❌ No — please upgrade to 0.3.x |
| < 0.2 | ❌ No |
Use checkLibraryUpdate() or watch GitHub Releases for newer versions.
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
- Go to the repository Security tab → Advisories → Report a vulnerability
or open: https://github.com/solutionforest/AndroidHealthConnect/security/advisories/new - Include:
- Affected package / version(s)
- Description of the issue and impact
- Steps to reproduce (PoC if available)
- Any suggested fix
If you cannot use private advisories, email jayden.chan@solutionforest.net with the subject:
[SECURITY] android-health-connect
Do not attach secrets or production credentials. Redact sensitive patient/health data from any logs.
| Step | Target |
|---|---|
| Initial acknowledgement | Within 3 business days |
| Status update | Within 7 business days of acknowledgement |
| Fix / advisory (if confirmed) | As soon as practical; timing depends on severity and complexity |
If we accept the report, we will coordinate a fix and, when appropriate, publish a GitHub Security Advisory and release notes.
If we decline the report, we will explain why (e.g. not reproducible, out of scope, or accepted risk).
This project is a React Native / Android Health Connect client library. In scope:
- Vulnerabilities in this repository’s TypeScript, Kotlin, Expo config plugin, or CI scripts that could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or unexpected exposure of health data through misuse of this library’s APIs
- Supply-chain issues in direct dependencies that we can reasonably patch or pin
Out of scope (report upstream where applicable):
- Bugs in Android OS, Health Connect, React Native, Expo, or Google Play services themselves
- Issues that require a compromised device, rooted phone, or malicious host app with already-granted Health Connect permissions (unless the library mishandles permissions beyond the host app’s intent)
- Denial-of-service against third-party services
- Social engineering, physical attacks, or speculative reports without a concrete impact
Health data access is gated by Android Health Connect and the host app:
| Layer | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| OS / Health Connect | User consent UI, per-type permissions, on-device store, provider signature checks |
| This library | Thin TurboModule bridge; requests only the permissions the host app asks for; no network upload of health records |
| Host app | Least-privilege permission lists, UI copy, retention, any server sync / encryption beyond HC |
Special read permissions (declare + request only when needed):
| Permission | Purpose |
|---|---|
READ_HEALTH_DATA_HISTORY |
Read older than ~30 days before first grant (check readHealthDataHistory) |
READ_HEALTH_DATA_IN_BACKGROUND |
Read after the app is backgrounded (check readHealthDataInBackground) |
This package does not provide root detection, certificate pinning, or anti-tamper. Those belong in the host app if required.
Use getHealthConnectAvailability() before enabling HC UI — devices without Google Play services (common on mainland China / some HMS phones) cannot use Health Connect.
- Dependency updates via Dependabot (npm, Gradle, GitHub Actions)
- CI security audit job (
yarn npm audit) on GitHub-hosted runners - Scheduled CodeQL analysis on
mainand weekly - Coverage / lint / typecheck / Kotlin unit-test gates on every PR
- Weekly version-check workflow that opens upgrade-reminder issues for maintainers
- Release
.tgzships with an SPDX SBOM and GitHub Sigstore attestations (gh attestation verify <tarball> --repo solutionforest/AndroidHealthConnect)
We appreciate good-faith security research. We will not pursue legal action against researchers who:
- Make a good-faith effort to avoid privacy violations, service disruption, and data destruction
- Report vulnerabilities promptly through the channels above
- Do not exploit the issue beyond what is needed to demonstrate it