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sqs: add the admin purge/peek audit line and counters (§3.6) - #1228
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| Check name | Status | Explanation | Resolution |
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Docstring coverage is 68.75% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 16 functions across 6 files. (1 skipped: … | Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold. |
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Check name Status Explanation Linked Issues check Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. Out of Scope Changes check Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. Title check タイトルは、SQSの管理用purge/peek操作に監査ログとカウンタを追加する主な変更を正確かつ簡潔に示しています。変更内容と一致しています。 Description Check Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
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Docstring coverage is 68.75% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 16 functions across 6 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.)
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Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.
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Claude finished @bootjp's task in 4m 18s —— View job Review
Sandbox note: I couldn't run Finding: the "429 still emits an audit line" requirement from the design doc isn't implemented
In I checked whether the HTTP layer covers this instead: This deviation isn't listed in the PR's "Two deviations from the design text" section, so it reads as an oversight rather than a documented, intentional scope cut. Worth either: (a) closing the gap — move/duplicate the audit line so it also fires with Finding: no adapter-level test exercises the observer wiringAll new tests live in This matters because the adapter's outcome labels ( Minor nit:
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In `@docs/design/2026_05_16_implemented_admin_purge_queue.md`:
- Line 496: 統一監査ログのテンプレートと関連説明を、`subject=<principal.Subject>` から
`access_key=<principal.AccessKey>` に更新してください。`AdminPrincipal` の実装済み識別子である
`AccessKey` を使い、同じ節の Line 511 相当の `subject` 表記もすべて `access_key` に揃えてください。
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adapter/sqs.goadapter/sqs_admin.goadapter/sqs_admin_peek.godocs/design/2026_05_16_implemented_admin_purge_queue.mdmain_sqs.gomonitoring/sqs.gomonitoring/sqs_admin_test.go
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| // - ErrAdminSQSValidation — empty / whitespace name | ||
| func (s *SQSServer) AdminPurgeQueue(ctx context.Context, principal AdminPrincipal, name string) (AdminPurgeResult, error) { | ||
| if !principal.Role.canWrite() { | ||
| s.observeAdminPurge(name, adminOutcomeForbidden) |
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In production this increment is unreachable for the common forbidden case because SqsHandler.handlePurge calls principalForWriteOnPurge before dispatching to AdminPurgeQueue; likewise, peek authorization, malformed path/name, and invalid numeric query parameters can return before AdminPeekQueue runs. Consequently the new counters omit several advertised forbidden and validation outcomes, making rejection metrics under-report real admin requests. Instrument these pre-dispatch exits at the HTTP boundary or otherwise pass the observer into the handler.
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| // who-purged-what-when. The generations come from the committed | ||
| // OCC round rather than a pre/post read, so they cannot report a | ||
| // pair of values that never existed as one consistent state. | ||
| slog.InfoContext(ctx, "admin.sqs.purge_queue", |
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When an admin server is constructed with a custom ServerDeps.Logger, or with the production component="admin" child logger, this call writes through the process-wide slog.Default() instead of that configured audit destination. Successful purge records can therefore bypass a dedicated audit sink and lose the attributes attached to the admin logger, unlike every other admin audit entry. Emit this record from handlePurge using its h.logger and the already-forwarded PurgeResult, or inject that logger into the adapter.
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All three findings are correct and fixed in a2947ef. P2 — Route purge audits through the configured admin logger. Confirmed: I kept the emission in the adapter rather than moving it to P2 — Audit purge-in-progress failures before returning. Confirmed. The structural fix is that the audit and the counter now go out together through one P2 — Count rejections that stop in the HTTP handler. Confirmed, and the audit matches yours: On how it gets the counters — I took them from the WithAdminQueueObserver(adminQueueObserverFrom(deps.Queues))
The thing that matters about that choice, given this PR's history: the test asserts the production bridge satisfies the interface, through the interface, not by calling the concrete method. A handler-side test with a stub passes regardless of whether Verification
Unrelated CI note: the full |
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| principal, ok := h.principalForWriteOnPurge(w, r) | ||
| if !ok { | ||
| h.observePurgeRejection(name, adminQueueOutcomeForbidden) | ||
| return |
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When the live RoleStore rejects a purge, this increment is followed immediately by a return, so AdminPurgeQueue and its sole admin.sqs.purge_queue emitter, recordAdminPurge, never run. The generic admin_audit record lacks the explicit purge outcome, leaving unauthorized attempts absent from the operation-specific audit even though the counter reports forbidden. Fresh evidence after the claimed audit fix is this newly added metric-only handler exit; emit an equivalent record through the configured handler logger or share an audit helper across both layers.
