ci: pinned runner, job timeouts, SECURITY.md, ci-standard

.github/workflows/security.yml

@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ env:
 jobs:
   lint:
     name: lint
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
+    timeout-minutes: 15
     steps:
       - name: checkout
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1  # v7.0.1
@@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ jobs:
 
   zizmor:
     name: zizmor
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
+    timeout-minutes: 10
     steps:
       - name: checkout
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1  # v7.0.1
@@ -72,7 +74,8 @@ jobs:
 
   secrets:
     name: secrets
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
+    timeout-minutes: 10
     steps:
       - name: checkout
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1  # v7.0.1
@@ -90,7 +93,8 @@ jobs:
 
   images:
     name: list images
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
+    timeout-minutes: 10
     outputs:
       matrix: ${{ steps.list.outputs.images }}
     steps:
@@ -105,7 +109,8 @@ jobs:
   image-scan:
     name: scan ${{ matrix.image }}
     needs: images
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
+    timeout-minutes: 20
     strategy:
       fail-fast: false
       matrix:

SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Security
+
+This is a practice repo: a local Ethereum devnet and its monitoring, not a
+production service. No keys are committed; the validators use the public
+interop keys.
+
+To report a problem (a leaked secret, an unsafe default someone could copy,
+a vulnerable pin), open a private report under the Security tab ("Report a
+vulnerability"), not a public issue. Expect a reply within a week.

docs/ci-standard.md

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+# CI standard
+
+The CI rules this repo follows. The same standard covers my other practice
+repos; this copy holds the parts that apply here: Baseline and Containers.
+Sources: [OpenSSF Scorecard](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md),
+GitHub's *Security hardening for GitHub Actions*, and the
+[zizmor](https://docs.zizmor.sh/audits/) audits.
+
+A rule that is not met is listed under "Gaps" with the reason.
+
+## Baseline
+
+| ID | Rule | Why |
+|---|---|---|
+| B1 | Top-level `permissions: contents: read`; writes granted per job | least token for a compromised step |
+| B2 | Actions pinned to a commit sha; tool images by digest | tags move, shas do not |
+| B3 | Dependabot keeps the pins current | a pin that never moves collects CVEs |
+| B4 | `actions/checkout` with `persist-credentials: false` | no token left in `.git/config` |
+| B5 | actionlint and zizmor on every change | broken expressions, injection, dangerous triggers |
+| B6 | Untrusted values reach `run:` only through `env:` | `${{ }}` in `run:` is shell injection |
+| B7 | yamllint `--strict`, shellcheck | cheap, catches real mistakes |
+| B8 | Secret scan of the tree | a leaked key is found before it spreads |
+| B9 | Hygiene script: English only, no AI attribution in this repo | one script enforces the repo's rule |
+| B10 | Superseded runs are cancelled | stale checks waste minutes |
+| B11 | Weekly scheduled run | pins do not change, advisories do |
+| B12 | Runner image pinned (`ubuntu-24.04`); `timeout-minutes` on every job | no silent image change, no 6 h hung job |
+| B13 | `main` protected: no force-push, no deletion | history cannot be rewritten or lost |
+| B14 | `LICENSE` and `SECURITY.md` | how to report a problem |
+
+## Containers
+
+| ID | Rule | Why |
+|---|---|---|
+| C1 | Every image reference pinned, checked by a script | no floating tag reaches the devnet |
+| C2 | Image CVE scan: CRITICAL, ignore unfixed; accepted findings have a reason and an expiry | the weekly run fails once an expiry passes |
+| C3 | Compose files render; Prometheus rules and rule tests pass | broken config fails before it is started |
+
+## Where each rule is met
+
+| ID | Where |
+|---|---|
+| B1, B2, B4, B6, B10, B11, B12 | `.github/workflows/security.yml` |
+| B3 | `.github/dependabot.yml` (github-actions) |
+| B5, B7, B9 | `security.yml`, `lint` and `zizmor` jobs; B9 is `.github/scripts/hygiene.sh` |
+| B8 | `security.yml`, `secrets` job (trivy, `trivy-secret.yaml`) |
+| B13 | branch protection on `main`: force-push and deletion blocked |
+| B14 | `LICENSE`, `SECURITY.md` |
+| C1 | `.github/scripts/list-images.sh --check` |
+| C2 | `security.yml`, `image-scan` job, `.trivyignore.yaml` |
+| C3 | `.github/scripts/compose-config.sh`, promtool steps in `lint` |
+
+## Gaps
+
+| ID | Gap | Why |
+|---|---|---|
+| B3 | dependabot does not update the client images | they are set through `${VAR}` and the devnet pin file, which dependabot cannot read; upgrades are done by hand with a soak, and C2 flags the ones that matter |
+| B13 | no required checks before a push to `main` | changes go straight to `main`; a failed check turns the commit red but does not block it |
+| C1 | client images are pinned to exact tags, not digests | `list-images.sh --check` rejects floating tags; the CI tool images are pinned by digest |