Report it privately through GitHub: the repository's Security tab → Report a vulnerability. Please don't open a public issue for it. If the private form isn't available, open an issue asking for a private contact, with no details.
| Version | Security fixes |
|---|---|
| 4.0.x | Yes |
| 3.1.x | Yes, for now: fixes for serious vulnerabilities, while projects move to 4.0. The end date will be announced here and in the CHANGELOG |
| ≤ 3.0.x | No |
Fixes go into the latest release of a supported line. Upgrade with
setup-rebar.sh (see UPGRADING.md).
rebar's CLI is Go; govulncheck checks it against the Go vulnerability database:
| When | What | Workflow |
|---|---|---|
Every PR and push to main / release/* |
Source (cli/): vulnerabilities reachable from rebar's code, in its modules or the standard library |
ci.yml |
| Every release tag | Each built binary (-mode=binary); any finding stops the release before upload |
release.yml |
| Weekly (and on demand) | main's source and the latest release's binaries, so new advisories against unchanged code surface |
vulncheck.yml |
Dependabot proposes weekly, grouped updates of the Go modules and of the
SHA-pinned GitHub Actions (.github/dependabot.yml).
Release binaries are built with the latest patch of the newest supported Go
release (go-version: stable in release.yml), so standard-library fixes ship
in the next rebar release. The Go version is printed in the release log and
stated in the Release notes. cli/go.mod's go line is only the minimum for
building from source; CI builds and tests with it too. Building from source,
use a supported Go release — the
binary includes your toolchain's standard library and its vulnerabilities.
rebar v3.1.0's binaries were built with go1.25.0 and include standard-library vulnerabilities fixed in later Go releases; upgrade to v3.1.1 or later.
In HTTP mode these are network services that run ask — and through it
claude — on the host, with the server user's files and credentials (from
4.0, rebar ask serve and rebar mcp serve; the old names are shims for
them). From v3.1.2:
- They bind
127.0.0.1by default. Serving other machines needs--host <addr>and an API key (--api-key/ASK_API_KEY); a non-loopback bind without a key is refused unless--insecure-no-authis given. Use TLS via a reverse proxy for anything beyond a trusted LAN. - A loopback-bound server rejects non-loopback
Hostheaders (DNS rebinding); POSTs must beapplication/json(no cross-site form or text/plain posts) and at most 1 MiB; API keys are compared in constant time. - Network input can only ask questions (
ask --question): it can never name an agent command script, andrepo/rolemust be a served repo and one of its agents.
Advisory — rebar ≤ v3.1.1. The HTTP mode of ask-server /
ask serve and ask-mcp-server listened on all interfaces with no API key
by default, and request text could make ask run existing *.sh files
outside the agent's commands/ directory or reach agents outside the served
repos. Anyone who could reach the port (or a web page in a local browser,
via DNS rebinding or a cross-site POST) could run code as the server user.
ask-mcp-server --stdio — the mode rebar init configures — opens no
port; only the local MCP client that started it can send requests. If you
ran either server in HTTP mode, upgrade to v3.1.2 or later.