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| principal, ok := h.principalForReadSensitive(w, r) | ||
| if !ok { | ||
| h.observePeekRejection(name, adminQueueOutcomeForbidden) | ||
| return |
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If SqsHandler is invoked without a principal—for example after an alternate mount or middleware wiring regression—principalForReadSensitive writes a 500 internal response, but this unconditional !ok branch increments the forbidden outcome; the purge branch has the same mismatch. This hides the wiring fault from the internal_error series and falsely reports an authorization rejection, so the helper needs to return the failure classification rather than only a boolean.
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Second round: all three fixed in 2c66a84. All three are gaps in my own round-1 fix rather than new code, and the "fresh evidence after the claimed fix" framing on two of them is fair — I added observers at the handler exits I had enumerated and did not check whether those were all the exits. P2 — Count validation failures rejected during route parsing. Confirmed: The outcome is now recorded at the route rejection, attributed by method on a messages route — DELETE is a purge attempt and GET a peek attempt whatever else is wrong with the path. Two deliberate details: queue CRUD paths are attributed to neither counter, because they have no §3.6 series, and the queue label is left empty rather than parsed out of a path the validator just refused — a guessed label would put junk in the metric's cardinality. P2 — Audit purge refusals handled before the adapter. Confirmed. The counter fired and
P3 — Classify missing-principal failures as internal errors. Confirmed, on both branches. The gates now return a classified One consequence worth noting: Verification
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🟡 Changes recommended
Leader-churn outcomes and pre-dispatch purge audit records are currently misclassified or incomplete.
4 open findings
What changed in this PR
Adds SQS admin purge auditing and bounded Prometheus outcome counters.
Changes:
- Adds purge/peek outcome metrics with cardinality controls.
- Wires observers through the adapter and admin handler.
- Adds audit, metrics, and production-wiring tests.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
monitoring/sqs.go |
Defines admin counters and outcome normalization. |
monitoring/sqs_admin_test.go |
Tests counter behavior and bounds. |
main_sqs.go |
Wires metrics and audit logger. |
main_sqs_admin_observer_test.go |
Tests production observer bridging. |
main_admin.go |
Exposes the adapter observer. |
internal/admin/sqs_handler.go |
Records pre-dispatch outcomes and audits. |
internal/admin/sqs_handler_metrics_test.go |
Tests handler metrics and auditing. |
internal/admin/server.go |
Installs the handler observer. |
docs/design/2026_05_16_implemented_admin_purge_queue.md |
Marks observability as implemented. |
adapter/sqs.go |
Adds observer and audit logger options. |
adapter/sqs_admin.go |
Records purge outcomes and audit entries. |
adapter/sqs_admin_peek.go |
Records peek outcomes. |
adapter/sqs_admin_audit_test.go |
Tests purge audit logging. |
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| if h.admin == nil { | ||
| return | ||
| } | ||
| if !strings.Contains(escaped, "/"+sqsSubResourceMessages) { |
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The newly added substring check misclassifies malformed queue CRUD paths whose queue name begins with messages as peek or purge attempts. For example, DELETE /admin/api/v1/sqs/queues/messages%2Fbad fails segment validation, but this condition matches /messages and increments the purge validation counter even though the request targets the queue resource; the test suite explicitly expects malformed queue paths to be attributed to neither operation. Inspect the raw segment position rather than searching the entire escaped path.
