Skip to content

Security: willackerly/rebar

Security

SECURITY.md

Security

Reporting a vulnerability

Report it privately through GitHub: the repository's Security tab → Report a vulnerability. Please don't open a public issue for it. If the private form isn't available, open an issue asking for a private contact, with no details.

Supported versions

Version Security fixes
4.0.x Yes
3.1.x Yes, for now: fixes for serious vulnerabilities, while projects move to 4.0. The end date will be announced here and in the CHANGELOG
≤ 3.0.x No

Fixes go into the latest release of a supported line. Upgrade with setup-rebar.sh (see UPGRADING.md).

What is scanned, and when

rebar's CLI is Go; govulncheck checks it against the Go vulnerability database:

When What Workflow
Every PR and push to main / release/* Source (cli/): vulnerabilities reachable from rebar's code, in its modules or the standard library ci.yml
Every release tag Each built binary (-mode=binary); any finding stops the release before upload release.yml
Weekly (and on demand) main's source and the latest release's binaries, so new advisories against unchanged code surface vulncheck.yml

Dependabot proposes weekly, grouped updates of the Go modules and of the SHA-pinned GitHub Actions (.github/dependabot.yml).

Go toolchain policy

Release binaries are built with the latest patch of the newest supported Go release (go-version: stable in release.yml), so standard-library fixes ship in the next rebar release. The Go version is printed in the release log and stated in the Release notes. cli/go.mod's go line is only the minimum for building from source; CI builds and tests with it too. Building from source, use a supported Go release — the binary includes your toolchain's standard library and its vulnerabilities.

rebar v3.1.0's binaries were built with go1.25.0 and include standard-library vulnerabilities fixed in later Go releases; upgrade to v3.1.1 or later.

ASK servers (ask-server, ask-mcp-server)

In HTTP mode these are network services that run ask — and through it claude — on the host, with the server user's files and credentials (from 4.0, rebar ask serve and rebar mcp serve; the old names are shims for them). From v3.1.2:

  • They bind 127.0.0.1 by default. Serving other machines needs --host <addr> and an API key (--api-key / ASK_API_KEY); a non-loopback bind without a key is refused unless --insecure-no-auth is given. Use TLS via a reverse proxy for anything beyond a trusted LAN.
  • A loopback-bound server rejects non-loopback Host headers (DNS rebinding); POSTs must be application/json (no cross-site form or text/plain posts) and at most 1 MiB; API keys are compared in constant time.
  • Network input can only ask questions (ask --question): it can never name an agent command script, and repo / role must be a served repo and one of its agents.

Advisory — rebar ≤ v3.1.1. The HTTP mode of ask-server / ask serve and ask-mcp-server listened on all interfaces with no API key by default, and request text could make ask run existing *.sh files outside the agent's commands/ directory or reach agents outside the served repos. Anyone who could reach the port (or a web page in a local browser, via DNS rebinding or a cross-site POST) could run code as the server user. ask-mcp-server --stdio — the mode rebar init configures — opens no port; only the local MCP client that started it can send requests. If you ran either server in HTTP mode, upgrade to v3.1.2 or later.

There aren't any published security advisories