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| m.mu.Lock() | ||
| defer m.mu.Unlock() | ||
| return admitCounterQueueLocked(queue, m.trackedAdminCounterQueues) |
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Both admin CounterVecs feed this single admission map, so activity in one metric can exhaust the other's queue-label budget. For example, a read-only caller can peek 512 distinct nonexistent names, each of which records not_found and is admitted here; the next purge of a previously unseen real queue is then labeled queue="_other" even though the purge counter has no named queue series. Use separate purge and peek admission maps so each metric family retains its own bounded per-queue visibility.
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| } | ||
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| func (m *SQSMetrics) admitForAdminCounterBudget(queue string) string { | ||
| if queue == "" { |
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When either exported admin entrypoint receives a whitespace-only name (both AdminPurgeQueue and AdminPeekQueue explicitly reject values such as " "), it records the original string, but this check only collapses an exactly empty name. Consequently whitespace variants create named metric series and consume the finite admission budget; enough malformed direct or forwarded calls can force subsequent real queues into queue="_other". Treat strings.TrimSpace(queue) == "" like the empty validation case, or pass an empty label from those rejection paths.
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Fixed in 39c13e5. Empty and whitespace-only queue names now collapse to _other before queue-budget admission, and the regression test covers both purge and peek while asserting that blank labels do not consume the cardinality map.
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Updated onto the latest main and resolved the admin authorization conflict while preserving the shared JWT/live-role policy. Fixed the current queue-label finding by collapsing whitespace-only names to |
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The current HEAD is 39c13e5. The code review receipt reports no major issues, but the security summary reports has_any_findings=true and has_unresolved_findings=null while saying finding details are still loading. No security finding details or security completion receipt are visible in issue comments, review submissions, or current-HEAD inline roots. Please re-evaluate this exact HEAD and publish any actionable security findings or an explicit no-findings receipt. No code or HEAD changes have been made for this request. @codex security review |
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| m.mu.Lock() | ||
| defer m.mu.Unlock() | ||
| return admitCounterQueueLocked(queue, m.trackedAdminCounterQueues) |
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When the optional admin listener is reachable by a read-only admin, GET .../{name}/messages accepts an almost-1 MiB queue segment because routing and AdminPeekQueue do not enforce the existing 80-byte queue-name limit. The new observer retains the first 512 distinct names in trackedAdminCounterQueues and Prometheus labels for the process lifetime, allowing roughly 512 MiB of attacker text plus metric overhead to degrade or OOM the node. Validate names before observing and collapse invalid names to _other.
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Fixed in signed commit 18be766. Regression failed before the fix on an 81-byte retained map key. Queue labels are now checked for the existing 80-byte limit and syntax before admission, invalid labels collapse to _other in both metrics without consuming budget, and valid labels are copied to avoid retaining a larger URL backing string. Oversized (including almost-1-MiB), invalid-character, whitespace, and exact standard/FIFO boundary tests pass under race. HTTP/authorization semantics are unchanged.
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Fixed the P2 security finding in signed commit 18be766, with a failing regression before the fix. Admin metrics now reject oversized or syntactically invalid queue labels before admission and aggregate them into _other without consuming queue budget. Valid standard/FIFO names at the exact 80-byte boundary remain supported, and copied labels cannot retain oversized request URL backing storage. Audited both observers and all callers; no HTTP, authorization, error, or queue data-path behavior changes. Full monitoring/admin race suites, targeted adapter/root wiring race suites, and v2.9.0 monitoring lint pass. PR evidence updated; remote SHA confirmed. Please review this final HEAD. @codex review |
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Final signed HEAD is d56ef75. The security retention fix is unchanged; the follow-up addresses the four CI lint diagnostics in this PR only: a constant for the admin outcome label and NewRequestWithContext in three new handler tests. No common backup/GC fixture changes were made. Full monitoring/admin race suites pass again, and v2.9.0 lint with the current main configuration reports 0 issues for both packages. Please review this final pushed HEAD, including security. @codex review |
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| // all, leaving only the generic HTTP audit middleware's status | ||
| // and path -- which cannot say WHY it was refused, and so cannot | ||
| // answer the question the §3.6 signal exists for. | ||
| s.recordAdminPurge(ctx, principal, name, adminPurgeOutcomeForError(err)) |
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For a syntactically invalid but nonblank name such as orders.bad, the route parser accepts the segment and this call receives the storage-layer nonexistent-queue error, so the new purge audit/counter records not_found; AdminPeekQueue similarly records not_found when its metadata lookup returns exists=false. Such names can never identify an SQS queue and §3.6 assigns malformed names to validation, so operator URL-construction errors are currently mixed with requests for valid queues that were deleted or do not exist. Run the existing queue-name validator before dispatching either operation and record validation for failures.
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Fixed in signed commit c3a3aaf, with failing purge and peek regressions first. Both entrypoints now use the existing queue-name validator before storage dispatch and return/record validation for malformed names; padded whitespace is rejected rather than accepted through the trimming validator. Tests pin both sentinel errors, both observer outcomes, and the purge audit. Audited all callers through sqsQueuesBridge and translateAdminQueuesError to the existing structured HTTP 400 response. Targeted race suites and CI-equivalent v2.14.0 lint pass.
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Final signed HEAD: c3a3aaf. Addressed the new P2 with failing regressions before the fix: both purge and peek now validate names before storage dispatch and consistently return/observe validation for malformed names, including the purge audit. Audited every production caller through the root bridge and HTTP error translation; valid-name behavior, authorization, and leader-check ordering are preserved. Also converted all remaining new test requests to explicit contexts. CI-equivalent Go 1.27.1 / lint v2.14.0 on monitoring/admin/adapter reports 0 issues with truncation disabled; adapter and caller race suites pass. The security memory-retention fix remains in place. No common backup/GC fixture edits. Please review the final pushed HEAD. @codex review |
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Design: docs/design/2026_05_16_implemented_admin_purge_queue.md
What
admin.sqs.purge_queueaudit record for every purge outcome._otherbefore retaining them. Labels must satisfy the existing queue-name syntax and 80-byte limit, including the.fifosuffix. Valid labels are copied so a short substring cannot retain a much larger request URL.validationrather thannot_foundin returned errors, counters, and purge audits.Behavior and Risk
Valid queue operations and authorization policy are unchanged. Malformed admin purge/peek names now return the existing validation sentinel (HTTP 400 through the bridge) rather than a nonexistent-queue error (404). The changes add observability to low-frequency admin operations and keep metric labels within closed outcome sets and a bounded queue-name budget.
The purge generation values come from the committed OCC round. Handler-side and adapter-side audit records use the same fields:
access_key,role,queue, andoutcome; successful purges also include the committed generation pair.The P2 security finding was real, not merely an old summary: read-only admin requests could retain oversized queue names in the new metrics. The fix bounds individual label bytes as well as label cardinality. Invalid names do not consume budget or create named Prometheus series. Normal and FIFO names at the exact 80-byte boundary retain their labels.
Validation
TestSQSAdminCountersRejectInvalidQueueLabelsfailed because an 81-byte name remained in the admission map.TestAdminQueueInvalidNamesRecordValidationfailed for both purge and peek, withErrAdminSQSNotFoundinstead ofErrAdminSQSValidation. After fix, it verifies the sentinel, both observed outcomes, and the purge audit outcome.go test -race -p 1 -parallel 2 ./monitoring ./internal/admin -count=1passed after the final lint correction (2.825s and 2.672s).git diff --check: passed.sqsQueuesBridge.AdminPurgeQueue/AdminPeekQueue,translateAdminQueuesError, and handler dispatch/error translation. All production callers already translate the validation sentinel to the existing structured 400 response; none assumes malformed names are not-found or retries them. No new package imports or cycles beyond the standard-library regular expression implementation.GOMAXPROCS=4,-p 1 -parallel 2.Earlier validation also passed targeted normal/race suites for monitoring, admin, and adapter and
go vet ./monitoring ./internal/admin ./adapter. The full adapter package exceeded its 600-second default local timeout; full Linux CI remains the final whole-repository gate.Self-Review
Final Acceptance
c3a3aafccdf233a948eae76ae51a5a46b038d933; pushed SHA matches remote; signed bootjp contact@bootjp.me commits verified by GitHub.